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ABSTRACT
Foreclosures have increased in the US since the 1970’s. The increase in
foreclosures has caused concern among some researchers on their affect on crime.
Social disorganization theory measures the effect various structural characteristics,
such as poverty, residential instability/mobility, racial/ethnic heterogeneity, and family
disruption have on crime. This study, though, is concerned with residential
instability/mobility, or the presence of foreclosed houses in neighborhoods. Although
most studies using this theory look at low-income neighborhoods, the following research
looks at middle- and upper-income neighborhoods, which have been greatly affected by
foreclosures. The theory also argues that the level of collective efficacy can reduce
crime even in neighborhoods that are otherwise considered to be socially disorganized.
Using ArcGIS mapping, the following research investigated 30 neighborhoods in
Orange County, Florida that have high foreclosures in neighborhoods for the years of
2005-2009. Canvasses were conducted in all 30 neighborhoods to measure the level of
collective efficacy within the neighborhoods to help explain the presence of high or low
residential burglary. Thirteen neighborhoods stood out as noteworthy because they fell
at the far end of the spectrum – high foreclosures and high crime, and high foreclosures
and low crime. Some of the neighborhoods with high residential burglary did have
strong indicators of low collective efficacy, while neighborhoods with low residential
burglary had indicators of high collective efficacy. The majority of the indicators found in
this research support previous research on various indicators of collective efficacy.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Since the 1970’s, foreclosure levels in the United States have been on the rise
(Elmer and Seelig 1998; Immergluck and Smith 2006). In fact, Edmiston and Zalneraitis
(2007) note that since 2006 residential foreclosures in the United States have been
increasing rapidly. By mid-2007, the number of mortgages in some stage of the
foreclosure process was at an all-time high, which suggested that the foreclosure
problem in the U.S. is likely to get “worse before it gets better” (Edmiston and Zalneraitis
2007:115). Of particular concern are the increasing foreclosures on singly-family
homes, which are thought to be a serious threat to the stability and well-being of
neighborhoods and communities (Immergluck and Smith 2006a). Housing markets in
the Northeast, as well as states such as California and Florida, for example, have been
experiencing decreasing rates of appreciation since 2006. This trend has increased
national awareness of the foreclosure crisis. In effect, these areas of the U.S. have
experienced dramatic increases in local foreclosure rates, which have increased the
national foreclosure levels to record highs (Immergluck 2008).
In response to the rapid increase in foreclosures, the federal government has
taken steps to alleviate homeowners and mortgage lenders from financial pressures.
First, in March 2009 a $75 billion federal initiative to curtail foreclosures was
implemented by the government. It was estimated that as many as 9 million
homeowners would be able to obtain more affordable mortgages, working to make their
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mortgage payments no more than thirty-one percent of their income (Wolf and Armour
2009). More recently, the government has taken even more drastic steps to help
certain states that have been hit the hardest with foreclosures. The Obama
Administration approved a $1.5 billion funding plan for foreclosure-prevention in
February 2010. The states that received these extra funds were Arizona, California,
Florida, Michigan, and Nevada. The “Hardest Hit Fund” caters to those who are
unemployed and/or “underwater” homeowners, where the original federal initiative did
not cover (Office of the Press Secretary 2010). Even more, in March 2010 the Obama
Administration declared a second targeted plan for additional states that are in dire
need of assistance because of high rates of concentrated unemployment – North
Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, and South Carolina (Press Room 2010). Thus,
with the government stepping in to assist homeowners all over the country who are
losing, or facing the loss of their homes, it is evident that the foreclosure crisis has
reached an all time high.
Additionally, a major concern that has emerged due to increased foreclosures is
the impact they have on crime in these vulnerable neighborhoods. Despite this public
concern, there has been very little research that directly measures the impact that
foreclosed homes have on neighborhood crime. In fact, I could locate only two studies
and a special issue that address this topic. One study examined the link between
abandoned buildings and crime (Spelman 1993), while another study explores the effect
that foreclosures have on crime (Immergluck and Smith 2006b). Obviously, with the
rapid increase in foreclosures in the past several years, it seems vital for researchers to
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further gain an understanding of the link between foreclosures and crime. The special
issue published in 2008 by Geography & Public Safety is a quarterly bulletin of applied
geography for the study of crime and public safety. The seven articles published in the
special issue focus on the public concern that foreclosures have on crime. Most of the
articles in the special issue made recommendations for policy; unfortunately, few
presented actual research findings.
To date, RealtyTrac®, which offers information for pre-foreclosures, foreclosure
auctions, bank owned foreclosures, for sale by owner homes, and resale MLS in all of
the states in the U.S., reports that the national foreclosure filings reached 2.8 million in
2009. In fact, 2.9 million properties went into foreclosure in 2010, an increase from the
year before (RealtyTrac®). Even more striking, the Center for Responsible Lending
(2010a) projected that between 2009-2012 foreclosures nationwide will reach 9 million.
Nationally, Florida has one of the largest numbers of foreclosures. The Center for
Responsible Lending reported that the projected foreclosures for Florida over the next
four years were almost 1.5 million (2009). In fact, the highest number of total
foreclosures (default, auction, and bank-owned) in Florida was in September, 2009,
when foreclosures reached just over one million (RealtyTrac®). With that said, Florida
is of particular concern when examining the impact of foreclosures in the United States.
When Florida is broken down into foreclosures by county, Orange County has ranked
within the top four counties in the last four years for highest foreclosures. Even more,
Orange County foreclosures significantly increased between 2008 and 2009, with a total
of 26,131 foreclosures in 2008, and 31,308 foreclosures in 2009 (Nolz 2010).
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According to Orange County Clerk of Courts, the highest peak in foreclosures was in
2009, with a drastic decrease in 2010 (17,921 foreclosures) and 2011 (10,320
foreclosures) (Nolz 2012).
The foreclosure process differs by state, as well as by county. First, states differ
in the foreclosure procedure depending on whether they are judicial or non-judicial
foreclosures. Most states only allow the judicial process of foreclosure – the foreclosure
is ordered by the court and the court “supervises the sale and disbursement of the
proceeds” (p.157). In contrast, a non-judicial foreclosure procedure is not conducted
and overseen by the courts, and thus they are typically less time-consuming and costly
than a judicial foreclosure (Clauretie 1987). With that said, the state of Florida is a
judicial state and therefore foreclosures are court ordered and handled by the court
system. Moreover, Orange County, Florida’s foreclosures process differs than other
counties in the state.
According to the Orange County Board of County Commissioners (2008), the first
step of the foreclosure process is a default period that can take anywhere from two to
six months. Then, the foreclosure process moves on to the court systems where a
lawsuit/Lis Pendens is filed, which takes approximately 30 days. After the Lis Pendens
is filed, the parties, or homeowners are served, and this can take between one to six
months. Often, the homeowners will voluntarily move out of the home, but in some
instances, the court will order an eviction to remove the tenants. Just as important,
because of the high volume of foreclosures and the backlog of foreclosures, this stage
of the foreclosure process mostly likely will take six months, if not more. Next, the
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foreclosure is back in the court’s hands where a final judgment is made, and followed by
the sale of the foreclosed home or property. Lastly, the home or property becomes
REO, or real-estate owned, and is put back on the market for resale. These last three
stages of the foreclosure process take 30 to 60 days. Thus, the foreclosure process for
Orange County, Florida can take anywhere from five months to around a year and a half
to finalize.
With the drastic increase in foreclosures, it seems pertinent to investigate the
impact foreclosures have on various social problems, specifically crime. Thus, by
building on social disorganization theory (Shaw and McKay 1942), I am interested in
exploring the relationship between foreclosures, an indicator of social disorganization,
and crime in Orange County, Florida. Although social disorganization theory has been
used primarily to explain the relationship between disorganized areas and crime using
characteristics such as poverty, racial and ethnic heterogeneity, and female headedhouseholds, my research attempts to fill the gap on another indicator of disorganization
and measure of residential instability and mobility – foreclosures. Foreclosures can
also indicate that a neighborhood is disorganized, and thus likely to demonstrate a
greater level of crime and delinquency.
In the chapters that follow, I present an overview of the social disorganization
approach to crime. Next, I discuss the existing research on foreclosures, followed by
existing, but minimal, research on the relationship between foreclosures and crime.
Subsequently, I discuss the methodology used to examine social disorganization and
foreclosures, which occurred in two stages – geographical mapping and unobtrusive,
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field observations of neighborhoods. I then end with a presentation of the findings, as
well as a discussion of my research.
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CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

Those who study crime and deviance in society employ an array of theories to
help explain and understand criminal and deviant behavior. In fact, these theories focus
on answering the question of why legal and social norms are violated. To answer this
question, theories focus on two interconnected parts; first, “why are there variations in
group rates of crime and deviance”, and second, “why are some individuals more likely
than others to commit criminal and deviant acts” (Akers and Sellers 2009:3). The first
theoretical question seeks to understand differences in proportion and location of
criminal and deviant behavior in a variety of groups and societies, which focuses on
group and societal patterns. For instance, comparing crime rates of various states or
countries, or comparing crime rates by different race/ethnicities, genders, and age
intervals. The second theoretical question focuses on explaining variations among
individuals who refrain from or commit criminal acts. For example, why are some
people more likely to not obey the law than others, and what is the process by which
some people either choose to violate or obey the law? This approach to crime and
deviance is interested in the individual differences of crime and deviance (Akers and
Sellers 2009).
Other theories focus on ecological factors of delinquency and crime that occur at
the neighborhood level. These theories are concerned with specific neighborhood
structural characteristics and how they lead to increased levels of crime and disorder.
More specifically, these theories focus on how the presence or absence of guardians,
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as well as physical and social decay, either increase or decrease criminal behavior. For
instance, routine activities theory (Cohen and Felson 1979), broken windows theory
(Wilson and Kelling 1982), and social disorganization theory (Shaw and McKay 1943,
1969) help to understand and explain criminal behavior.
To begin with, routine activities theory (Cohen and Felson 1979) explains that
criminal acts depend on three, co-occurring characteristics of time and space: motivated
offenders, suitable targets, and lack of capable guardians. According to this theory,
criminal acts occur if all three of these characteristics transpire at the same time.
However, if there are no motivated offenders, no suitable targets, and there is a
presence of capable guardians, routine activities theory states that crime will not occur.
It is important to point out that a capable guardian is not only the police (e.g., official
role), but also people in everyday life – family, friends, neighbors, and even oneself
(e.g., unofficial role) (Jacobs 1961). By and large, routine activities theory is concerned
with the ecological distribution of crime (i.e., the criminal ecosystem), such as its
motivated offenders, victims, and criminal opportunities (Felson 2006).
Similarly, James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling’s (1982) broken windows
theory was developed to understand and explore urban decline and aide policy in New
Jersey. A book published, Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing
Crime in Our Communities (Kelling and Coles 1996), discussed how minor forms of
public disorder lead to serious crime. The authors concluded that disorder and crime
lead to a downward spiral of urban decay. According to this theory, disorder impedes
the manners in which communities typically maintain social control (c.f. Skogan 1992).

8

Thus, criminals and delinquents see that the members in the community cannot
collectively control the activities that are occurring in their community and disorder
arises. Just as important, if neighborhoods tolerate or cannot effectively deter these
forms of disorder, crime and other forms of disorder will continue. Visual signs of
disorder, such as broken windows, litter, and graffiti indicate that an area lacks social
control, and therefore crime and delinquency will persist and escalate in that area
because criminals are drawn to these disorganized areas (Wilson and Kelling 1982;
Kelling and Coles 1996).
All in all, routine activities theory (Cohen and Felson 1979) and broken windows
theory (Wilson and Kelling 1982) are interested in the ecological aspect of crime, as well
as some sort of social control agent, whether it is an individual (e.g., capable guardian)
or a community (e.g., one’s neighbors). Although both of these theories can be, and
have been, widely used to study deviance and crime in neighborhoods, the theory of
social disorganization (Shaw and McKay 1943, 1969) is the most relevant theory to use
in the following study concerning foreclosures and crime. For instance, one of the
ecological characteristics that social disorganization theory states increases crime is
residential instability or mobility. With that said, with the recent increase in foreclosures,
or neighbors frequently moving in and out of neighborhoods and often leaving houses
empty, a new interesting indicator of social disorganization in neighborhoods needs to
be explored. Even more, social disorganization theory asserts that social change
increases disorganization in neighborhoods. With the recent economic crisis, the U.S.
has undoubtedly experienced social change. Thus, social disorganization theory,
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extending the concept of residential mobility/instability to include foreclosures, could
offer a deeper understanding into the current state of our neighborhoods and economy
as a whole. Therefore, a discussion of social disorganization is presented next.

Social Disorganization Theory
Two sociologists from the University of Chicago and the Institute for Juvenile
Research in Chicago, Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay, developed social
disorganization theory from studies of urban crime and delinquency (1942, 1969). The
authors found a systematic pattern of residential location of youths who had been sent
to juvenile court. Specifically, Shaw and McKay found that rates of delinquency were
significantly higher in inner city, lower class neighborhoods compared to more affluent
neighborhoods that reside on the outer limits of the area. In fact, social disorganization
borrowed much of its foundation from Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess’ (1924)
concept of human and urban ecology. This model presumed that residential mobility
was influenced by a variation in the amount of assimilation of populations into urban
areas for occupational reasons. Their research focused on immigrants migrating and
taking on primarily low-earning jobs, which would tend to place them in neighborhoods
that were economically deprived. However, their argument was that as time passed,
they would increase in their occupational level which would lead to residential mobility
into more desirable neighborhoods.
Contrary to much of the research on crime around the time of social
disorganization theory’s naissance, Shaw and McKay (1942) argued that the residents
in these socially disorganized areas were not psychologically or biologically abnormal,
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but instead that deviance and crime is a normal response committed by normal people
to abnormal social conditions. Moreover, they emphasized that social changes, such as
urbanization, industrialization, and so on, cause social disorganization because there is
a decrease in social control. According to Akers and Sellers (2009), the “notion of
social disorganization as the breakdown of social control at the local or neighborhood
level has remained at the center of the theory” (p. 178). A central theme to social
disorganization is that it is not only characteristics of the residents who live in the
neighborhood that shape crime rates, but it is also the neighborhood ecological
conditions, which they argue are more influential on crime (Shaw and McKay 1942).
Characteristics of disadvantaged neighborhoods are high levels of poverty, racial and
ethnic heterogeneity, residential mobility or instability, and family disruption, most often
measured by female-headed households (Shaw and McKay 1942; Sampson and
Groves 1989; Bursik and Grasmick 1993a, 1993b; Sampson 1997).
The theory of social disorganization helps explain and understand how a
community is unable to recognize common goals and “solve chronic problems” (Kubrin
and Weitzer 2003) by measuring structural factors that influence a breakdown within the
community. Research on social disorganization often branches into two types of
neighborhood social processes - informal and formal networks of association and
informal social control, which increases when neighborhood’s collective efficacy
increases (Sampson, Morenoff, and Gannon-Rowley 2002; Leventhal and Brooks-Gunn
2003). In the first conceptual explanation of neighboring process, it is argued that social
networks, such as informal and formal associations, shape neighborhood life. These
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associations affect a neighborhood’s informal social control, social support, and the
resources available. The second framework, which will be discussed in more detail
below, is interested in the collective efficacy, or the linkage of social control through
social ties and cohesion (Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001) within
neighborhoods.
After the initial work of Shaw and McKay (1942) other researchers have further
developed the theory of social disorganization by adapting the idea of neighborhood
social control (Sampson 1987; Sampson and Groves 1989; Bursik and Grasmick
1993a) from systemic theory of urban communities (Kasarda and Janowitz 1974). This
more developed approach to the theory of social disorganization emphasized the
importance of both informal and formal networks and informal social control among
neighborhoods to reduce crime and delinquency. The systemic approach’s viewpoint of
local communities is that they are a complex system of kinship and friendship networks,
as well as informal and formal ties formed through socialization and withheld within
family life (see also Sampson 1988). It is through these informal and formal networks
that tie neighborhood residents together (Bursik and Grasmick 1993a). Even more, the
systemic approach also emphasizes that residential stability exemplifies a community’s
social organization (Kasarda and Janowitz 1974). Having local ties and attachment are
imperative in the formation and support of social networks and control, and residential
instability undermines the ability for communities to form these vital relationships
(Sampson 1988).
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From the systemic approach to social disorganization, researchers distinguish
between three levels of relationships in systemic social control (Bursik and Grasmick
1993a). The level of neighborhood systemic control relies on private, parochial, and
public dimensions of social order. The private system of social order is based on
intimate, informal groups, such as the family. The next level of systemic social control is
the parochial system, which is made up of informal networks of acquaintances and
friends. According to Bursik and Grasmick (1993a), the parochial system of social
control “represents the effects of the broader local interpersonal networks and the
interlocking of local institutions” (p. 17). In fact, this system of control is highly effective
when members have mutual acceptance among friends and acquaintances in the
community. The parochial network system acts as supervision and surveillance for the
community, as long as the residents have local ties and attachment, as pointed out by
Sampson (1988). Even more, parochial control can emerge from participation in local
institutions, with relationships primarily consisting of secondary groups with weak ties.
Bursik and Grasmick (1993a) go on to say that control at the parochial level is
accomplished through “the effects of the broader local interpersonal networks and the
interlocking of local institutions such as store, schools, churches, and voluntary
organizations” (p. 17). Lastly, the public system of control refers to the relationship
between the community and agencies that provide goods and services outside of that
community (Bursik and Grasmick 1993a). The private and parochial systems are
systems of social order that illustrate a community’s social networks that become
apparent among community residents as they interrelate in their everyday lives (Hunter
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1985). Undoubtedly, these two systems are most important to social disorganization
and the concept of collective efficacy, which is discussed next.
The second conceptual framework from the systemic approach of social
disorganization, informal social control through social ties, or collective efficacy as it is
described in the literature, is frequently used to study social disorganization. Supporters
of this approach argue that while social networks are important and necessary, they are
not necessarily sufficient for informal control of crime and delinquency. Sampson,
Raudenbush, and Earls (1997) argue that mutual trust and expectations of residents in
a neighborhood greatly affects the willingness of residents to intervene in acts of crime
and delinquency. Informal social control, according to Sampson and colleagues (1997),
is the willingness of residents to intervene in various acts of crime and delinquency.
Even more, the shared norms and values, as well as mutual trust among neighbors, is
used to assess social cohesion within communities. The link between mutual trust and
the willingness of residents to intervene for the good of the community is what they coin
collective efficacy. Thus, the more collective efficacy among neighbors, the more likely
they are to take on the role of informal social control agents. Sampson (1997) analyzed
crime in Chicago and found that less collective efficacy in neighborhoods increased
rates of violence. Just as important, this research found that the effects of residential
instability and concentrated disadvantage on violence were significantly reduced when
collective efficacy was present in neighborhoods. Sampson and colleagues (Sampson
et al. 1997; Morenoff et al. 2001) have shown that collective efficacy does in fact
prevent violence, property crime, and delinquency.
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Neighborhood attachment has frequently been used to measure a
neighborhood’s level of collective efficacy. Obviously, if there is more neighborhood
attachment, crime and disorder would decrease, according to social disorganization
theory and collective efficacy. In fact, Woldoff (2002) measured neighborhood
attachment using attitudinal and behavioral attachment to analyze the collective efficacy
of neighborhoods and found very interesting results. For example, she found that
residents who were more educated were less sentimentally attached to their
neighborhood, and that long-time residents and Blacks were more sentimentally
attached. However, Woldoff concluded that victimization and perception of crime had
no affect on sentimental attachment to one’s neighborhood. In all, it appears that order
in the physical and social environment is more important than crime factors in
determining resident’s sentimental attachment. In evaluating neighborhood satisfaction,
the author found that even though more educated people were less sentimental toward
their neighborhood, they were actually more satisfied with their neighborhood. Also
contrary to sentimental attachment findings, Blacks had lower neighborhood
satisfaction. Thus, Blacks may live in areas that they are not necessarily satisfied to
live, but nonetheless they have a strong sentimental tie to their neighborhood. Once
again, one’s satisfaction with his/her neighborhood was not significantly affected by
victimization or perception of crime (Woldoff 2002).
Researchers have also been interested in how behavioral attachment is affected
by victimization and crime in one’s neighborhood. Woldoff (2002) measured this by
analyzing routine neighboring (e.g., saying “hi”, knowing neighbor by name, etc.) and
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social neighboring (e.g., eating dinner with neighbor, more communication on a regular
basis with neighbor). Routine neighboring was most commonly performed by Blacks
compared to other populations. Also, neighborhoods with social disorder also had a
decrease in routine neighboring. The other behavioral measurement, social
neighboring, found that Blacks and women socialize and had more intimate interactions
with their neighbors, while older people were less likely to socialize. Additionally, while
physical disorder had no affect on social neighboring, social disorder was found to
decreased. Perhaps neighbors were hesitant on establishing a close friendship when
they were leery about the residents who live in the neighborhood. Once again,
victimization or perception of crime did not influence social neighboring (Woldoff 2002).
Other research has looked at the physical features of neighborhoods to measure
social ties, or collective efficacy, among residents (Newman 1972; Brower, Dockett, and
Taylor 1983; Taylor 1984). Much of the research looks at the social ties among
residents, either intimates or acquaintances, in reference to their likelihood to intervene
if crime is witnessed in the neighborhood. However, according to the systemic
approach, the parochial level of control also includes ties to local institutions (e.g.,
schools, churches, and stores) and the community as a whole (Bursik and Grasmick
1993a). With that said, the physical residential environment can impact social ties
among residents in a neighborhood (Taylor 1984). For instance, researchers found that
the presence of a fence around a home implied to the observers that the homeowners
would react toward any intruders (Brower et al. 1983), thus reducing crime because
neighbors are taking actions, as a community, to reduce crime.
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The physical environment of a neighborhood and its surroundings can either
increase or decrease perception of fear among residents, and the more secure
residents feel in their neighborhood, the more likely they are to be outside and more
likely to come into contact with other residents (Newman 1972). Naturally, coming into
contact with other residents, making friendships or acquaintanceships, increases social
ties and mutual trust among residents of a neighborhood. Thus, the physical
environment of a neighborhood can impede or facilitate a neighborhood’s level of
collective efficacy, and therefore has a bearing on the ability to control crime and
delinquency. The theory used to explain how physical characteristics of a residential
environment can help residents gain a sense of security and control is Newman’s theory
of defensible space (1972). Therefore, the collective efficacy of a neighborhood can be
affected if residents do not feel safe in their neighborhood to formulate social ties and
gain mutual trust among other residents.
Social disorganization theory commonly focuses on ecological characteristics,
such as high levels of poverty, racial and ethnic heterogeneity, residential mobility, and
family disruption (Shaw and McKay 1942; Bursik and Grasmick 1993b; Sampson 1997;
Oh 2005). However, poverty seems to be one of the leading explanations of
neighborhood crime (Oh 2005; Boyle and Hassett-Walker 2008). Moreover, another
ecological characteristic associated with a community being socially disorganized is
racial and ethnic heterogeneity. Racial and ethnic heterogeneity is said to disrupt local
social networks because communities with different racial and ethnic groups often have
different cultures and traditions, weakening the community and reducing the ability for
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the residents to identify and solve common problems (Kornhauser 1978). Residential
mobility, or residential instability, can also cause neighborhoods to be socially
disorganized. Many contend that with a lack of residential stability, it is exceedingly
difficult to create a strong network among residents, which results in “weak ties” within
the community (Cantillon, Davidson, and Schweitzer 2003). Lastly, the importance of
family structure was later added to the list of ecological characteristics of social
disorganization. Sampson (1986, 1987) adapts the premise of control theory, arguing
that a variety of family structures, such as single-parent or divorced families, weaken
the ability of members to exert informal social control within the community. The lack of
parental and/or other adult figures within the neighborhood reduces the overall ability of
the neighborhood to control other members’ behavior.
Poverty
One indicator of social disorganization, poverty, is often measured as the
socioeconomic status (SES) of a community or using the poverty rate as a determinant.
A community with high levels of poverty is said to have a difficult time developing local
networks between members (Bursik and Grasmick 1993a). However, the results are
mixed on the effect poverty has on the development of local friendship networks (Bellair
1997). Some studies indicate that poverty is unrelated to the development of
community friendship networks (Sampson 1988; Sampson and Groves 1989), while
others argue that social class is in fact inversely related to community friendship
networks (Sampson 1991). For instance, in a study using the British Crime Survey,
researchers found that SES had a statistically significant inverse effect on neighborhood
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friendship networks (Lowenkamp, Cullen, and Pratt 2003). Yet, it has been reported
that neighborhood disorder and decay is more common in areas with less household
income, which is explained by the fact that there is a breakdown of social control among
residents (Ross and Mirowsky 1999). Analyzing physical and social disorder and
poverty, Sampson and Raudenbush (1999) found that poverty is strongly associated
with disorder. What’s more, comparing different classes of neighborhoods, those in
higher class neighborhoods indicate that there is more commitment to the area and
more involvement with other residents (Taylor 1996).
Research has repeatedly shown that socioeconomic disadvantaged
neighborhoods have higher rates of crime and delinquency (Olson et al. 2009;
Markowitz et al. 2001; Morenoff et al. 2001). For instance, even after controlling for
neighborhood disorder, researchers reported that an increase in concentrated
disadvantage increased burglary (Wilcox et al. 2004). Looking at neighborhood
characteristics and individual homicide risks, researchers found that the higher the
socioeconomic disadvantage, as well as the lower the social cohesion, the higher
probability that the residents in the neighborhood would be murdered (Nieuwbeerta et
al. 2008). This is consistent with other findings indicating that neighborhoods with high
levels of poverty often have less social contact with other members (Bellair 1997;
Morenoff et al. 2001), and thus have less social cohesion. In other words, crimes, such
as homicides, occur in neighborhoods that are socioeconomically disadvantaged more
frequently because of the mediating factor of the level of social cohesion among
residents (Nieuwbeerta et al. 2008).
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Neighborhood disadvantage, or in other words poverty, was found to have a
significant, positive relationship on the number of gang homicides committed within
census tracts in Chicago (Mares 2010). Additionally, injuries resulting from assaults
were also found to be correlated with poverty in a study conducted in Newark, New
Jersey. The authors measured three structural characteristics of social disorganization
– poverty concentration, percentage of vacant housing units, and percentage of rental
housing units – and they concluded that concentrated poverty was the strongest
predictor of assault injuries (Boyle and Hassett-Walker 2008). While Kingston,
Huizinga, and Elliott (2009) found poverty to be a strong predictor of violent offending,
they did not find poverty to be significant for property offending. In contrast, applying
social disorganization theory to the study of American Indian Homicides using the
measurement of below poverty level, Lanier and Huff-Corzine (2006) did not find a
statistically significant relationship between poverty and homicide among an American
Indian population.
Using the poverty rate to test social disorganization theory of youths in
nonmetropolitan counties, Osgood and Chambers (2000) also did not find a relationship
between delinquency rates and poverty. In fact, neither did they find a relationship in
economic status or unemployment and delinquency rates. Similarily, other researchers
have also found no significant effect of unemployment on crime (Olson et al. 2009). In
the end, the Osgood and Chambers (2000) concluded that they did not find that
delinquency increases with higher rates of poverty, and that “poverty comes in a very
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different ‘structural package’ in small towns and rural communities than in larger urban
areas” (104).
Racial and Ethnic Heterogeneity
Similar to research findings on the relationship of poverty and crime and
collective efficacy, research findings for racial and ethnic heterogeneity are also mixed.
First, Bellair (1997) found that racial diversity within the 60 urban neighborhoods studied
did impede the formation of social networks. In fact, he concluded that residents in
homogeneous communities engage in more interaction because they are more likely to
recognize commonalties with neighbors. However, another study concluded that ethnic
heterogeneity had an inverse effect on local friendship networks (Lowenkamp et al.
2003), which is consistent with previous findings from Sampson and Groves (1989). In
addition, in analyzing 66 Baltimore, Maryland neighborhoods, Taylor (1996) found that
neighborhood racial composition did not have an impact on residents’ attachment and
involvement, or their responses to disorder. Just as important, according to Cantillon
and colleagues (2003), racial homogeneity was not significantly correlated with stealing,
fighting, school delinquency, and severe delinquency among the youths in their study.
Despite these findings, others have concluded that neighborhood heterogeneity
does increase crime and delinquency. For example, neighborhood heterogeneity had a
significant positive effect on the number of homicides in Chicago (Mares 2010). Also,
Olson et al. (2009) argued that racial heterogeneity is a significant, positive indicator of
aggravated assault among their sample, but not homicide, sexual assault, or robbery.
Comparing urban and rural communities, researchers report that racial diversity is a
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strong indicator for violent crime, but not property crime (Wells and Weisheit 2004).
Looking at youth violence in a rural setting, research has concluded that ethnic
heterogeneity is significantly and positively related to higher rates of all violent offenses
(e.g., homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, and weapons) and simple assaults
(Osgood and Chambers 2000).
Residential Mobility/Instability
Like poverty, residential mobility, or instability, has had mixed results in the
research as a determinant of neighborhood social disorganization for both collective
efficacy and crime. Sampson and Groves (1989) and Lowenkamp et al. (2003) found
that residential stability had a large direct effect on community friendship networks,
meaning that as residential stability increased, friendship networks also increased.
Other findings also report that stability, as well as education, had the most significant
impacts on neighborhood attachment and responses to disorder. This is undoubtedly
consistent with the systemic approach to social disorganization, where in more stable
communities residents feel more attached to one another and the community and are
more involved within the community (Taylor 1996). Interestingly however, others also
found that residential stability has a positive, significant effect on unsupervised peer
groups, which is contrary to social disorganization theory (Sampson and Groves 1989).
In fact, looking at the role of nonresidential land use on violent crime and burglary,
population instability negatively affected neighboring behaviors (Wilcox et al. 2004).
Recent research found neighborhoods with higher levels of residential mobility actually
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had higher levels of institutional effectiveness1, which is contrary to social
disorganization theory (Kingston et al. 2009).
Other research examined the effects of physical and social disorder as stressors
for neighborhood attachment (Skogan 1992; Perkins and Taylor 1996; Woldoff 2002).
In fact, one measure of physical disorder is abandoned buildings and empty lots. Other
measures of physical disorder are poor property maintenance, absentee landlords, and
poor housing. Interestingly, social disorder is very similar to the concept of collective
efficacy. For example, social disorder is said to occur when residents in a
neighborhood “cannot be trusted, do not get along, and cannot be relied upon to look
out for trouble” when a resident is away (Woldoff 2002). However, according to Woldoff
(2002) these indicators differ from other research that measures trust and social
cohesion (Sampson et al. 1997) because these also measure the respondent’s views of
social disorder in the neighborhood. Despite other social disorganization literature that
supports the contention that local stressors (such as crime or disorder) negatively affect
attachment to one’s community, Woldoff’s (2002) research did not support this claim,
nor did other research claiming that neighborhoods that have higher rates of crime
actually had more involved, attached residents (Taylor 1996).
Looking at residential mobility/instability and crime or delinquency, Mares (2010)
stated that an increase in neighborhood instability actually predicted a reduction in gang
related homicides, and thus was not a relevant factor in explaining gang violence in the
different Chicago neighborhoods in the study. Others (Lanier and Huff-Corzine 2006)
1

Institutional Effectiveness was a 7-item scale constructed to measure the quality of parochial networks
in the neighborhoods.
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also concluded that mobility was not a significant predictor of homicides among an
American Indian population. Yet, taking into account all homicides2, Mares (2010)
found that instability was highly significant, which is consistent with previous studies of
residential mobility in socially disorganized neighborhoods in Chicago (Papachristos
and Kirk 2006). In measuring instability as neighborhood residential turnover, others
stated that the odds of being victimized increased by 62 percent when new residents
replaced longer term residents (Xie and McDowall 2008), further supporting the claim
that mobility reduces collective efficacy, and thus increases crime in these
neighborhoods. Just as interesting, Xie and McDowall (2008) also conclude that the
effect of household turnover is the same in affluent rural neighborhoods as it is in
deteriorating inner-city neighborhoods.
Some research found that family instability is the most consistently strong
predictor of crime rates in both urban and rural settings. However, household instability
is less consistent and a weak predictor with differences in crime rates in the
communities (Wells and Weisheit 2004). In testing different crimes and their
association with the theory of social disorganization, Osgood and Chambers (2000)
found that residential instability was related to higher rates of weapons violations,
aggravated assault, rape, and simple assaults, as well as an increase in the overall
violent crime index. Even more interesting, they found that within a five-year span, the
arrest rate for violent offenses would double with a 24% increase in residential turnover.
Residential stability has also been used to study delinquency among youths, and these
2

Mares (2010) analyzed different homicides in Chicago between 1985-1995, such as homicides resulting
from gang and nongang activities, robberies, intimate violence, and drug-related activities.
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researchers claim that the more stability, the less stealing, fighting, and severe
delinquency (Cantillon et al. 2003). Stability overall, nonetheless, has been reported as
the most important determinant of residents’ responses to disorder as compared to
other characteristics of neighborhood structure (Taylor 1996).
While residential mobility is often measured by the frequency of changes in
residency (Osgood and Chambers 2000; Kingston et al. 2009), the idea of moving out
and having a household vacant for a long period of time is also supportive of
neighborhoods being socially disorganized. For instance, Skogan described in his book
Disorder and Decline: Crime and the Spiral of Decay in American Neighborhoods
(1992) that vacant buildings and houses are visible evidence of social disorder, which
“provides direct, behavioral evidence” that a community is disorganized. Moreover,
similar to Skogan’s argument of vacant structures being a sign of social disorganization
in a community, Boyle and Hassett-Walker (2008) measure residential mobility by the
percentage of vacant houses and percentage of rental housing units. In fact, prior
research points out that low rates of home ownership and residential instability are
associated with problematic behaviors (Sampson et al. 2002).
In comparing the impact that vacant housing and rental housing has on rate of
assault, Boyle and Hassett-Walker (2008) reported that there was a moderate
correlation among vacant housing units and the assault rate. In all, they found that
areas with a higher percentage of vacant housing units were associated with increased
rates of assault, and thus they are ideal measures of social disorganization. On the
other hand, rental housing units were not found to be a good measure of social
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disorganization. Interestingly, they emphasized the impact that vacant housing units
have on crime rates, and indicated that they contribute “above and beyond the direct
effects of poverty” (p. 1022). For instance, areas with higher numbers of vacant houses
may set up an ideal environment for violence and crime to occur because of the
increased likelihood of the community having less collective efficacy. Also,
neighborhoods that are in poverty but have less vacant houses have more residents
that are willing to keep an eye out for others, or in other words, have greater collective
efficacy (Boyle and Hassett-Walker 2008).
Moreover, other research argues that residential mobility does not cause crime,
but instead crime causes people to be more mobile (Hipp, Tita, and Greenbaum 2009).
Kingston et al. (2009) however found that when looking at juvenile delinquency in highrisk neighborhoods, neighborhoods with high levels of residential mobility actually had
more effective social institutions, (police, schools, medical services, and transportation
services) which was a measurement of neighborhood social processes. They also found
that mobility was not a statistically significant predictor of property or violent offending.
Thus, the research findings on the effects that residential mobility has on crime are
mixed.
Family Disruption
Family disruption, a structural indicator of social disorganization, is typically
measured by the presence of female-headed households in a neighborhood or the
divorce rate in a neighborhood, and once again, these findings are often mixed. Both
measures of family disruption are said to impact a neighborhood because single parents
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are strained with time and money, which hinders parents’ abilities to supervise their
children and communicate with other members of the neighborhood. Even more, the
fewer adults in a neighborhood, the less supervision there will be and a decrease in
collective efficacy (Sampson 1985). Although the theory of social disorganization would
argue that family disruption would negatively impact the ability to collectively enforce
neighborhood controls, Lowenkamp et al. (2003) found that family disruption was not
related to local friendship networks.
As discussed previously, some research differentiates between three different
systemic control groups within neighborhoods – private, parochial, and public. The
private system of social order is based on intimate, informal groups, such as the family,
while the parochial system is made up of informal networks of acquaintances and
friends. The parochial network system acts as supervision and surveillance for the
community, as long as the residents have local ties and attachment, as pointed out by
Sampson (1988). Lastly, the public system of control refers to the relationship between
the community and agencies that provide goods and services outside of that community
(Bursik and Grasmick 1993a). The private and parochial control groups are most
important to social disorganization and the concept of collective efficacy. With that said,
some researchers seek to identify which systemic control groups are most effective.
Interestingly, Capowich (2003) reported that the most disorganized
neighborhoods also had the weakest parochial and public mechanisms of control. In
fact, there was a relationship between a low level of informal control and a weak
parochial control method, further supporting the claim of the importance of systemic
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control groups in operating collectively to reduce crime and delinquency. As stated
already, the concept of collective efficacy is apparent among the private and parochial
systemic control groups. Thus, a study further supported this claim, reporting that with
an increase in collective efficacy among neighborhoods, there was a reduction in the
homicide rate (Morenoff et al. 2001). Once again, these findings illustrate the
importance of different system control groups that collectively work to reduce crime in
neighborhoods, even those that are structurally disadvantaged. In contrast, others have
found that “residents of geographic areas characterized by lower levels of collective
efficacy are no more or less likely to intervene” (Wells et al. 2006:540) and act out as
informal control agents.
Osgood and Chambers (2000) investigated the relationship between femaleheaded households and crime or delinquency and found that higher levels of femaleheaded households were strongly associated with higher rates of rape, robbery,
aggravated assault, and weapons violations. In truth, the presence of female-headed
households was the strongest indicator in their research. They found that an increase of
13% of female-headed households, the overall offense rate double (Osgood and
Chambers 2000). Moreover, an increase in American Indian female-headed
households was associated with an increase in the homicide rate among American
Indians (Lanier and Huff-Corzine 2006). Comparing immigrants and homicide,
researchers reported that female-headed households positively and significantly
influenced the homicide and robbery rates, and aggravated assault count in Orange
County, Florida (Olson et al. 2009). Interestingly though, research has reported that
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female-headed households are not inherently at risk for crime and/or victimization, but
rather it is explained by other structural conditions, such as the fact the many femaleheaded households reside in poorer, more disadvantaged neighborhoods (Capowich
2003:54).
Academic Performance
At the naissance of Shaw and McKay’s theory of social disorganization (1942),
academic performance or achievement was not one of the indicators included in
characteristics of socially disorganized neighborhoods, which have been discussed
above. However, research has shown that disadvantaged neighborhoods have poorer
academic performance and achievement. According to Berliner (2005), poverty within
neighborhoods needs to be addressed in order to improve academic achievement and
school performance among children. Although there is a modest amount of empirical
research reporting the impact of neighborhood characteristics on academic
achievement, it is growing. Past research has shown that neighborhood structural
characteristics such as high levels of crime and violence exposure (Schwartz and
Gorman 2003; Shumow, Vandell, and Posner 1999), high levels of economic
impoverishment (Plunkett, Abarca-Mortensen, and Behnke 2007), and low levels of
employment in professional jobs (Ensminger, Lamkin, and Jacobson 1996) are
associated with poorer academic achievement. In addition, research has found a
relationship between homeownership and academic performance. For example,
homeownership has been found to have positive effects on the educational
development and attainments of children (Aaronson 2000; Bramley and Karley 2007;
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Green and White 1997; Harkness and Newman 2001). Clearly, in line with human
capital theory, homeownership is positively related with social capital, specifically
because there is a lower mobility rate; this in turn, has been linked to education
(DiPasquale and Glaeser 1999).
Comparing the effects of neighborhood characteristics on school performance for
black and white students, Dornbusch, Ritter, and Steinberg (1991) reported that
neighborhood SES was a good predictor of self-reported grades. Basically, the authors
found that as a community’s SES increased, so did the grades of the students. In
measuring the impact of neighborhood disadvantage among black and white students’
achievement, Lee and Madyun (2009) found consistent results with arguments posed
by social disorganization theory. For example, neighborhoods with low poverty and low
crime had higher achievement rates for students in both reading and math. Conversely,
students residing in neighborhoods with high poverty and high crime lagged in both
reading and math. In the end, they found that the “achievement gap between the
advantaged (low crime-poverty) and the disadvantaged (high crime-poverty)
neighborhoods were substantial” (p. 159).
As discussed above, neighborhood characteristics, such as poverty, racial and
ethnic heterogeneity, residential mobility/instability, and family disruption are the
common factors researchers use to measure socially disorganized neighborhoods.
Research has also shown that academic performance and/or achievement has been
found to be associated with neighborhoods that are disadvantage and socially
disorganized. Furthermore, researchers argue that a neighborhood’s level of collective
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efficacy determines whether crime and delinquency will occur. Even neighborhoods
that are structurally disorganized can have lower crime and delinquency rates as long
as their level of collective efficacy is high and neighbors work together to instill informal
social control. However, with the recent increase in foreclosures nationwide, residents
are often left in neighborhoods with fewer neighbors with whom to engage in informal
social control, and therefore it would seem that these areas are at risk for increasing
rates of crime and delinquency. Accordingly, the impact foreclosures have on crime
and delinquency deserves attention.
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CHAPTER THREE: FORECLOSURES

Starting in the early 1990’s, America has promoted and expanded the opportunity
of homeownership to ethnic and racial minorities who prominently live in low- and
moderate-income areas (Newman and Wyly 2004). At the same time that the U.S.
started promoting the importance of homeownership, there was also a large increase in
the number of subprime loans – loans which have high interest rates that are offered to
borrowers who are considered a high risk for default – made by mortgage companies
(Immergluck and Smith 2005, 2006a). Although the increase in homeownership has
been viewed as a positive trend, there are also negative repercussions that have and
will continue to occur after the boom in real estate and homeownership. For instance,
subprime lending is the most default-prone mortgage type of all home loans (Apgar and
Calder 2005). The increase in foreclosures not only harms the already financially
unstable households but they also lower home price appreciation in neighboring areas,
weaken communities, and decrease homebuyers’ wealth (Delgadillo and Gallagher
2006).
It is pertinent to point out the difference between defaulting and foreclosing.
Defaulting is the failure to make a payment on a home loan, and often researchers see
defaulting and foreclosing as synonymous, but foreclosure is not the result in every
default (Ambrose and Capone 1998). In other words, allowing one’s property or
household to go into foreclosure is in fact a two-step process. First, the mortgage
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borrower decides to default on his or her property or household by missing a payment.
The second step is to let the property or home go into foreclosure by not taking certain
actions to avoid foreclosure, whether intentionally or not (Ambrose and Capone 1998;
Ambrose and Buttimer 2000). Sometimes those who default on a mortgage loan do so
to obtain expenditures for other expenses. However, when defaulting for that purpose,
a foreclosure is often the outcome because of the “result of new and unforeseen
expenditures or else the inability to gain new income after a trigger event causing the
initial default” (Ambrose and Capone 1998:394).
Those who default, and often do eventually foreclose, can be divided into two
categories, what Ambrose and Capone (1998) call ruthless and trigger-event defaulters.
While these two categories undoubtedly help to explain why people choose to default, it
is safe to assume that those who foreclose on their home can also fall into these two
categories, and thus these categories can be applied to those who default as well as
those who foreclose. First, ruthless defaulters are those whose local area has
experienced declines in price, and in effect the estimated loan-to-value ratios (LTV
ratios – where the appraised value of one’s home drops below the value of the loan) are
above one at default. Ruthless defaulters see their behavior as being effective by
allowing a foreclosure to occur. In contrast, trigger-event defaulters are those whose
estimated LTV ratios are below one at default and the probabilities of having negative
equity are significantly lower than ruthless defaulters.3 Borrowers who default due to a
3

Having the LTV ratio greater than one indicates that one has a high LTV ratio, meaning one borrowed
more than the home was valued at, i.e. a ruthless defaulter. Often this puts mortgage lenders and
mortgage borrowers at great risk of default and/or foreclosure, and thus considered high risk. Having the
LTV ratio below one indicates that one has a low LTV ratio, i.e. a trigger-event defaulter. Typically, those
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trigger-event may only foreclose on their home because of reasons outside of their
control. Therefore, while foreclosures occur for ruthless defaulters and trigger-event
defaulters, the motivations for foreclosing are different and the rate at which they
foreclose is different (Ambrose and Capone 1998). In fact, the research conducted by
Ambrose and Capone (1998) on this phenomenon concluded that ruthless defaulters, or
those classified as high-LTV defaulters, have a tendency toward foreclosure. While on
the other hand, trigger-event defaulters, or those classified as low-LTV defaulters, have
a tendency to reinstate their mortgage loan.

Subprime Lending
Before the 1990’s, those who applied for a home loan did not have much of an
option on loan type. Mortgage companies varied their loans by different characteristics
such as adjustable rates, fifteen- or thirty-year loans, and attributes of the home and/or
property. In fact, if the borrower was not seen as being creditworthy by the mortgage
company, he or she was not granted the loan. Those who qualified for the loan,
however, paid around the same price (Avery et al 2005). Not surprisingly, these
practices resulted in mortgage lenders not granting loans to inner city residents which
led to the lenders being racially biased (Squires and Velez 1987; Buist, Megolugbe, and
Trent 1994; Leven and Sykuta 1994). However, during the 1990’s subprime loans were
expanded and gave more opportunities to those who were not so creditworthy but still
wanted to acquire a home mortgage loan. Inside Mortgage Finance, an industry

who have a low LTV ratio put a larger down payment on the loan, and therefore has more home equity
and less debt toward the home.
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publication, reported that subprime lending increased in 1994 from approximately $35
billion to $665 billion in 2005 (Schloemer et al. 2006). Also, in 2006 subprime loans
accounted for approximately 20 percent of the total mortgages in the U.S. (Avery,
Brevoort, and Canner 2006; Joint Center for Housing Studies 2007).
The idea behind subprime lending is rather straightforward. Potential
homeowners who cannot qualify for a prime loan, typically rated as having A credit,
need to find a means of obtaining a different loan to purchase a home. Thus, these
potential homeowners resort to subprime loans, typically rated as A (i.e., Alt-A or near
prime) B, C, and D. The majority of individuals who fall within these subprime loan
categories are in A or B credit ratings (Center for Responsible Lending 2003). Yet, it is
argued that if subprime lending, especially B, C, or D lending, is highly concentrated in
certain neighborhoods, then these vulnerable neighborhoods “will bear a
disproportionate share of the foreclosures” (Immergluck 2004:31). In fact, the majority
of households that are considered as not creditworthy are concentrated in lower and
middle-income households, and therefore these households constitute the majority of
subprime loans. Since these borrowers are considered high risk because of their credit
history, subprime loans are more expensive than prime mortgage loans (Carr 2007),
and that undoubtedly has a negative impact on many neighborhoods comprised of low
and middle-income households.
The abuses of subprime lending have been implicated as the number one
explanation for the recent increase in foreclosures nationwide (Kaplan and Sommers
2009). In fact, Hevesi (2002) found that between 1993 and 2002 the foreclosure rate
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nationwide increased by 68 percent. The significant increase in foreclosures were
found exclusively in loans that were subprime, while prime loans (A rated) decreased
during these same years (Hevesi 2002). This is supported by the fact that a mortgage
borrower with positive home equity prefers to refinance or sell the home, instead of
defaulting, while a mortgage borrower with negative home equity will not have these
options, and thus will default and possibly foreclose (Gerardi and Willen 2009). Lending
practices are very important to policy makers who seek to control and monitor mortgage
companies lending practices to ensure that loans are not discriminatory. The
relationship between mortgages and foreclosures is the simple fact that “you cannot
have a foreclosure unless you have a loan” (Immergluck and Smith 2005). Most
research emphasizes the relationship between subprime lending, also known as
predatory lending, and the number of foreclosures (Walters and Hermanson 2001; Cutts
and Van Order 2004; Immergluck and Smith 2005; Nichols, Pennington-Cross, and
Yezer 2005; Grover, Smith, and Todd 2008; Immergluck 2008; Rose 2008), as indicated
above. While subprime lending has come under extreme scrutiny for being responsible
for many increases in foreclosures around the nation, subprime mortgages undoubtedly
bring many benefits for homebuyers who cannot receive another type of loan due to
credit history problems (Immergluck 2008).
In fact, in the U.S. home mortgages with subprime loans have increased
significantly during the 1990’s, with some estimates indicating that subprime loans
accounted for $200 billion by the end of the 1990’s (Gruenstein and Herbert 2000) while
others estimated that in 2005 subprime loans were a $600 billion business (Avery et al.
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2006; Joint Center for Housing Studies 2007). It has been argued that subprime
lending contributes the most to foreclosures (Immergluck 2008). Immergluck and Smith
(2005) reported that home mortgages that had a 100 or more subprime loans per
Census tract between 1996 and 2001 corresponded to having almost 86% more
foreclosures in 2002.
While most research has centered on policies relating to subprime lending (e.g.,
underwriting techniques), some researchers and policy makers have focused on
prevention and/or counseling programs for borrowers (see for example the MFP
Program discussed below). Unfortunately however, little research has focused on the
role of homeownership counseling and foreclosure (Delgadillo and Gallagher 2006).
The major studies (1995; 1998) that have concentrated on mortgage foreclosure
prevention programs have been promoted by the Family Housing Fund in Minneapolis,
Minnesota. They have analyzed the impact and cost effectiveness of their program in
reducing mortgage foreclosures in the area. A summary of the Mortgage Foreclosure
Prevention Program (MFP Program) reported that in the initial six years (beginning in
1991) of the program in operation, the MFP Program “provided intensive counseling” to
nearly 1,700 homeowners and successfully assisted over half of them in reinstating their
mortgages.
The MFP Program also found that the counseling was a cost-effective and
practical way to assist homeowners with their mortgages and prevent them from
foreclosure. At the time, the MFP Program’s expenditures were on average $2,800 to
assist a homebuyer in reinstating his or her mortgage, while the estimated cost of
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foreclosure losses to mortgage companies ranged from $10,000 to $28,000. Lastly, the
MFP Program concluded that during the six years in operation, the program estimated
saving the mortgage companies around $7.6 million in the areas of Minneapolis/Saint
Paul. The MFP Program reported that their success was due to two main factors:
working closely with homeowners and mortgage services to getting borrowers’ home
loans back on track and early delinquency intervention (Moreno 1998).
Many studies have shown that borrowers’ race/minority, income, and age
increase the chance of receiving a subprime loan, and in effect the borrowers have a
higher possibility of their home becoming delinquent and subsequently placed into
foreclosure (Calem, Gillen, and Wachter 2004; Delgadillo and Gallagher 2006;
Immergluck and Smith 2005, 2006a; Immergluck 2008). The relationship of subprime
lending and foreclosures has been demonstrated in many different geographical studies
(Gruenstein and Herbert 2000; Burnett, Herbert, and Kaul 2002; Collins 2003; Newman
and Wyly 2004). Although there is a positive relationship between subprime lending
and foreclosures, a characteristic of economic instability– unemployment – which is not
directly related to subprime lending, can also increase foreclosures (Immergluck 2009).
According to Kaplan and Sommers (2009), “foreclosures are unevenly distributed,
concentrated in particular neighborhoods” (p. 102), and thus, the following sections
present a discussion of the race/minority, income, and age characteristics that previous
research indicates influences subprime lending and subsequently increases the chance
of foreclosures, as well as the role unemployment plays in foreclosures.
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Minority Factors
Of particular concern is the tendency of foreclosed homes to have increased at
higher rates in areas with substantial concentrations of low-income minority households
(Apgar and Calder 2005). The incentives for subprime lenders to target minority
communities to gain more business are common routines subprime/predator lenders
use (Newman and Wyly 2004). Not only will minority communities, and especially lowincome minority communities, have more of a hardship because of higher-cost
subprime mortgages, but they are also at high risk of financial problems down the road
(Apgar and Calder 2005). Further, many minorities who are new homeowners are fairly
unsophisticated in financial operations and do not necessarily fully understand the
process of obtaining and maintaining a mortgage loan (Immergluck 2004). The National
Community Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC) reports that minority neighborhoods receive
significantly higher levels of subprime lending (2003). In fact, the NCRC found that
African-Americans are considered high risk in the mortgage market based on their race,
and therefore they have higher levels of subprime lending.
Moreover, a study by Nichols, Pennington-Cross and Yezer (2005) concluded
that the borrower demographic characteristics of their study of racial groups behaved
differently. For instance, Hispanics, African Americans, Indians and Asians were more
likely to use subprime financing than Whites. Similarly, Asian and African American
borrowers were found to have a “higher probability of using the subprime market”
(Pennington-Cross, Yezer, and Nichols 2000). Using data from foreclosures in Chicago
however, Immergluck and Smith (2005) noted that Hispanic neighborhoods had lower
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foreclosure levels compared to similar White neighborhoods, but there were higher
rates of foreclosures in Black neighborhoods because of higher subprime lending.
Another study found that African Americans were twice as likely as non-Hispanic whites
to have a subprime mortgage, and that Hispanics are somewhat less likely to have a
subprime loan (Newman and Wyly 2004).
The Center for Responsible Lending conducted a study in 2007 and found that
African American and Latino borrowers were more likely than non-Latino borrowers to
receive “higher-rate” purchase loans, such as subprime loans (Gruenstein-Bocian,
Ernst, and Li 2007). Even more, looking strictly at refinance loans, Immergluck (2004)
concluded that in predominantly African American neighborhoods, 58 percent of the
refinance loans were granted by subprime lenders; while in predominantly white
neighborhoods, less than 10 percent of the refinance loans were given by subprime
lenders. Quercia, Cowan, and Moreno’s (2005) findings show that Black homeowners
have substantially higher interest rates than the average interest rate for other race
borrowers, which help why Black borrowers have drastically higher rates of default
(Anderson and VanderHoff 1999). In fact, compared to other racial groups, the authors
reported that other than having a full-time job, being a Black homeowner reduced that
chance of avoiding a foreclosure by 40 percent. African American borrowers are
repeatedly found to have a higher probability of obtaining a subprime loan compared to
borrowers of other racial or ethnic groups (Calem, Gillen, and Wachter 2004). Just as
interesting, the American Association of Retired Persons (i.e., AARP) conducted a study
on the elderly population and subprime lending and discovered that 18 percent of the
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older African American borrowers held subprime mortgages, while only 7 percent had
prime mortgages. The older Hispanic borrowers accounted for 7 percent of the
subprime lending, but only 2 percent of the prime mortgages. Conversely, older white
borrowers accounted for 68 percent of the subprime and 85 percent of the prime
mortgages (Walters and Hermanson 2001).
Moreover, Abt Associates conducted a study in the Atlanta metro area and
observed that since 1998, the amount of subprime lending in high-minority communities
has doubled. Just as interesting, subprime lending grew to more than 158 percent in
moderately high minority tracts and grew to 317 percent in high minority tracts
(Gruenstein and Herbert 2000). Even after controlling for income on loan type,
subprime lenders granted more loans than prime lenders in the 40 middle-income,
African American neighborhoods in a study conducted in Chicago (Immergluck 2004).
Immergluck and Smith (2005) conducted foreclosure research in Chicago as well and
they reported that neighborhoods with minority populations of 10 percent or less in 2000
saw an increase in foreclosures of 215 percent, while neighborhoods with a minority
population of 90 percent or more had an increase of foreclosures of 544 percent.
A study conducted on foreclosures in Utah also reported that race was a
statistically significant indicator of foreclosure, and that as race changes from “white” to
“non-White” the chance of foreclosure increased by a factor of 2.8 (Delgadillo and
Gallagher 2006). Another study conducted between 2001 and 2003 in Ohio reported
that the percentage of minorities in general, and African Americans in particular, are
highly correlated with foreclosures (Kaplan and Sommers 2009). Similarly, research
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findings from Massachusetts support the same findings and also conclude that
foreclosures are exceedingly concentrated in minority neighborhoods (Gerardi and
Willen 2009). All together, prior research suggests that “racial composition plays a
tremendous role in the geographical distribution of foreclosures” (Kaplan and Sommers
2009:115).
Instead of being denied any form of credit, minorities are being targeted by
higher-cost, and often abusive, lenders (Immergluck 2004). So, because of those who
have credit problems and/or other financial instabilities, they are disproportionately
singled out for subprime loans. However, researchers also argue that credit risk by its
self may not entirely explain why some borrowers end up in the subprime market
(Couchrane, Surette, and Zorn 2004). In other words, these loan companies are racially
discriminating in their loan practices (Apgar and Calder 2005), and lack of or bad credit
cannot solely be used to explain who is targeted for subprime lending. As presented
above, numerous studies have found that minorities, specifically Blacks, are more likely
to become victims of predatory lending practices. And although they have been granted
more access to homeownership by these lenders, numerous abuses have also arisen,
such as predatory lending (Apgar and Calder 2005). Unfortunately, many of these
minority groups who sought homeownership through the use of subprime lending are
feeling the backlash of such risky borrowing – foreclosures.
Income Factors
Traditionally, a steady and rather substantial income was necessary in obtaining
a home mortgage. Low-income families or individuals have typically had a difficult time
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obtaining a home mortgage loan (Delgadillo and Gallagher 2006), and they typically are
less sophisticated regarding the process of obtaining and maintaining a home mortgage
compared to middle- and upper-income households (Immergluck 2004). Nevertheless,
down payment requirements had become more lenient and mortgage companies were
granting mortgages to individuals that would have been considered high risk borrowers
at one time, but were then able to obtain homeownership with a lower level of income.
However, because of the lower income bracket of individuals now being able to obtain
mortgages (mostly subprime mortgages because of their high risk), there have been an
increase in the number of foreclosures in areas of low- and moderate-income
households (Delgadillo and Gallagher 2006).
In truth, Bunce and colleagues (2001) reported that by 1998, subprime loans
encompassed one in every three loans granted to low-income areas in Chicago and
Baltimore. Interestingly though, one study (Boushey and Weller 2008) found that as
income increased, the foreclosure rates also increased in that area. The authors
explained this phenomenon by pointing out that those with higher (increasing) incomes
often take on more financial responsibilities because they believe they can afford more,
which can inadvertently increase the chance of foreclosure (Boushey and Weller 2008).
Another study also reported that subprime loans are just as likely to foreclose in all
neighborhoods and not just low-income neighborhoods. But they also concluded that
since there is a very high concentration of subprime loans in low-income
neighborhoods, the increasing growths in the minority areas are the real concern
(Bunce et al. 2001). The National Community Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC; 2003)
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actually found that income had a “small impact on the level of subprime lending in
census tracts” (p. 33).
Despite Boushey and Weller’s (2008) interesting findings regarding income, most
studies report a correlation between low-income and increased foreclosure rates
(Gruenstein and Herbert 2000; Newman and Wyly 2004; Immergluck and Smith 2006a;
Grover et al. 2008). For example, a study (Gruenstein and Herbert 2000) conducted in
the Atlanta Metro area found subprime lending was the strongest in low- and very lowincome neighborhoods. In fact, the study reported that subprime originations in the
Atlanta Metro area increased to 238 percent in low-income tracts, but increased to 440
percent in very low-income tracts (Gruenstein and Herbert 2000).
Moderate- to low-income borrowers are often faced with other unexpected
expenses that increase their likelihood of foreclosure. For example, if low-income
individuals are faced with a drop in income or other expenses relating to family, health,
and employment, these borrowers have more difficulties of being able to pay for their
mortgage (Quercia, Cowan, and Moreno 2005). A study conducted by Quercia, and
associates (2005) on the effectiveness of a foreclosure prevention program reported
that since the enactment of the program in 1991, approximately 35 percent of the
borrowers had reported a cut in their pay or income as a reason for them defaulting on
their mortgage. In fact, this could be what Ambrose and Capone (1998) refer to as a
trigger-event. As discussed earlier, trigger-event defaulters often default and
subsequently foreclose because of an event that is out of their control. Undoubtedly, a
cut in pay or the loss of one’s job is a trigger-event. However, research indicates that
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looking at trigger-event defaulters, low-income groups often have more of a difficult time
gaining wealth and therefore they will work harder to protect the wealth they have, such
as home equity; the same goes for high-income groups (Ambrose and Capone 1998).
Thus, if mortgages have a low LTV ratio and a trigger event occurs, both low-income
and high-income groups have roughly the same reduced chance of foreclosing (5
percent - 6 percent) and a higher probability of reinstatement (6 percent - 7 percent).
So, the trigger-event significantly effects whether a foreclosure or reinstatement occurs,
no matter the income group (Ambrose and Capone 1998).
The “correlates of neighborhood foreclosure activity suggests that there is a
strong relationship” (Kaplan and Sommers 2009:112) with household income. These
researchers found that the majority of foreclosures occurred in block groups with a
median income between $20,000 and $30,000. In fact, while the foreclosure rate
dropped significantly for higher income neighborhoods, as one would suspect, lower
income neighborhoods also had fewer foreclosures. The authors attributed this to the
fact that the majority of lower income neighborhoods have a higher proportion of renters
who cannot have their property foreclosed on, but rather only evicted, and therefore are
at less risk of foreclosure. However, they conclude that there is not necessarily the
relationship between foreclosures and household income, but rather it is the prevalence
of subprime loans that explains foreclosures (Kaplan and Sommers 2009).
All in all, low-income areas and/or households are considered to be higher risk
when it comes to having mortgage loans, and often this is because of negative credit
history. Thus, mortgage companies grant subprime loans to these individuals with a
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higher level of risk. Low-income individuals and families are seen as being a high risk,
and thus they are prime candidates for receiving subprime loans to gain
homeownership. These conclusions are consistent with the National Community
Reinvestment Coalition’s 2003 study on discrimination and unequal access to affordable
loans.
Age Factors
There are mixed results on whether younger or older borrowers are at more of a
risk of their home being foreclosed due to subprime lending. For instance, one study
discovered that borrowers that were 65 years of age or older were three times more
likely than borrowers who were less than 35 years of age of holding a subprime loan
(Lax et al. 2004). Demographically, the AARP reported that older minority and female
borrowers were more likely to have a subprime mortgage than older non-minority and
male borrowers. In fact, older females had 45 percent of the subprime mortgages and
only 28 percent of the prime mortgages. Also, as previously mentioned, older AfricanAmerican and Hispanic borrowers had a higher percent of subprime mortgages than
they did prime mortgages (Walters and Hermanson 2001). Just as important, a study
conducted on subprime lending in ten large metropolitan areas found that abusive,
subprime lenders do in fact target elderly populations, taking advantage of the fact they
often have substantial amounts of equity but often have minimal access to immediate
cash (NCRC 2003).
When looking at foreclosures and age, some research indicates that elderly
women are especially vulnerable to foreclosures (Immergluck and Smith 2005). Yet,
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another study concluded that many neighborhoods with higher proportions of elderly
women were actually less likely to foreclose (Kaplan and Sommers 2009). In truth,
some researchers indicate that younger borrowers have a higher chance of foreclosure.
Using national data, Anderson and VanderHoff (1999) revealed that younger borrowers
had a higher default probability. Furthermore, Ambrose and Capone (1998) imply that it
is expected that younger homeowners might have fewer resources to use if they are at
risk of a foreclosure, and therefore they are more susceptible to foreclosure. However,
they also claim that younger homeowners, as opposed to older homeowners, may have
a higher chance of reemployment and thus could have the means to get their
foreclosure turned around. In contrast, a study of foreclosures in two Minnesota
counties found that young homeowners often have less stable employment and less
wealth than older mortgage borrowers and thus have a higher chance of foreclosure
(Grover et al. 2008). Yet, other research has reported that the age of the borrower was
not a significant predictor of foreclosure (Delgadillo and Gallagher 2006).
The previous research on foreclosures in America support the claim that
subprime lending occurs more in predominately minority or racial neighborhoods, low to
moderately-low neighborhoods, and either young homeowners and elderly
homeowners. It is apparent then that there is widespread price discrimination in
subprime versus prime mortgage lending in America. Most of the research to date has
focused on large metropolitan areas throughout the United States that have had high
foreclosure rates for some time. However, other research suggests that some of the
largest disparities in mortgage lending practices exist in the smallest metropolitan areas
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in the U.S. (Bradford 2002), and thus, foreclosures could also be very common in these
smaller, less populated areas.
Impact of Unemployment
Undoubtedly, subprime loans are more common in neighborhoods with higher
proportions of racial or minority households, lower levels of household income, and
younger and older individuals and/or households, which subsequently increase the
chance of foreclosure. Although there is a positive relationship between subprime
lending and foreclosures, a characteristic of economic instability– unemployment –
which is not directly related to the practice of subprime lending, can also increase
foreclosures and thus deserves some discussion. In truth, rising levels of
unemployment contributed to the new wave of foreclosures. Naturally, mortgage
borrowers who are unemployed for long periods of time have more difficult time paying
their home mortgage, and even if mortgage companies assist in reducing their monthly
mortgage payment, these individuals still cannot afford their mortgage and risk
foreclosure (Immergluck 2009). Indeed, Kaplan and Sommers (2009) found a positive
correlation between unemployment and foreclosures. Yet, other research concluded
higher rates of unemployment actually resulted in higher rates of mortgage
reinstatement after default rather than foreclosure (Ambrose and Capone 1998). The
authors point out the fact that during periods of economic instability, in this case high
rates of unemployment, local and state governments might pressure mortgage lenders
to grant borrowers greater leniency during tough times (Ambrose and Capone 1998).
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Similarly to the previously discussed sociodemographic characteristics, the effect of
unemployment on foreclosures also has mixed results.
Subprime lenders have primarily targeted minority, lower income, and the
younger and older households. Furthermore, households that go into foreclosure are
most likely to be households with subprime loans, as oppose to prime loans, and thus,
research has found a relationship between subprime loans and foreclosures. Also,
unemployment has shown to have a significant negative effect on foreclosures because
homeowners that become unemployed have fewer means of paying for their home
mortgage. According to social disorganization theory, residential mobility or instability
increases the chance of crime and delinquency because there is a lack of informal
social control among neighbors to reduce crime and disorder. Therefore, social
disorganization theory and the concept of collective efficacy are useful to understand
the effect that foreclosures have on crime and disorder, if any at all.

Foreclosures and Crime
There has been very little research on the correlation between neighborhoods
with high rates of foreclosures and crime and delinquency. Although foreclosures cause
many other problems within communities and families, for instance displacement, more
specifically, crime may be a leading concern for those closely affected by foreclosures.
Residents in neighborhoods are concerned about foreclosures because they can
jeopardize the security and safety of the neighborhood (Immergluck and Smith 2006b).
Low-income neighborhoods typically have always had higher rates of foreclosures and
crime. Thus, the research that has analyzed the correlation between the two has
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focused exclusively on low-income neighborhoods. One study (Immergluck and Smith
2006b) that measured the impact of foreclosures on crime argued that in low-income
areas a sizable number of foreclosures are expected to leave buildings vacant for an
extended period of time. In fact, they argued that neighborhood crime was affected
through this “long-term vacancy and abandonment” (p. 854). The authors found that the
foreclosure rate was a statistically significant predictor of violent crime, but not property
crime (Immergluck and Smith 2006b).
Furthermore, research (Skogan 1992) on abandoned structures (buildings and
homes) presents an abundance of negative consequences that abandoned homes can
have on the community. Although less serious, they can harbor trash, animals, such as
rats, and squatters. Even more serious, however, abandoned homes can be a safe
haven for criminals. They can be places to buy and sale illegal drugs or a hangout for
predators in the area. Just as important, homes that are abandoned can lead to
vandalism and the stealing of building components, such as wiring. The author finally
concluded that abandoned and boarded up structures can indirectly reduce collective
concern of neighborhood crime among neighborhood residents (Skogan 1992).
With this increased concern of foreclosures and crime, an entire issue of
Geography & Public Safety (2008) was dedicated to this matter. A handful of articles
was published that discussed this phenomenon in greater detail. Wilson and Paulsen
claim that foreclosures are in “middle-class or revitalized neighborhoods that were
fueled by the housing boom of the last decade and not in socially disorganized or
otherwise destitute neighborhoods” (2008:1). Also, another study from North Carolina
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reported that entire neighborhoods were starting to show signs of blight and disorder,
resembling inner-city disadvantaged neighborhoods (Bess 2008). These
neighborhoods are faced with crimes such as vagrancy, drugs, arson, vandalism, theft,
and prostitution (Wilson and Paulsen 2008). Furthermore, there has been an increase
in juvenile delinquency because vacant houses attract juveniles as a welcoming
hangout. Just as important, violent crime and property crime have increased since the
foreclosure rates have increased (Bess 2008). Foreclosures not only affect those who
are displaced, but also the residing residents because of a decrease in property values
as well as an increase in pubic disorder and crime (Brown 2008). With that said,
residents who still reside in these abandoned neighborhoods have an increased risk of
robbery and burglary (Wilson and Paulsen 2008); thus, these findings demonstrate the
impact that foreclosures have on everyone in the community.
Despite an entire issue being devoted to discuss the problematic correlation
between foreclosures and crime, none of the articles utilized social disorganization
theory. In fact, the only theory used to explain the correlation between foreclosures and
crime is Wilson and Kelling’s broken windows theory (1982). Broken windows theory
argues that physical and social disorder in a neighborhood is a precursor to crime.
Although physical and social disorder can indeed lead to crime, they leave out an
important factor that can either increase or decrease crime in neighborhoods with
disorder – informal social controls and social cohesion/ties. Strong informal social
controls and social cohesion and/or ties within a neighborhood can help deter crime,
while having weak informal controls and social cohesion and/or ties can foster crime in
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a neighborhood (Sampson 1987; Sampson and Groves 1989; Bursik and Grasmick
1993a).
Social disorganization theory (Shaw and McKay 1942) fills in this gap of research
on disorganized neighborhoods, and prior research has found that vacant houses do in
fact increase crime (Boyle and Hassett-Walker 2008). What’s more, prior research
argues that not all socially disorganized neighborhoods are the same (Kingston et al.
2009) and perhaps different structural characteristics impact various neighborhoods in
different ways. So, different structural characteristics might be important to incorporate
in studying diverse areas that are thought to be socially disorganized. Foreclosures
should undoubtedly be used as an indicator of residential instability/mobility, and
subsequently indicate how a neighborhood is socially disorganized. Also, different
neighborhoods might tolerate or react to different levels of crime and disorder. Those
who impose social order in poor neighborhoods could be substantively different in more
affluent neighborhoods (Capowich 2003). Consequently, research that tests social
disorganization theory should include additional indicators of disorganization, such as
foreclosures, and also look at diverse neighborhoods’, such as those with middle- and
upper-income households.
Therefore, the purpose of the following study is to fill a void in the research on
social disorganization theory by incorporating middle- and upper-income neighborhoods
into the analysis, rather than looking only at lower-income neighborhoods. As
presented above, with the increase in foreclosures, houses are being left vacant, and
neighborhoods are showing signs of disorder and decay, with increases in criminal and
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delinquent behavior. The following chapter presents the methodology of the current
study on social disorganization and foreclosures. Using a multi-stage process of data
collection – geographical mapping and unobtrusive field observations – I locate the
neighborhoods of interest as well as measure neighborhood collective efficacy by
conducting canvasses within the neighborhoods to locate indicators of social
disorganization.
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CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY

Most of the research on social disorganization has focused on extreme acts of
delinquency and crime. Many researchers measure violent crimes in socially
disadvantaged neighborhoods (Oh 2005; Kingston et al. 2009). These neighborhoods
often are characterized by high rates of poverty, racial and ethnic heterogeneity, and
female-headed households. In addition, violent crimes are commonly defined as
homicide, rape, aggravated assault, and robbery. This approach to measuring crime is
typical because in neighborhoods with high poverty rates violent crime is also more
common (Sampson et al. 1997). However, violent crimes are not that common in
middle- to upper-income level neighborhoods. In my analysis, I focus on crimes
commonly found in middle- and upper- income areas. These crimes involve property
crimes, such as residential burglary, which have been identified as being criminal acts
that typically occur in areas with foreclosures.
In my research, I compare the association between physical disorder (i.e. vacant,
foreclosed homes) and crime in Orange County suburbs. Suburbs have been defined in
many different ways. Yet, a basic definition that attempts to encompass various
definitions of suburbs states that suburbs are a “residential environment on the outskirts
of larger cities, occupied primarily by families of similar class and race, with plenty of
trees and grass” (Nicolaides and Wiese 2006:7). The theory of social disorganization
argues that residential mobility increases crime, and thus with permanent residential
mobility (i.e., residents moving out of neighborhoods and no one moving back in for
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extended periods of time), the likelihood of crime in these areas would increase. There
are fewer residents present in neighborhoods with high foreclosures, hence fewer
people to exhibit informal social control. These expectations are supported by Skogan
(1992) and Boyle and Hassett-Walker (2008) who found that vacant houses significantly
increase the chance of disorder and crime. It is also difficult to form social ties in
neighborhoods with high turnover rates or in situations where vacant houses surround
current residents.
Wilson and Paulsen (2008:1) argued that recent foreclosure trends are in
“middle-class or revitalized neighborhoods that were fueled by the housing boom of the
last decade and not in socially disorganized or otherwise destitute neighborhoods.” As
such, it is important to ascertain if social disorganization and patterns of crime impacts
suburban neighborhoods. A study that looked at foreclosures in Charlotte, North
Carolina reported that entire neighborhoods were starting to show signs of blight and
disorder, resembling inner-city disadvantaged neighborhoods (Bess 2008). These
neighborhoods are faced with crimes such as vagrancy, drugs, arson, vandalism, theft,
and prostitution (Wilson and Paulsen 2008). Because past research has found a
significant increase in foreclosures in middle- and upper-income areas, it is important to
understand if social disorganization can in fact occur in these neighborhoods in patterns
that parallel extant research for low-income neighborhoods. However, many of the
structural factors commonly used to measure social disorganization in the past are not
necessarily relevant to understanding the effect foreclosures have on crime in middleand upper-income level neighborhoods. Therefore, a comparison of middle- and upper-
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income neighborhoods with higher rates of foreclosures is important for law
enforcement and it can offer important policy implications in handling foreclosures,
crime, and possibly even lending practices as well.
Past researchers have argued that higher rates of residential mobility inhibit the
formation of social networks and reduce community ties among neighbors (Kingston et
al. 2009). These social ties are what Bursik and Grasmick (1993a) refer to as informal
ties or the private and parochial systems of social order. As discussed in the previous
chapter, the private system is based on intimate, informal groups, such as the family,
while the parochial system of control is maintained through acquaintances and ties to
local institutions, such as churches, schools, and stores (Bursik and Grasmick 1993a).
This approach, using informal ties from the private and parochial systems as a
measurement of collective efficacy, is the most common form of measurement found in
previous research. Even more, taking from Newman’s (1972) theory of defensible
space, researchers have not measured collective efficacy using the physical
characteristics of a neighborhood, such as a gated neighborhood, a neighborhood with
a homeowner’s association (HOA), and a neighborhood with fenced yards.
Nonetheless, all of these characteristics have been shown to impact residents’ ability to
shape social ties and therefore impact the levels of collective efficacy within a
neighborhood.
It is expected that residents within neighborhoods with certain physical
characteristics (e.g., non-gated neighborhood, no HOA, no fencing, etc.) may feel less
secure, and thus have less neighborhood collective efficacy because of weakened
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social ties that typically bind neighborhood residents together as a community. Also, a
neighborhood could have a high rate of vacant, foreclosed homes, but if residents feel a
sense of security and stronger social ties because of neighborhood characteristics, then
crimes may not be a problem. Yet, with a lack of strong indicators of neighborhood
collective efficacy, criminal acts, such as property crimes, are expected to have
increased in these high foreclosure areas. However, it is expected that if a
neighborhood has high foreclosures and strong indicators of collective efficacy, crime
will be reduced in these neighborhoods, which has been found with previous research
(Sampson 1997; Sampson et al. 1997; Morenoff et al. 2001).
To fully understand the impact that foreclosures have on crime in Orange
County, I used a dual-stage method of data collection. First I mapped foreclosures and
crime using geographical information systems software to identify specific
neighborhoods. Then, I conducted field observations by canvassing neighborhoods that
had both high rates of foreclosures and crime, as well as high rates of foreclosures but
low rates of crime, to visually document levels of disorder within these neighborhoods.
Skogan (1992) used this method in studying physical and social disorder to provide a
deeper insight and understanding of neighborhood decay. This part of the data
collection method is used to tap into the collective efficacy of these neighborhoods – it is
expected that neighborhoods with high foreclosures and high crime will have fewer
indicators of neighborhood collective efficacy than neighborhoods with high foreclosures
and low crime.
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The data for my research were collected in the fall, spring, and summer
semesters of 2010-2011. In order to perform the first step of data collection, the
mapping method, there was a two-step process of gathering the information I needed to
analyze foreclosures and crime in Orange County, Florida. First, I obtained crime data
for residential units from Orange County Sheriff’s Office’s crime analysis unit.
According to the crime analyst supervisor for Orange County Sheriff’s Office, Sheena
Lovette, a common crime occurring in areas with foreclosures is residential burglary.
Burglary is defined by the Uniform Crime Report as the “unlawful entry of a structure to
commit a felony or theft,” including residential and commercial properties. Residential
burglary refers to housing structures, such as single-family residences, duplexes, and
multifamily residences (Clontz n.d.). I obtained addresses of residential burglary data
from January 31, 2005 to December 31, 2009 (separated by year) that was responded
to by Orange County Sheriff’s Office. Since I used Orange County data only, any
neighborhoods that lie outside of Orange County Sheriff’s Office’s jurisdiction are not
included in my final sample.
The second step of data collection obtained foreclosures information. To gather
foreclosure information for my research, I analyzed foreclosed homes in Orange
County, Florida. The term foreclosure is very broad and often loosely applied. In fact, it
can be exceptionally difficult to identify which properties are at risk of, or actually in
foreclosure, sold in foreclosure auctions, or real estate owned (REO) (Newman 2010).
Research has used various categories of foreclosures, such as defaults and preforeclosures. In my analysis, however, I used the real estate owned (REO) addresses
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to examine the relationship between foreclosures and residential burglary in Orange
County. Using REO addresses provides a stronger data set because these are homes
that have gone through the entire foreclosure process. For instance, research that uses
defaults or pre-foreclosures might not be as accurate of a measure because defaults
and pre-foreclosures could be reinstated and therefore not actually resulting in a
foreclosure. So, using REO addresses provides the most accurate, and valid measure.
To obtain the REO addresses, I requested the assistance of the Orlando
Regional Realtor Association. The statistician for the association, Mike Blinn, assisted
me in locating foreclosed addresses of homes that went into REO status. The
association uses a program called MLXchange, which offers listings for realtors to
locate and track homes for sale for clients. A search was conducted to locate
addresses in Orange County that were listed as “sold,” “pending,” “withdrawn,” “active,”
and “expired” as REO homes, ranging from the dates of January 1, 2005 to December
31, 2009. The data offers information such as the address, the city, the list price (and
sold price if home was sold), the property style (condominium, townhouse, single family
home, duplex, and manufactured/mobile home), the year the home was listed, as well
as other information regarding the property.
After gathering the relevant information (e.g., addresses) on residential burglary
and foreclosures in Orange County, Florida, the data was mapped using geographical
information systems software, ArcGIS, produced by ESRI. Using boundary lines of
neighborhoods obtained from the Orange County Property Appraisers Office, I
determined in which neighborhoods residential burglaries and foreclosures were
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concentrated. I have five years (2005-2009) of data on foreclosures and residential
burglary to map the trends and changes, if any at all, on the location of crimes and
foreclosures within the various neighborhoods. During the years of interest for my
research, the year 2005 is when foreclosures were low, and the year 2009 is when the
foreclosures were at their highest. Thus, mapping the five different years offered a
visual understanding of the changes in location of residential burglaries and
foreclosures.
Because I am interested in the examining neighborhoods with high foreclosures
and high residential burglaries compared to neighborhoods with high foreclosures and
low residential burglaries, I located which census tracts are either middle- or upperincome areas with high foreclosures. I determined the income level of the census tracts
using data from the American Community Survey (ACS) for the years 2005-2009. The
ASC has data for each tract’s median household income in dollars. To determine
whether the tract is considered low-, moderate-, middle-, or upper-income, I used the
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) information to determine
what income amount coincides with a tracts income level. I used the Orange County
Property Appraiser’s neighborhood information to locate the number of households in
each neighborhood to determine foreclosure and residential burglary rates in each
neighborhood. This allowed me to compare the neighborhoods, which all vary in size,
to each other. In total, the FFIEC Census data revealed 193 tracts in Orange County,
Florida. The number of homes that occupy a specific tract in Orange County ranged

60

from a low of 22 homes, to as many as 5099 homes. The population also varied from
48 to almost 25,000 residents per tract.
Finally, I conducted in-depth, unobtrusive field observations to gather data for the
second stage of collection. This data collection process was used by Skogan (1992)
and proved to offer findings that other methods could not. Also, Taylor et al. (1984)
canvassed neighborhoods to take photographs and written documentation about the
physical characteristics of neighborhoods and their ability to form social ties and reduce
crime. My research used similar methods and conducted field observations by
canvassing areas that were found to have high foreclosures and high residential
burglaries, as well as those with high foreclosures and low residential burglaries. My
canvasses were conducted on two separate days, one a weekday and the other a
weekend, to identify the different levels of activity on a ‘work/school’ day and an ‘off’
day. My canvasses only took place during the day however, and thus could be a
limitation because I am not able to measure activity within the neighborhoods in the late
afternoon or evening time when people are off work.
Initially I canvassed the actual neighborhood (see Appendix B) to document
certain characteristics of the neighborhood that can affect social ties among residents.
For instance, a sense of neighborhood security can increase if the neighborhood’s
entrance is gated and if there is a HOA present, which has an effect on social ties
among residents. Also, neighborhood activity, such as being outside, walking down the
streets, children playing, etc., can also indicate whether neighbors feel safe to be
outside and active. These characteristics were used as indicators of collective efficacy.
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Characteristics of the neighborhoods, as well as the condition of homes, both vacant
and occupied, and any signs of disorder, were also documented in detail.
Moreover, because of the importance expressed by social disorganization
researchers such as Bursik and Grasmick (1993a) on parochial systems of social
control, observing and documenting the surrounding areas of the neighborhoods is
imperative (see Appendix C). Local institutions, commercial businesses, and leisure
outlets that are available to residents can increase interaction and ties among residents.
Visual observations focused on various physical characteristics such as the presence of
stores and what types of stores, the presence of community churches, presence of
parks, as well as schools around the neighborhood. The condition of these institutions
was also documented. Physical activity surrounding the neighborhood was also
documented. Physical activity included foot and bike traffic on sidewalks, vehicle traffic
on the roads near the neighborhood, and activity at local parks. High levels of
involvement outside of the home and in the surrounding area indicate that residents feel
more secure, and thus have stronger social ties. Thus, these characteristics are also
used as indicators of collective efficacy.
The neighborhoods that were canvassed and documented were identified from
the ArcGIS mapping results. As previously mentioned, the definition of what constitutes
“high” and “low” residential burglaries relies on the results of the mapping method.
Therefore, the mapping results serve as a sampling method to locate the
neighborhoods of interest. My field observations provided a visual representation of the
condition of the neighborhoods and an understanding of the neighborhood’s collective
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efficacy measured by specific indicators. I am interested in finding out why
neighborhoods that are characterized by high foreclosures can differ on having low or
high residential burglary rates. As social disorganization theory suggests,
neighborhoods with high foreclosures should also have high crime (e.g., residential
burglary), but why do areas with high foreclosures have low residential burglary? The
idea of neighborhood collective efficacy, measured by field observations of the
neighborhoods of interest and the physical structure characteristics surrounding these
neighborhoods, should give insight into this phenomenon.
In this chapter, I outlined the methods used to examine the relationship between
residential burglary and foreclosures using the premise of social disorganization theory.
My research occurs in stages that are ultimately combined to get a full picture of the
relationship between residential burglaries and foreclosures. As indicated previously,
the first stage was mapping the residential burglaries and foreclosures to locate the
neighborhoods characterized by high foreclosures and high residential burglaries, and
expected anomalies, such as neighborhoods with high foreclosures but low residential
burglaries. Secondly, I conducted drive-bys and canvassed these different
neighborhoods with foreclosed residences, using the guide of a checklist and taking
field notes. I also examined the immediate surroundings of the neighborhoods to
document the availability of community involvement and any physical activity that could
demonstrate a higher level of collective efficacy. My field observations provide a more
in-depth analysis for my research. Ultimately, I am exploring whether there is an
increase in residential burglary as foreclosures, a characteristic of social disorganization
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theory, also increase. In addition, I am investigating whether neighborhoods with high
foreclosures and high residential burglaries have less collective efficacy as measured
by physical and social indicators, compared to neighborhoods with high foreclosures but
low residential burglaries. In the following chapters I provide an overview of
foreclosures and residential burglaries in Orange County for the years 2005-2009,
present selected notes from my field research, and discuss the findings of my research.
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CHAPTER FIVE: FINDINGS

As stated previously, my research is seeking to explore whether social
disorganization theory, as measured by foreclosures, can explain residential burglaries
in middle- and upper-income neighborhoods in Orange County, Florida. Therefore, I
had to locate neighborhoods with high foreclosure for 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, and
2009, and also had to find their residential burglary count for the given years. I defined
the neighborhoods based on the Orange County Property Appraisers Office definition
and received the boundary lines for mapping the neighborhoods from the appraisers
office as well. I then mapped the addresses to locate neighborhoods by foreclosures
and crime. The foreclosure neighborhoods are presented in Figures 1-5, while the
residential burglary neighborhoods are presented in Figures 6-10, using ArcGIS
mapping. A major argument of my research is that as foreclosures increased between
2005-2009, which is an indicator that these neighborhoods are socially disorganized,
then the crime, measured by residential burglary, within these neighborhoods should
also increase.
First, I recorded the neighborhoods with a total foreclosure of 8 or more for the
last year, 2009. The foreclosure count for 2009 ranged from 0 to 108. I decided to
have a cutoff point of 8 foreclosures because of the distribution of foreclosures within
the neighborhoods. As the foreclosures went below 8, the number of neighborhoods
increased dramatically and the majority of the neighborhoods had less than 8
foreclosures.
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Figure 1: Foreclosure Neighborhoods by Count, 2005
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Figure 2: Foreclosures Neighborhoods by Count, 2006
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Figure 3: Foreclosure Neighborhoods by Count, 2007
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Figure 4: Foreclosure Neighborhoods by Count, 2008
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Figure 5: Foreclosure Neighborhoods by Count, 2009
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Figure 6: Residential Burglary Neighborhoods by Count, 2005
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Figure 7: Residential Burglary Neighborhoods by Count, 2006
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Figure 8: Residential Burglary Neighborhoods by Count, 2007
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Figure 9: Residential Burglary Neighborhoods by Count, 2008
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Figure 10: Residential Burglary Neighborhoods by Count, 2009
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Therefore, the foreclosure data had a positively skewed distribution of foreclosures.
The cutoff point then was decided by the tail end of the distribution. Moreover, some of
the neighborhoods with foreclosures ranging from 8-108 for 2009 had a total residential
burglary count for years 2005-2009 of 0. It is important to remember that my data is
limited to Orange County and not other police agencies. As a result, any
neighborhoods with a residential burglary count of 0 for all years were once again not
included in the final sample.

Foreclosures and Residential Burglary in 2005-2009
Table 1 shows the results of the change in neighborhoods during 2005-2009.
The neighborhoods are in order of highest foreclosure count for 2009. The table is of
the descriptive statistics for foreclosures and residential burglary in neighborhoods with
more than 8 foreclosures. With that said, the main purpose for analysis of this section is
to see whether the neighborhoods with an increase in foreclosures in 2005-2009 also
increase in residential burglary. All of the foreclosures are increasing with every year,
but it is the residential burglary count that fluctuates. Some of these neighborhoods did
in fact support social disorganization theory. However, many did not, with either
remaining stable in residential burglaries, having just a slight fluctuation, or some even
decreasing in residential burglaries as foreclosures increased. Yet, these
neighborhoods are still of interest for the neighborhood field observation step of the
research because perhaps these neighborhoods maintained low counts of residential
burglary because they had higher collective efficacy.
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Table 1: Foreclosures and Residential Burglary Counts, 2005-2009

Neighborhood
Hawthorne Village
Condos
Sanctuary at Bay
Hill Condos
Audubon Villas at
Hunters Creek Con.
Summerport
PH 5
Villanova at Hunters
Creek Condos
Sand Lake Private
Residences Condos
Palms Villa Residences
Condos
Crest at Waterford
Lakes Condos
Capri at Hunters Creek
Condos
Plantation Park Private
Residences
Bella Terra
Condos
Orangewood
NBHD 2
Los
Terranos
Eagle Creek
PH 1 A
Sandhill
Preserve
Waterford Trail PH 2
East Village
La Cascada
PH 1
Spring Isle
UT 1
Wyndham Lakes ESTS
UT 1
Cedar Bend at Meadow
Woods PH1
Island Cove Villas
PH 3
Signature Lakes –
Parcel 1 C
Mirabella
Condos

Foreclosures
‘06 ‘07 ‘08

Income

‘05

MI

0

0

0

U

0

0

U

0

U

Crime
‘07 ‘08

‘09

‘05

‘06

9

78

18

3

7

28

13

0

6

54

5

0

4

3

8

0

1

3

42

5

2

6

3

4

0

0

1

10

41

0

2

2

1

2

U

0

0

5

26

41

2

2

3

5

2

U

0

0

2

20

40

4

4

5

12

6

MI

0

0

0

9

38

6

2

0

0

2

U

0

0

1

10

37

0

6

2

2

16

U

0

0

1

2

36

1

2

3

4

4

MI

0

0

0

1

31

3

8

0

2

2

MI

0

0

4

11

31

6

6

0

2

1

MI

0

0

0

5

31

20

11

8

10

24

MI

0

0

0

2

27

0

2

0

2

1

U

0

0

2

6

27

3

3

7

5

4

MI

0

0

1

15

26

3

2

3

5

2

U

0

0

0

10

23

0

4

5

3

7

MI

0

0

1

7

20

1

5

4

9

4

U

0

0

0

3

19

0

1

3

2

2

MI

0

0

0

7

19

0

2

5

14

15

MI

0

0

0

9

18

5

2

5

3

4

MI

0

0

1

8

18

4

5

4

1

1

U

0

0

1

2

18

0

3

2

3

3

MI

0

0

0

1

17

2

10

1

5

2
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‘09

Neighborhood
Windrose at
Southmeadow UT 2
Lakes of Windermere
PH 2A
Parkview Village
Condos
Heather Glen at
Meadow Woods
Sandpoint at Meadow
Woods
Island
Walk
Timber
Isle
Huntcliff
Park
Avalon Lakes PH 3
VLG(S) A & B
Timber Pointe
PH 1
Stoneybook Hills
UT 1
Londonderry Hills
Sec 2
Tudor Grove at Timber
Springs
Moss Park
Commons
Heritage Estates
Condos
Sanctuary
Surrey
Ridge
Discovery Palms
Condos
Whisper Lakes
UT 4
Cape ORL ESTS
UT 4
Lakes of Windermere
PH 1
Keystone
Sub
Meadow
Creek
Avalon Park
Village 5

Foreclosures
‘06 ‘07 ‘08

Income

‘05

MI

0

0

1

MI

0

0

U

0

MI

Crime
‘07 ‘08

‘09

‘05

‘06

2

17

0

2

3

1

5

0

5

17

0

0

0

3

0

0

0

2

16

1

2

2

7

13

0

0

0

9

15

2

4

4

12

7

MI

0

0

4

9

15

2

4

3

8

7

MI

0

0

0

8

13

2

3

5

4

3

U

0

0

1

6

13

2

2

3

3

3

MI

0

0

0

7

13

3

1

2

3

5

U

0

0

0

3

13

0

2

5

6

2

U

0

0

1

3

13

0

0

1

0

1

U

0

0

0

2

13

0

3

2

1

3

MI

0

1

0

3

13

10

23

12

33

10

U

0

0

1

9

13

1

2

1

1

2

U

0

0

0

0

12

0

0

0

1

0

U

0

0

2

2

12

0

1

1

1

5

U

0

0

0

3

11

5

4

7

2

3

MI

0

0

0

4

11

4

2

4

2

5

MI

0

2

2

6

11

0

3

1

2

1

U

0

0

0

3

11

0

0

0

1

0

MI

0

0

0

7

11

5

4

7

7

4

MI

0

0

1

7

11

1

0

2

7

1

MI

0

0

1

7

11

3

5

0

2

3

MI

0

0

0

3

10

2

5

2

2

4

U

0

0

2

5

10

1

2

0

3

4
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‘09

Neighborhood
Chatham Place at
Arbor Meadows
Las Palmas at Sand
Lake Condos
Quail Hollow at
Rio Pinar
Chickasaw
Place
Prosper Colony
BLK E
Beaconhill
Cypress Lakes
PH 1
Islebrook
Ph 1
Island Cove Villas
PH 2
Waterford Trails
PH 1
Robinson Hills
UT 1
Heritage Bay
PH 2
Avalon Park
Village 3
Signature Lakes
Parcel 1A
Silver Ridge
PH 2
La Cascada
PH 1C
Avalon Park South
PH 1
Meadow Woods
Village 10
Heritage Bay Dr
Phillips FL
Frisco Bay
UT 1
Avalon Park South
PH 3
Creekside Villas at
Meadow Woods
Hunters Creek
TR 525
Plaza De Las
Fuentes Condos

Foreclosures
‘06 ‘07 ‘08

Income

‘05

MI

0

0

0

MI

0

0

MI

0

MI

Crime
‘07 ‘08

‘09

‘05

‘06

0

10

0

0

1

2

4

1

2

10

6

1

14

4

4

0

0

2

10

3

3

2

5

8

0

0

0

0

10

1

1

5

3

5

MI

0

0

0

10

10

5

8

5

15

10

MI

0

0

0

3

10

5

6

10

10

11

MI

0

0

2

3

10

0

0

0

1

1

MI

0

0

2

7

10

1

6

4

0

15

MI

0

0

0

2

10

0

1

1

3

3

U

0

0

0

7

9

3

2

2

6

6

MI

0

0

1

3

9

2

1

5

4

7

U

0

0

0

3

9

0

0

1

1

0

U

0

0

0

2

9

1

1

1

2

1

U

0

0

0

4

9

0

1

0

4

1

MI

0

0

1

3

9

12

12

13

12

15

MI

0

0

0

2

9

0

1

5

5

3

U

0

0

1

2

9

0

0

1

0

2

MI

0

0

0

2

9

1

2

1

5

3

U

0

0

0

2

9

1

0

0

0

0

U

0

0

0

0

9

2

3

2

2

1

U

0

0

0

4

9

2

0

1

2

4

MI

0

0

0

2

9

1

0

7

1

5

MI

0

0

1

4

9

1

0

2

2

0

MI

2

0

0

0

9

0

0

1

2

0
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‘09

Neighborhood
Lakes of Windermere
Peachtree
Rosewood
UT 1
Stonebridge
PH 1
Sky Lake South
UT 3
Avalon Park
Village 6
Green Briar
Village
Sky Lake South
UT 1
Newbury
Park
Reserve at Pershing
Oaks Condos
Beacon Park
PH 2
Avalon Park South
PH 2
Southchase PH 1B
Village 1 & 3
Cedar Bend at
Meadow Woods PH 2

Foreclosures
‘06 ‘07 ‘08

Income

‘05

MI

0

0

3

MI

0

0

MI

0

MI

Crime
‘07 ‘08

‘09

‘05

‘06

‘09

4

9

0

0

1

1

1

0

0

9

0

0

1

10

12

0

0

0

9

1

6

9

11

4

0

0

0

2

9

0

1

2

0

3

U

0

0

1

2

9

1

2

1

0

4

MI

0

0

0

1

8

1

1

2

2

2

MI

0

0

0

0

8

3

4

3

5

7

MI

0

0

0

3

8

0

2

1

0

2

MI

0

0

0

0

8

1

2

0

2

0

MI

0

0

0

2

8

0

0

7

3

2

U

0

0

2

6

8

0

1

3

2

2

U

0

0

0

3

8

6

4

2

8

3

MI

0

0

2

2

8

0

3

4

2

0

As Table 1 indicates, some of the increases in residential burglaries within these
neighborhoods coincide clearly with the increase in foreclosures. For example, the
neighborhood titled Crest at Waterford Lakes Condos had a residential burglary count
for 2005-2009 of 0, 6, 2, 2, and 16, while the foreclosures in this neighborhood went
from 0, 0, 1, 10, and 37 for the same years. Thus, there was a drastic increase in both
foreclosures and residential burglaries for 2009. Another example is Parkview Village
Condos. The residential burglary count for residential burglaries significantly increased
in 2009 while the foreclosure count also increased (2005-2009 residential burglary
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count: 1, 2, 2, 7, and 13; foreclosure count: 0, 0, 0, 2, and 16). Yet, not all of the
neighborhoods with an increase in residential burglaries that also coincided with an
increase in foreclosures were such a drastic change. For instance, Windrose at
Southmeadow UT 2 increased in residential burglary count for 2005-2009 from 0, 2, 3,
1, to 5, while the foreclosures in this neighborhood for those years went from 0, 0, 1, 2,
to 17. As a result, there was not a sizeable increase in 2009 for residential burglary
even though the foreclosures increased considerably, but the increase in residential
burglary was still very apparent.
However, just because there was an increase in residential burglary, it is difficult
to directly attribute it to the increase in foreclosures. Some of the neighborhoods had a
high residential burglary count in the early years, but then decreased in the middle, and
ultimately increased in the latter years around 2009; yet, foreclosures only increased in
the latter years. For instance, Orangewood NBHD 2 had a large fluctuation in
residential burglary count; from 2005-2009, the residential burglary count went from 20,
11, 8, 10, and 24, while the foreclosure count for the respective years was 0, 0, 0, 5,
and 31. So, while it looks like the residential burglary count increased with the
foreclosure count, the fact that 2005 had a residential burglary count of 20, but 0
foreclosures, makes it questionable on whether residential burglaries in fact increased
due to an increase in foreclosures. Another example is the neighborhood titled
Waterford Trail PH 2 East Village; the residential burglary count for this neighborhood
for the years of 2005-2009 was 0, 4, 5, 3, and 7, while the foreclosure count for the
same years was 0, 0, 0, 10, and 23. The residential burglary count for 2009 did in fact
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increase when foreclosures significantly increased in this neighborhood, yet the
residential burglary count was higher in years 2006 and 2007 when there were 0
foreclosures, and decreased slightly when foreclosures increased in 2008.
Just as important, many of the neighborhoods seemed to have maintained
stability among the residential burglary count throughout the years of 2005-2009 while
there was still an obvious increase in foreclosures. As mentioned previously, it may be
because the neighborhoods had higher collective efficacy and therefore were able to
impose informal social controls among the residences, and outsiders, of these
neighborhoods. One of the most obvious neighborhoods that remained stable even
though there was a substantial increase in foreclosures in 2009 was Summerport PH 5.
As presented in Table 1, this neighborhood’s residential burglary count went from 0, 2,
2, 1, and 2, while the foreclosures went from 0, 0, 1, 10, and 41 for the years of 20052009. Interestingly, although this neighborhood experienced a drastic increase in
foreclosures in 2009, the residential burglary count remained stable (Note: This
neighborhood’s characteristics are discussed later with the findings of the neighborhood
canvassing). Another neighborhood that displayed stability during an increase in
foreclosures was Moss Park Commons. In 2005-2009, the residential burglary count for
this neighborhood went from 0, 0, 0, 1, to 0, while the neighborhood had 0 foreclosures
for 2005-2008, and then it jumped to 12 in 2009.
Even more, while some neighborhoods seemed to maintain stability in residential
burglaries, other neighborhoods actually appeared to have a slight decrease in
residential burglary count, or a residential burglary count with an unusual pattern for the
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years of 2005-2009. For example, one neighborhood presented in Table 1, Sanctuary,
had an unusual pattern of residential burglaries during the years of interest. In fact, the
residential burglary count fluctuated from 5 in 2005, 4 in 2006, increased to 7 in 2007,
decreased to 2 in 2008, and slightly increased to 3 in 2009. The foreclosures recorded
in this neighborhood for 2005-2007 were 0, 3 in 2008, and 11 in 2009. Therefore, while
the foreclosures increased during the 5 years, the residential burglary count peaked in
2007, when foreclosures were 0, but actually decreased in 2008 and 2009 when the
foreclosures were increasing. Additionally, Las Palmas at Sand Lake Condos had a
more drastic change in residential burglary count. The residential burglary count in this
neighborhood was 6, 1, 14, 4, and 4, for 2005-2009, while the foreclosure count was 0
in 2005 and 2006, 1 in 2007, 2 in 2008, and jumped to 10 in 2009. Interestingly, when
the residential burglary count was at its highest in 2007 (n=14), the foreclosure count
was only at 1, and when the foreclosure count was at its highest in 2009 (n=10), the
residential burglary count reduced significantly to only 4. To gauge the level of
collective efficacy and how it may have played a role in whether residential burglary
increased, decreased, or remained stable in neighborhoods where foreclosures
increased, the method of neighborhood canvassing was used to locate certain
indicators of collective efficacy. The following section presents the findings of some of
the neighborhoods that were presented in Table 1.

Neighborhood Canvassing
After compiling all foreclosures for the years 2005-2009, I located the
neighborhoods with high foreclosures that were used to conduct the field observations.
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These neighborhoods ranged from having 0 foreclosures to 136 foreclosures within the
5-year span. In fact, the majority of the neighborhoods in Orange County had 0
foreclosures. As the number of foreclosures increased per neighborhood, the amount
of neighborhoods decreased, as one would expect. The cut-off for what constituted
high foreclosures was 20. This amount of foreclosures was chosen as a cut-off point
because there was a natural break in the data. As the numbers in foreclosures
decreased below 20, the amount of these neighborhoods drastically increased, once
again forming a positively skewed distribution. Therefore, the neighborhoods that fell at
the tail end, or the extreme cases, were used for this part of the analysis. Using a cutoff of 20 total foreclosures for 2005-2009 produced a total of 52 neighborhoods within
Orange County.
Although the initial analysis of neighborhoods with high foreclosure rendered a
total of 52 different neighborhoods, the sample size further reduced because of other
factors. For instance, after locating these neighborhoods and then locating the total
residential burglaries within these specific neighborhoods, 17 of the neighborhoods had
a residential burglary count of 0. As previously discussed, these neighborhoods were
located outside of Orange County jurisdiction and therefore were dropped out of my
analysis. Furthermore, 4 other neighborhoods were not included in my final analysis
because although they had 20 or more foreclosures, they were not located in middle- or
upper-income tracts. Lastly, one other neighborhood was also eliminated from the
sample because actually locating the neighborhood posed many difficulties. The
neighborhood was located near SeaWorld and most of the area included in the

84

neighborhood was businesses and other tourist attractions. In the end, the total number
of neighborhoods used to conduct the field research portion of this research was 30
(n=30). After these 30 neighborhoods with high foreclosures were located, I then
located the residential burglary within these neighborhoods by mapping them in ArcGIS.
These results are presented in Figure 3.
The canvassing took place over the course of six days – four days of weekday
field observations and two days of weekend observations. It was important to visit the
neighborhoods on a weekday and a weekend because the activity could be very
different depending on work and school schedules. The weekdays of neighborhood
observations took place on May 12 (Thursday), May 13 (Friday), May 17 (Tuesday), and
May 18 (Wednesday) in the year 2011. The weekend drive-bys took place on June 4
and June 18, both on Saturdays in 2011. For the weekday neighborhood canvassing,
the public school system for Orange County was still in session, and I feel that was
important because the data could have been skewed if school was out for the summer
session since there could have been more activity within the neighborhoods. However,
the same neighborhoods were also visited on a weekend day to observe the activity
within the neighborhoods on a non-work/non-school day. The average time spent
canvassing each neighborhood ranged from 15-30 minutes, depending on the size of
the neighborhood. Once again, these neighborhoods all had high foreclosures (20 or
more for the combined years of 2005-2009), but some had higher numbers of
foreclosures while others had fewer.
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Foreclosures

Crime

Figure 11: Total Foreclosures and Residential Burglary by Count, 5 Years Combined
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The argument is that neighborhoods that have high foreclosures but less
residential burglary will exhibit stronger indicators of collective efficacy because they are
able to enforce informal social controls and maintain a sense of security (Morenoff et al.
2001). All of this was based on the condition, activity, and other attributes of the
neighborhood. My research located indicators of collective efficacy by conducting
unobtrusive field observations, or neighborhood canvasses. In particular, I focused on
visible physical and social characteristics of neighborhoods as indicators of collective
efficacy. For example, some indicators were: was the neighborhood gated, was the
perimeter fenced, was there an HOA or was it deed restricted? I measured the amount
of foot and vehicle activity as well as outside residential activity within the neighborhood.
I also looked at the condition of homes, vacant, foreclosed, and occupied, as well as
any other signs of disorder.
The following presents an overview of the thirty neighborhoods which were
observed to locate indicators or characteristics of collective efficacy. The original field
notes were more explicit, but I am discussing the main components of the canvasses to
offer snapshots of the neighborhoods to help the reader visualize the characteristics of
the neighborhoods. To do so, I combined the foreclosure and residential burglary rates
for the years 2005-2009. Just as important, the rates presented for the following
neighborhoods are per 100 homes, also making it a percentage of the total number of
homes that was threatened by both foreclosures and residential burglaries. The
neighborhoods’ foreclosure and residential burglary rates are presented in Table 2. A
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more detailed table of the neighborhood canvasses is presented in the Appendix. Also,
a map of the top 30 neighborhoods that were canvassed is presented in Figure 12.
Table 2: Top 30 Neighborhoods’ Foreclosure and Residential Burglary Rates

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Neighborhood
Name
Hawthorne Village Condos
Villanova at Hunters Creek Condos
Sand Lake Private Residences Condos
Sanctuary at Bay Hill Condos
Summerport PH5
Crest at Waterford Lakes Condos
Palms Villa Residencecs Condos
Audubon Villas at Hunters Creek Condos
Bella Terra Condos
Sandhill Preserve
Capri at Hunters Creek Condos
Eagle Creek PH 1A
Waterford Trails PH 2 East Village
Plantation Park Private Residences Con.
Los Terranos
Sandpoint at Meadow Woods
La Cascada PH 1
Cedar Bend at Meadow Woods PH 1
Island Cove Villas PH 3
Wyndham Lakes ESTS UT 1
Heather Glen at Meadow Woods
Tudor Grove at Timber Springs
Spring Isle UT 1
Lakes of Windermere PH 2A
Island Walk
Discovery Palms Condos
Signature Lakes-Parcel 1C
Timber Isle
Huntcliff Park
Windrose at Southmeadow UT 2

Fore.
Count
87
72
62
60
52
48
47
46
46
42
39
35
33
32
29
28
28
27
27
26
24
23
22
22
21
21
21
20
20
20

Rates are per 100 homes; also a %
Table is in order of highest to lowest foreclosures

88

R.B.*
Count
69
14
31
20
7
31
12
20
15
15
14
22
19
15
5
24
23
19
15
36
29
7
8
3
17
7
7
13
14
11

Tract/
Income
170.08/MI
170.07/U
171.07/U
148.13/U
171.05/U
167.19/U
170.08/MI
170.07/U
152.01/MI
168.05/MI
170.07/U
167.04/U
167.19/U
170.05/MI
**
168.05/MI
168.05/MI
168.05/MI
168.05/MI
168.05/MI
168.05/MI
167.19/U
167.19/U
171.03/U
168.05/MI
170.05/MI
171.05/U
167.19/U
168.05/MI
168.05/MI

Fore.
Rate
23.8
23.1
14.8
19.7
16.4
17.3
24.4
13.0
12.7
28.0
15.6
7.3
10.1
9.9
26.9
20.6
13.9
15.8
15.4
6.5
13.3
17.4
7.3
10.7
11.1
6.3
6.5
10.5
9.9
18.3

*Residential Burglary
**135.06,135.07,167.11/MO/MI/MI

R.B.*
Rate
18.9
4.5
7.4
6.6
2.2
11.2
6.2
5.7
4.2
10.0
5.6
4.6
5.8
4.6
4.6
17.6
11.4
11.1
8.6
9.0
16.1
5.3
2.7
1.5
8.9
2.1
2.2
6.8
6.9
10.1

Figure 12: Map of Top 30 Neighborhoods
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Field Observations of the Thirty Neighborhoods
Hawthorne Village Condos
Foreclosure Rate: 23.8
Residential Burglary Rate: 18.9
Hawthorne Village Condos lie in Census tract 170.08, which is considered a
middle-income tract. According to the American Community Survey (2005-2009), the
racial/ethnic composition of the tract is as follows: 33.5 % white; 10% Black/African
American; 46% Hispanic; and 7.8% Asian. The neighborhood is located in a fairly busy
area, near SeaWorld in Orlando. The several roads nearby are heavily trafficked, with a
newer shopping plaza nearby, and a Publix Shopping Center as the closest store.
There is one entrance and exit into the condominium complex and it is gated, with 47
separate buildings with approximately 365 individual condos. Also, there is a Home
Owners’ Association (HOA) for the complex, which is typical for condos, and it is
responsible for lawn maintenance. Therefore, the grass is not personally maintained by
residents. The perimeter of the neighborhood is partly fenced, and there are speed
bumps located in the neighborhood. The condos were in fairly good condition; they
were older (built in 1985) but seemed to be well maintained. Within the neighborhood
there are two public pools, two tennis courts, and a small park/playground. Moreover,
as Table 1 indicates, Hawthorne Village Condos’ foreclosure count for 2005-2009 was
0, 0, 0, 9, and 78. The residential burglary count for the same years was 18, 3, 7, 28,
and 13, which indicates that while the neighborhood did show an increase in residential
burglaries as foreclosures increased, residential burglaries actually decreased by

90

almost half in 2009 even though the foreclosures skyrocketed in the same year.
Therefore, there is no support for the basic argument of social disorganization theory.
Canvass 1 - May 13, 2011, 2:15 pm
Upon arrival at Hawthorne Village Condos, the entrance and exit gates were
open. In fact, it appeared that the gates continuously stay open, or at least during the
day time. The neighborhood was fairly quiet in activity, and the parking lot was about a
quarter filled with cars; however, it was a weekday and residents were probably at work,
school, or out for the day. During the time spent canvassing the neighborhood, there
were three vehicles going through the neighborhood, two people recorded as foot traffic,
and one person who was outside. Furthermore, as discussed above, the complex has
two public pools, both of which were vacant during this canvass. The two tennis courts
and one park/playground were also vacant, once again supporting the finding that the
neighborhood activity on this day was fairly minimal. There were no visible signs
indicating a ‘For Sale’ or ‘For Rent’ residence, but this can be difficult sometimes to
measure in neighborhoods with condominiums because they did not normally display
these signs in a yard like a single-family neighborhood would. However, there were
visible vacancies or foreclosures in the complex (n=3), which were identified by seeing
empty condos through windows or lockboxes (which are placed on secured foreclosures
by mortgage contracting companies). Also, there were signs of some physical disorder
within the neighborhood – blinds ripped, screens ripped or pulled out, and boarded
windows (approximately three visible windows boarded). In addition, even though the
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premise is maintained by grounds keepers since it is an HOA community, compared to
other neighborhoods and surrounding areas, the grass was overgrown at this canvass.
Canvass 2 – June 4, 2011, 1:00 pm
Upon second arrival at Hawthorne Village Condos, the entrance and exit gates
were once again open. This canvass took place on a Saturday, and the activity on this
weekend increased slightly compared to the first canvass discussed above. The
parking lot was approximately half full of vehicles, and the car traffic within the
neighborhood had a count of two. The count of the foot traffic was five, and the count of
people outside was three. Despite this increase in activity, there was still no one
located at the pools, the tennis courts, or the park/playground.
As both of the neighborhood canvasses illustrated, Hawthorne Village Condos
did exhibit signs of physical disorder which is a strong indicator of a lower level of
collective efficacy (Skogan 1992). Even though the activity did increase in the
neighborhood on the weekend, the activity was still fairly low, indicating lower social
disorder (Woldoff 2002). Also, the visible vacancies or foreclosures, the physical signs
of disorder (boarded windows), the gates left open, the grass overgrown, the perimeter
only partly fenced, and the surrounding heavily trafficked, busy area, are all strong
indicators of an area exhibiting lower levels of collective efficacy. Thus, the lower
collective efficacy among this neighborhood could explain the relationship between the
overall high foreclosure and high residential burglary rates compared to other
neighborhoods.
Villanova at Hunters Creek Condos
Foreclosure Rate: 23.1
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Residential Burglary Rate: 4.5
Villanova at Hunters Creek Condos is located within Census tract 170.07, which
is an upper-income tract. The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as follows: 49.1%
white; 9.5% Black/African American; 29.8% Hispanic; and 9.4% Asian. This
condominium complex is located within Hunters Creek, which is a fairly large
neighborhood of other smaller neighborhoods, some being single-family neighborhoods
while others are condos/townhomes, such as Villanova. Hunters Creek in general, and
Villanova in particular, is located within a fairly busy, reasonably new area. The area
has newer shopping and plazas, with a Target Supermarket, a Publix, and an Office
Depot located nearby. Also, there are several golf courses located nearby, which
seems to be common in Hunters Creek. Sunchild Academy, a child care facility, is also
located near the neighborhood. There is a main entrance and exit located in the front of
the neighborhood with two gates for entrance and exit of the neighborhood, and another
gate located on the side of the neighborhood.
Villanova was built in 2001 with 26 separate buildings with multiple townhomes
located in each. Each building ranges from two to three stories. In total there are
slightly more than 300 individual condos/townhomes. In addition, each townhome has
its own personal garage. There is a Home Owners’ Association for the neighborhood,
which as mentioned earlier, is typical of condos/townhomes, and the HOA handles all
maintenance and yard care. Therefore the grounds are nicely kept and very eyeappealing. Even more, the entire perimeter of the neighborhood is fenced. The
neighborhood does not have a park or playground, or a tennis or basketball court
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located on the premise; however, there is a community pool. As Table 1 points out, the
foreclosure count for Villanova in the years of 2005-2009 was 0, 0, 5, 26, and 41. The
residential burglary count for 2005-2009 was 2, 2, 3, 5, and 2. For the most part, the
residential burglary count remained fairly stable, with a small decrease between 2008
and 2009; yet, the foreclosure count increased considerably in 2008 and then again in
2009. Therefore, it does not appear that residential burglaries in this neighborhood
were hugely affected by the large increase in foreclosures.
Canvass 1 – May 17, 2011, 2:00 pm
Upon arriving at Villanova at Hunters Creek Condos, the main entrance and exit
gates mentioned above were open. The neighborhood’s side gate, however, was
closed. The neighborhood was somewhat quiet with approximately a half full parking
lot, as would be expected on a weekday since people are typically either at work,
school, or out-and-about in the afternoon. While conducting the observations and
canvass of the neighborhood, I counted four vehicles either coming or going within the
neighborhood, three people outside walking (either to/from car, or on sidewalk), and one
person located directly outside of a condos. There were no people located at the pool
within the neighborhood.
Furthermore, there were no visible ‘For Sale’ or ‘For Rent’ signs, but as
mentioned in the discussion on Hawthorne Village Condos, this can be difficult
sometimes because condos and/or townhomes do not always display these signs, such
as in a front yard, as a residential neighborhood would. Just as important, during the
course of the canvass, I could not visibly see any signs of foreclosures or vacancies.
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However, because the neighborhood is HOA maintained, as well as being a
condos/townhome, the grounds maintenance workers obviously take very good care of
the neighborhood. Specifically, they maintain the grounds (grass, shrubs), and
therefore identifying a foreclosure or vacancy by that measurement is difficult. With that
said, they do a very good job of keeping the grounds in order because the
neighborhood undoubtedly has foreclosures (total rate for 2005-2009 was 23.1, fifth
largest), but visibly seeing these was nearly impossible.
Canvass 2 – June 4, 2011, 12:30 pm
During the second canvass, which took place on a Saturday, there were
approximately five walkers and bikers located directly outside of the neighborhood on
the sidewalk. During the first canvass, the front gates were open; however, upon
arriving the second time, both main gates were closed. I gained access by following
another vehicle in. Just as interesting, the side gate, which was closed for the first
canvass, was not open. The parking lot had about the same amount of vehicles, or
perhaps even fewer vehicles present. The vehicle traffic counted though was seven on
this canvass, as compared to four on the first canvass. Therefore, there was a slight
increase in vehicle activity on the weekend canvass. The foot traffic count though was
only one on this visit (it was three on the weekday canvass), while the number of people
located outside of the housing remained constant at one. There was other activity on
this day, with movers and a moving truck parked within the neighborhood. The pool
was in fact occupied during this canvass with three people. Finally, there was
neighborhood security present driving in a golf cart.
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The results from both of the canvasses, coupled with the foreclosure and
residential burglary rates for 2005-2009, presented some interesting findings in regard
to Villanova’s level of collective efficacy and social disorganization. Even though the
neighborhood has the fifth highest rate in foreclosures for all years, there are certain
characteristics of the neighborhood that can help explain why the residential burglary
rate was considerably lower. Although the activity within the neighborhood was not
relatively high compared to other neighborhoods, there was a moderate level of activity.
Also, the neighborhood was fully fenced, located in an upper-income, newer built area,
had an obvious presence of a security guard, and did in fact close the entrance and exit
gates, as opposed to leaving them open all the time. So, there appears to be support
for the defensible space theory (Newman 1972) with the perimeter being fenced and the
gates closed much of the time. Also, since the neighborhood is clustered closely
together with townhomes also supports Newman’s theory of defensible space. In
addition, an increased feeling of collective efficacy among the residents could result
because of the presence of a security guard. These physical and social characteristics
are strong indicators of collective efficacy which can help explain the lower residential
burglary rate in the neighborhood.
Sand Lake Private Residences Condos
Foreclosures Rate: 14.8
Residential Burglary Rate: 7.4
Sand Lake Private Residences Condos lie in Census tract 171.07, which is an
upper-income tract. The racial/ethnic composition of this neighborhood is as follows:
69.9% white; 2.8% Black/African American; 10.9% Hispanic; and 13.5% Asian. The
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neighborhood is close to a busy interstate, I4, near the Dr. Phillips area, a higher
income, and more affluent suburb. There is a Wal-Mart Supercenter nearby, which
appears to be one of the main shopping areas for the neighborhood. There is one
entrance and/or exit for the neighborhood, and it is gated. The neighborhood is
comprised of 16 separate, three story buildings with slightly more than 400 total condos.
The neighborhood has a club house/office located near the front of the neighborhood.
Similar to the two previous neighborhoods, there is also a HOA that is responsible for
maintaining the grounds, such as lawn care, and therefore they are nicely kept and
none of the residents are responsible for the yard maintenance. The condos, although
built in 1994, were well kept, in a somewhat secluded, wooded area off of the main
road. All of the porches attached to each condo were screened in.
The perimeter of the neighborhood is partly fenced with a wooded area and
water surrounding other parts of the neighborhood. The entire neighborhood is fairly
large and spread out. There is a pool, tennis and basketball court, and park/playground
located within the neighborhood. According to Table 1, Sand Lake Private Residences
had a foreclosure count of 0, 0, 2, 20, and 40 for the years of 2005-2009, and a
residential burglary count of 4, 4, 5, 12, and 6 for the same years. So, there does
appear to be an increase in residential burglaries as foreclosures increase, with a
drastic increase in 2008, but then residential burglaries actually decreases in 2009,
although the foreclosures in the neighborhood doubled. With that said, it cannot be
concluded with certainty that there is a relationship between foreclosures and residential
burglary. Perhaps foreclosures are not a good indicator of social disorganization within
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more affluent neighborhoods. Either way, no certainty can be made on whether this
neighborhood could be considered socially disorganized.
Canvass 1 – May 13, 2011, 3:15 pm
Upon arrival at Sand Lake Private Residences Condos, the one gated
entrance/exit was open, allowing for easy access into the neighborhood. The parking
lot appeared to be about half full of parked vehicles, which has been consistent with
other neighborhoods and weekday canvassing. There were also grounds maintenance
men present who maintaining the grass and bushes. Along with the grounds keepers
present, there was activity within the neighborhood. For instance, during the canvass I
counted nine vehicles, which were coded as car traffic, six people coded as foot traffic,
and three people were coded as being outside. However, there was no one located at
the pool, tennis or basketball courts, or park/playground. Just as important, there were
no visible ‘For Sale’ or ‘For Rent’ signs, nor any visible signs of vacancies or
foreclosures; yet, an explanation for this was discussed in previous neighborhoods,
which could explain this finding, especially since this neighborhood has a foreclosure
count of 62 and a rate of 14.8 for all five years.
Canvass 2 – June 4, 2011, 2:00 pm
Same as the first canvass, the one gated entrance/exit into the neighborhood
was open. In fact, according to an individual who maintains foreclosed homes for
mortgage companies, and who has assisted in the maintenance of a handful of condos
in this exact neighborhood, every time he worked in the neighborhood the gate has
been open. Thus, it appears that although there is a security defense measure, a gate,
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it is rarely ever used to its full potential. Similar to the first canvass, the parking lot was
only about half full and the activity within the neighborhood was about the same. For
instance, the car traffic count was eight, the foot traffic count was five, and the number
of people located outside was six, which includes a father playing with his kids near
their condos. Also, there were two people at the pool and two youths playing basketball
at the hoops. There was also a garage sale going on while I canvassed the
neighborhood as well.
According to the discussion above, Sand Lake Private Residences Condos has
strong indicators of a lower level of collective efficacy compared to other neighborhoods
with lower residential burglaries, such as Villanova at Hunters Creek Condos. For
instance, although Sand Lake was also gated, the gate seemed to remain open most of
the time, if not all of the time. Just as important, this neighborhood is located off of a
major interstate, which can invite potential criminals because of its easy accessibility.
The neighborhood is also not fully fenced (Newman 1972), although it is fairly secluded
with woods and water surrounding other parts. These structural characteristics are
indicators of lower collective efficacy within the neighborhood which could help explain
the higher residential burglary rate. Even though the activity within the neighborhood
was fairly concentrated, the layout of the neighborhood could still reduce collective
efficacy, supporting the relationship between higher foreclosures and higher residential
burglary within Sand Lake Private Residences Condos.
Sanctuary at Bay Hill Condos
Foreclosure Rate: 19.7
Residential Burglary Rate: 6.6
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Sanctuary at Bay Hill Condos lies in Census tract 148.13, which is considered an
upper-income tract. The racial/ethnic composition of the tract is as follows: 61.3%
white; 7.1% Black/African American; 16.2% Hispanic; and 14% Asian. Similar to the
previous neighborhood, this neighborhood is located close to I4, and is situated in the
Dr. Phillips area. There are a lot of commercial businesses nearby, all of which are
newer and in very nice condition. For example, Ruth’s Chris, a highly acclaimed
steakhouse is located directly around the corner from Sanctuary at Bay Hill. Also, there
is a newer Publix shopping plaza nearby, which appears to be the primary means of
shopping for the residents. Directly down the street from the neighborhood is also the
Dr. Phillips Orange County Library. Also, right next door is the Dr. Phillips YMCA, with a
large park, pool, and gym. There is one entrance/exit into this somewhat large
neighborhood which is gated. There are a total of 38 separate buildings with a little
more than 300 condos/townhomes in the entire neighborhood. The condos were built in
1996.
Just as important, the neighborhood is partly fenced with bricking and chain link
fencing and wooded areas around other parts. Several other neighborhoods are
located nearby. There are speed bumps throughout the neighborhood. Once again, as
with most condos/townhomes, there is a HOA present in the neighborhood. However,
with Sanctuary at Bay Hill, residents are responsible for the maintenance of their own
yards, which has resulted in taller grass (compared to other neighborhoods), weeds,
and dead grass, and also mounds of mulch in some yards. So, there were definite
signs of physical disorder with the lack of yard maintenance for some of the residences
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of the condos/townhomes. Despite that, the majority of the condos/townhomes
themselves appeared to be in nice condition, with no noticeable debris in the
neighborhood. What’s more, there is a community pool, a tennis and basketball court,
and three parks/playgrounds located within the neighborhood, as well as a community
center/office located near the front of the neighborhood. As Table 1 shows, Sanctuary
at Bay Hill’s foreclosure count for 2005-2009 was 0, 0, 0, 6, and 54, while the residential
burglary count for 2005-2009 was 5, 0, 4, 3, and 8. Accordingly, there does appear to
be an increase in residential burglaries in 2009, when the foreclosure count also
increased. Although this increase does not appear to be drastic, it nonetheless is an
increase and supports the theory’s hypothesis that as foreclosures increase (residential
instability/mobility), which is an indicator of social disorganization, residential burglary
will also increase.
Canvass 1 – May 17, 2011, 11:30 am
Upon arrival at Sanctuary at Bay Hill Condos, the gate entering the neighborhood
was open. Located near the gate were grounds keepers or lawn maintenance workers
who were landscaping the area. The level of vehicle activity in the neighborhood this
day was fairly active, with eleven vehicles reportedly coming and going. Yet, there were
not many vehicles parked outside of each condos/townhome. This could be explained
by the fact that it was a weekday and residents could be at work, school, or doing other
daily activities; plus, there were garages at each condos/townhome and the vehicle
could have been parked inside, making it not visible during the canvass. Despite the
numerous vehicle traffic, there was not much foot traffic or people outside on this day.
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In fact, there was only one woman going to check her mail at the community mailboxes,
and another woman walking within the neighborhood. There was another person who
was outside of his/her condos/townhome.
Furthermore, there were several people located at the community center for a
function. On this day there was no one at the pool, the parks/playgrounds, or the tennis
and basketball courts. Interestingly, the three parks/playgrounds were actually taped off
for some reason, perhaps for maintenance on the equipment. There were no visible
‘For Sale’ signs, nor were there any visible signs of foreclosures and/or vacancies.
There were two visible ‘For Rent’ signs though. However, because some of the yards
were unkempt, these condos/townhomes could have been in foreclosure or vacant, but
without any other signs of such (e.g., lock boxes on the front door), it cannot be
concluded with any certainty. Yet, we know there have been, and most likely are,
foreclosures located within this neighborhood since it had a total foreclosure rate of 19.7
(or about 20% of all homes in the neighborhood have been, or are, in foreclosure) for
the years of 2005-5009, placing it seventh on the list of highest foreclosure rate.
Canvass 2 – June 4, 2011, 1:30 pm
Upon second arrival at Sanctuary at Bay Hill Condos, which took place on a
Saturday, the entrance’s gate was closed. I gained access into the neighborhood by
following another vehicle through the gate. The neighborhood’s activity was about the
same, if not more, than the first canvass. For instance, the vehicle traffic count was
eight, the foot traffic count was three, and the count of outside people was five, some of
which were residents mowing their yards. Plus, there were two people located at the
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pool, and two children playing in one of the parks in the neighborhood; there was no
one at the tennis or basketball courts though. The neighborhood appeared to be about
half full with residents’ vehicles parked outside the condos/townhomes. Once again,
some of the yards were still poorly maintained. The Dr. Phillips YMCA located nearby
was very busy this day, with a field/activity day going on for children.
As a result of both of the neighborhood canvasses, this neighborhood did exhibit
signs of physical disorder, which are strong indicators of a low level of collective efficacy
(Taylor 1984; Skogan 1992). This could help to explain the high level of residential
burglaries. As mentioned previously, this neighborhood ranks seventh in foreclosure
rates and in the middle of the list in residential burglary rates. Thus, although this
neighborhood ranks fifteenth out of the total thirty neighborhoods in residential
burglaries, it still has a higher residential burglary rate than half of the other
neighborhoods. Although this neighborhood is located in an upper-income tract located
within the Dr. Phillips area, which is considered to be more affluent, and the higher
levels of traffic/activity within the neighborhood, there were physical signs of disorder
which appear to be stronger indicators of lower collective efficacy. For example,
numerous yards were poorly maintained. Also, the fact that the gate at the entrance of
the neighborhood does not stay closed could result in residents feeling less safe and
allow potential criminals an easy access and exit into the neighborhood. Additionally,
there were visible signs of residential instability with the ‘For Rent’ signs found within the
neighborhood. All of this taken together, it does appear that there are strong indicators
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supporting a lower level of collective efficacy, which could help explain the relationship
between foreclosures and residential burglary.
Summerport PH5
Foreclosure Rate: 16.4
Residential Burglary Rate: 2.2
The Summerport PH5 neighborhood lies in Census tract 171.05, which is
considered an upper-income tract. The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as
follows: 75.3% white; 5.8% Black/African American; 10.8% Hispanic; and 6.8% Asian.
The neighborhood is located in the town of Windermere, Florida, in a fairly new and nice
neighborhood. The area is more secluded with a golf course and a public park next to it
and across the street. Around the corner there are shopping plazas with a Publix
grocery store located within. Yet, located directly outside one of the entrances of the
neighborhood is a smaller shopping plaza that has several vacant store fronts. There
are three entrances/exits for the neighborhood, none of which are gated. As the name
of the neighborhood suggests, there are multiple phases, or PH’s to this neighborhood.
Thus, when conducting the neighborhood canvasses, I made an effort to stay within
PH5 only. Of particular concern to this research is PH5 only, because this phase had
the highest foreclosures, or at least twenty or more foreclosures to have made the list.
In fact, two phases to Summerport, PH1 and PH2, which are directly connected to PH5,
have less than ten foreclosures and residential burglaries for the five years.
The multiple entrances and the various recreations of the neighborhood are
shared throughout the neighborhood. With that said, the neighborhood has one
community/neighborhood pool, two tennis courts and a basketball court, and three
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parks/playgrounds. The houses (approximately 300) in the neighborhood were built in
the mid 2000s, during the construction boom. There is a Home Owner’s Association
present, which regulates the types of fencing the residents can use, but each resident is
still responsible for his/her personal yards. Some of the yards are fenced, but the
majority are not. Even more, the residential structures throughout the neighborhood
vary, from one to two-story homes as well as townhomes. The neighborhood is partly
fenced with wooded areas surrounding other parts. The neighborhood also has areas
that resemble small parks with benches and grills, and also has many sidewalks and
walk/bike paths located within.
Just as interesting, as Table 1 suggests, Summerport PH5 remained stable in the
residential burglary count even though the foreclosures increased over the five years.
For instance, the foreclosures for 2005-2009 went from 0, 0, 1, 10, to 41, while the
residential burglary count in the same years held fairly steady from 0, 2, 2, 1, and 2.
Thus, although the foreclosure count increased dramatically in 2009, the residential
burglary in the area did not change. So, the assertion that as foreclosures increase and
a neighborhood becomes socially disorganized, residential burglary will also increase,
was not supported in this neighborhood.
Canvass 1 – May 17, 2011, 12:15 pm
Upon arrival at the neighborhood, there was a ‘No Soliciting’ sign posted at the
entrance. Also, it appeared that the neighborhood did not have much outside,
residential activity. Additionally, it was obvious that the neighborhood grounds, those in
which the HOA maintain, are very nicely kept with the grass and shrubs nicely
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manicured. Numerous personal yards were also nicely kept; yet, many other yards
were not, with overgrown and/or dead grass, and a lot of weeds. A lot of these yards
were of homes that were visibly occupied, while others were obvious foreclosures.
Just as important, the various traffic recorded within the neighborhood ranged,
from twelve counted as vehicle traffic, three people counted as foot traffic, and two
people located outside of their home. Of those counted as foot traffic, there were two
people walking for exercise and one person walking his/her dog. Even more, there was
no one located at the community pool or at the tennis and basketball courts. Yet, there
was a mother and child playing in the park located within the neighborhood. There were
visible ‘For Sale’ and ‘For Rent’ signs posted at homes throughout the neighborhood.
Just as important, there were visible signs of vacancies and/or foreclosures. There
were identified by having overgrown yards while the home was obviously empty (can
visually see in the window that the home was vacant), and also having lock changes
and lock boxes on the front doors which are indicative that a property preservation
company, hired by mortgage companies, has secured the home. Besides the many
yards that were overgrown, there did not appear to be other visible signs of disorder
(i.e., the streets and yards did not have debris).
Canvass 2 – June 18, 2011, 11:15 am
Upon second arrival at Summerport PH5, lawn maintenance workers were
present to maintain the neighborhood’s grounds. This canvass took place on a
Saturday and therefore there was more activity recorded. For instance, there was a
garage sale going on, which undoubtedly increased the traffic count for the
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neighborhood. The vehicle traffic count was twenty-three, almost double from what it
was on the first canvass. However, this is expected because there typically is more
activity within a neighborhood on a weekend in which residents are home and more
mobile, as opposed to at work. The foot traffic count was two people, both of which
were residents walking their dogs. The number of people located outside also
increased on this day, with a count of ten, ranging from residents working on their yards,
getting the mail, etc. There was still no one located at the community pool, at the tennis
and basketball courts, and on this day, no one at the various parks/playgrounds.
Moreover, although the neighborhood did not appear to have signs of physical disorder,
such as trash and/or debris, there were trash cans, recycling bins, and trash bags
located at the end of driveways. Yet, this could have been because trash and recycling
day was either this day or the day before and the cans and bins had not been brought in
yet. Once again, some of the yards were poorly maintained, some of which were
obvious vacancies or foreclosures, while others were obviously occupied.
As both of the neighborhood canvasses illustrated, it appeared that this
neighborhood has compelling indicators supporting the claim that it had higher level of
collective efficacy. Interestingly, it ranked eleventh highest in foreclosures, but only
ranked twenty-fifth highest in residential burglaries. Although this neighborhood was not
gated, it was a large neighborhood with only three entrances and exits and was
surrounded by either fence, golf course, and wooded areas, all of which could decrease
the chance of an ‘easy out’ for criminals. Furthermore, the neighborhood was located in
a more secluded and rural area (Putnam 2007) and higher-income area, which could
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decrease criminal activity. There were also high levels of activity which is a strong
indicator of lower social disorder (Woldoff 2002) resulting in a more collective efficacy.
Although the foot traffic and number of people recorded outside was not significantly
high, the vehicle traffic recorded on both days of canvassing for Summerport PH5 was
the highest compared to all of the neighborhoods used in the study. Just as important,
the fact that the neighborhood appeared to be relatively new seemed be an indicator of
more collective efficacy. In the end, although there were some signs of physical
disorder (i.e., vacant/foreclosed homes and unkempt yards), it appeared that the other
indicators found in the neighborhood were stronger in increasing collective efficacy.
Crest at Waterford Lakes Condos
Foreclosure Rate: 17.3
Residential Burglary Rate: 11.2
Crest at Waterford Lakes Condos is located in Census tract 167.19, which is
considered to be an upper-income tract. The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as
follows: 53.8% white; 8.3 Black/African American; 28% Hispanic; and 7.3% Asian.
These condos are located in a fairly busy residential and commercial area, with a lot of
shopping and traffic. Directly across the street from the neighborhood is a shopping
plaza with a Winn Dixie store, but on a commercial street around the corner is more
shopping, such as a shopping mall and a Home Depot. There is only one entrance/exit
into the neighborhood and it is not gated. Posted at the entrance is a sign warning that
there is video surveillance of the entrance and exit. There is a Home Owner’s
Association (HOA), which once again, is common in condos. Therefore, the grounds
(grass and shrubs) and buildings are maintained by the maintenance crew of the

108

neighborhood. Thus, the residences of the condos are not responsible for the
maintenance of the yards.
Located near the entrance is a community area, with an office and community
pool for the residents of the condos. There is no tennis or basketball court or
park/playground located within the neighborhood. In addition, there is a fence
surrounding most of the perimeter of the neighborhood, with a heavily wooded area
separating the neighborhood from another residential neighborhood where there is no
fence. Even more, there are a total of 14 different, multi-story buildings, with roughly
275 individual condos located in each. The condos were built in 1998. The overall
appearance of the condos appeared to be very well taken care of and maintained.
Lastly, all of the condos have personal balconies, with the bottom floor balconies being
exposed, or not enclosed with screens.
As Table 1 indicates, Crest at Waterford Lakes Condos supported the claim of
social disorganization that as residential instability/mobility, or foreclosures, increased,
residential burglaries would also increase. For example, the foreclosures for 2005-2009
were as follows: 0, 0, 1, 10, and 37; while the residential burglaries in the same years
were as follows: 0, 6, 2, 2, and 16. There was a large increase in 2009 when both
foreclosures skyrocketed and reported residential burglary increased.
Canvass 1 – May 12, 2011, 11:45 am
Upon arrival at the neighborhood, the parking lot throughout the neighborhood
was approximately half full of vehicles. Similar with the above discussions, many of the
residents could have been at work, out, or at school. With that said, many of the
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vehicles that were parked in the neighborhood had college/university parking permits,
so it was apparent that many of the residents in this particular neighborhood were
college students. The condos were not located far from the University of Central
Florida’s campus, so this makes sense. There was minimal activity within the
neighborhood on this day. For example, there were only three vehicles recorded as car
traffic, zero people recorded as foot traffic, and one person, a young woman outside
washing her car, recorded as outside activity on the day of the first neighborhood
canvass. Additionally, there was no one located at the neighborhood pool. There were
no visible ‘For Sale’ or ‘For Rent’ signs, but as mentioned above, this is common in
condominium neighborhoods in which they do not always have a yard to display the
sign. There were not any visible vacancies or foreclosures either, but these could have
been difficult to identify because of the multi-story arrangement of the condos.
Canvass 2 – June 18, 2011, 12:55 pm
The second canvass also took place on a Saturday, when there would typically
be more activity than a weekday. In fact, there was more recorded activity when this
canvass took place. For instance, there were seven vehicles recorded that day as car
traffic, two people considered foot traffic (both of which appeared to be heading to the
community pool), and six people were located outside, some of which were people
moving in/out because they had a U-Haul truck. The pool located in the neighborhood
also had several people occupying it. On this day of canvassing there was also an
Orange County Sheriff’s Office vehicle parked on the premise. It is not clear if the
officer lived in the neighborhood or whether just parked there, visiting. The various
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dumpsters located in the neighborhood also appeared to be fairly full with personal
belongings (e.g., dresser, mattresses, and personal trash), which was not seen the first
time canvassing. However, it should be pointed out that since the neighborhood seems
to be occupied by many college students, this time of the year typically reveals a large
transformation in residential living. For example, the spring semester of college is over,
and many students have either graduated and moving out, or new students moving in.
This is supported by the U-Haul truck present and the overabundance of personals
located in the dumpsters.
Since this is primarily a student-occupied neighborhood, where students
frequently move in and out, could explain the higher residential burglary rate because
this is a form of residential mobility itself (11.2; ranking fifth largest rate). Undoubtedly,
it is difficult to form bonds with people who are moving in and out constantly (Shaw and
McKay 1942), which could be reflected by the higher residential burglary rate. Another
indicator of lower collective efficacy was the fact that the neighborhood was not gated
and was located in a heavily populated area. Although there was some outside activity
within the neighborhood, ranging from car and foot traffic to people located outside,
there was still not a large amount compared to other neighborhoods, which is an
indicator of having lower collective efficacy. As mentioned previously, the ground floor
condos had balconies which were not enclosed, and therefore could be inviting to
criminals, especially those committing residential burglary because it does not create a
defensible space (Newman 1972). All in all, with a rate of 17.3 per 100 units over the
five years resulting in a foreclosure (ranking tenth in the sample), there is evidence from

111

the neighborhood canvasses that there is lower collective efficacy based on strong
structural indicators of physical and social disorder.
Palms Villa Residences Condos
Foreclosure Rate: 24.2
Residential Burglary Rate: 6.2
Palms Villa Residences Condos lie within Census tract 170.08, which is
considered a middle-income tract. The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as
follows: 33.5% white; 10% Black/African American; 46% Hispanic; and 7.8% Asian.
The complex is located in a fairly quiet area, with other condos across the street and an
elementary school (Waterbridge Elementary School) and county park next door (Lester
Mandell Park). There is a Costco store located less than half a mile away as well.
Further down the main road (Central Florida PKWY) of the condos the activity increases
and is a fairly busy commercial and residential area; however, at this end of the main
road there is less activity and the neighborhood is more isolated. There are two
entrances/exits to the neighborhood and both are gated. Just as important, the
neighborhood is fully fenced, with seven large, three-story buildings containing almost
200 privately owned condos that were built in 2003. A community center/office is
located at the front entrance of the condos. The neighborhood does have a Home
Owners’ Association which handles all maintenance of Palms Villa Residences Condos.
Thus, the residents do not maintain any grass themselves, and the grounds are in very
nice condition. The condos themselves are newer and also in very nice condition. The
complex has a community pool located within, but no tennis or basketball courts or
playgrounds.
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According to Table 1, the foreclosure count for the years of 2005-2009 were as
follow: 0, 0, 0, 9, and 38; while the residential burglary count for the same years was 6,
2, 0, 0, and 2. Therefore, while there was an increase in foreclosures between 20072009, there was not such an increase in residential burglary during the same years. In
fact, it appears that when foreclosures were at their lowest in this neighborhood,
residential burglaries was at its highest, and when foreclosures increased, residential
burglaries actually decreased or remained stable. Thus, the expectation that as
foreclosures increase, the neighborhood becomes more socially disorganized, and
therefore crime, such as residential burglaries, increases, is not met with this
neighborhood.
Canvass 1 – May 13, 2011, 2:00 pm
Upon arrival at Palms Villa Residences Condos, both of the entrance/exit gates
were closed. I was unable to gain access by following in, and therefore my canvass
took place directly outside of the neighborhood in front of the condos’ office. Here I
could visually see inside part of the complex as well as all vehicle activity entering
and/or leaving the neighborhood. Posted on the gates was a ‘No Trespassing’ sign. It
was very evident that the neighborhood went to great measures to prevent easy access
into the neighborhood. Although I could not gain access into the neighborhood, I could
visually see that the parking lot was approximately half full of vehicles. Also, the
neighborhood appeared to be fairly quiet, with minimal activity. This is to be expected
though, considered that this is a weekday and many people could either be at work or
school.
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While observing the neighborhood, I did count four vehicles coming and/or going.
However, I could not visually see any foot traffic or people outside from where I was
posted. Also, there was no one located at the pool, which I could visually see.
Unfortunately, since I could not gain access into the complex, I could not see if there
were any ‘For Sale’ or ‘For Rent’ condos, nor could I visually see any signs of vacancies
or foreclosures. However, similar to other condos, it would be expected to be difficult to
observe any because the premises is maintained by the HOA and many times condos
do not allow residents to display signs indicating a unit is ‘For Sale’ or ‘For Rent.’ As
mentioned earlier, there is a county park located next door, Lester Mandell Park, and
there was one person at the park on this day – a woman laying or sleeping on a table.
Canvass 2 – June 4, 2011, 12:45 pm
On the second canvass of the neighborhood both gates were once again closed
and unfortunately I could not gain access. Because this canvass took place on a
weekend, the activity at the neighborhood did increase. For example, the counted
vehicle traffic either coming or leaving the neighborhood was five. Once again, I was
unable to visually observe any foot traffic, but I was able to observe four people outside.
Even more, there were three residents at the pool on this Saturday. Besides this
activity, the neighborhood still appeared to be fairly quiet. Lastly, there was a man
playing soccer at the park across the street.
Although this neighborhood did not increase in residential burlgary when
foreclosures increased, there were certain indicators found during the canvasses that
help to explain this phenomenon. The fact that the neighborhood is gated and locked
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could decrease the chance of criminals entering and committing burglaries. Just as
important, the complex was fenced around the entire property, and thus could act as a
deterrent to criminals. Having these barriers and the complex being closely clustered
lends support to Newman’s (1972) defensible space theory. The fact that the
neighborhood was gated, in nice condition, fully fenced, ‘No Trespassing’ signs present,
and located in a quiet, isolated area, were strong indicators of a higher level of collective
efficacy. These indicators can help in explaining the lower residential burglary rate in
the neighborhood (sixteenth largest), even though the foreclosure rate was high (third
largest).
Audubon Villas at Hunters Creek Condos
Foreclosure Rate: 13.0
Residential Burglary Rate: 5.7
Audubon Villas at Hunters Creek Condos are located within Census tract 170.07,
which is considered an upper-income tract. The racial/ethnic composition of the tract is
as follows: 49.1% white; 9.5% Black/African American; 29.8% Hispanic; and 9.4%
Asian. Similar to a previously discussed neighborhood, Villanova, Audubon Villas is
located within a larger neighborhood called Hunters Creek. Therefore, there are many
different residential neighborhoods located nearby, as well as a golf course and a Super
Target store. Also, a very busy road, Orange Blossom Trail, is located nearby,
increasing the traffic in the surrounding area. Audubon Villas, however, is not located
directly off the busy road and is fairly quiet. There is one entrance/exit into the
neighborhood and it is gated. There are sixteen different buildings that were built in
1997, which contain roughly 350 private condos, and the neighborhood is partly fenced.
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There is a golf course and other residential neighborhoods backing up to the
neighborhood.
Even more, there is a Home Owners’ Association for the neighborhood which
handles the grounds maintenance; thus, the yards are nicely maintained and residents
are not themselves responsible for the maintenance. The condos are in nice condition.
Audubon Villas has a community pool and a tennis and a basketball court located
within. There is no park or playground located within the neighborhood however.
Moreover, as Table 1 indicates, Audubon Villas’ foreclosure count for 2005-2009 was 0,
0, 1, 3, and 42, while the residential burglary count for the same years was 5, 2, 6, 3,
and 4. As these findings suggest, the residential burglary count remained fairly stable
over the five years, despite the drastic increase in foreclosures in the latter years,
specifically 2009. As a result, the assertion that as foreclosures increase, residential
burglaries would also increase because it becomes socially disorganized is not
supported for this neighborhood.
Canvass 1 – May 17, 2011, 2:20 pm
Upon arrival at Audubon Villas at Hunters Creek Condos, the entrance and/or
exit gate was open so I was able to gain access easily. The neighborhood was fairly
quiet with not much activity. This is to be expected on a weekday since many residents
are most likely working or at school. The grounds were nicely kept and maintained.
During the duration of the neighborhood canvass there were three vehicles recorded as
vehicle traffic, zero people recorded as foot traffic, and two people located outside.
There was also no one located at the community pool or the tennis and basketball
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courts within the neighborhood. At the end of the canvass though there was a school
bus letting students off right outside of the neighborhood and many were entering the
neighborhood, indicating that they most likely lived within this neighborhood. Similar to
previous findings, there were no visible signs indicating ‘For Sale’ or ‘For Rent’ condos,
and there were no visible signs of vacancies or foreclosures; however, because the
neighborhood consists of condos, we know that they are less likely to display these
signs and the grass is maintained by the HOA and therefore no visible signs of physical
disorder, indicating that a property is possibly vacant or foreclosed. With that said,
there were no other visible signs of physical disorder (e.g., no trash or debris within the
neighborhood, no boarded windows, etc.).
Canvass 2 – June 4, 2011, 11:45 am
Upon second arrival at Audubon Villas, the gate at the entrance/exit of the
neighborhood was once again open. Although this canvass took place on a Saturday,
the level of activity did not notably increase. For example, the vehicle traffic count was
three, same as the first canvass, there was still no recorded foot traffic, and the number
of people outside was still two. There was no one at the tennis or basketball courts
once again, but there was a large amount of people located at the community pool. It
appeared that there was a party and there was at least ten or more people there. Even
more, the parking lot was more than half full, which is expected on a weekend when
less people are either at school or work. During this canvass, a Florida State Trooper’s
vehicle was parked in the parking lot. There were also visible student parking permits
for the local university, University of Central Florida, indicating that some of the

117

residents in this neighborhood were students. There was a runner on the outside
sidewalk of the neighborhood, and the car traffic this day seemed to be more
congested. Lastly, there were golfers present on the golf course next to the
neighborhood.
As the results of two canvasses suggest, there were certain indicators of
collective efficacy within the neighborhood that assist in explaining the overall
residential burglary. As previously mentioned, this neighborhood lies in the middle of all
neighborhoods for both foreclosure and residential burglary rates (foreclosure rate:
13.0, ranking 17th; residential burglary rate: 5.7, ranking 18th). Besides the pool party
on the second day of canvassing, the neighborhood activity was fairly low. In truth, if
residents do not feel their neighborhood is safe then they may be less likely to be
outside and engage in interaction. As a result, they may be less likely to act as informal
agents of social control. Moreover, although the neighborhood is gated, the gate on
both canvasses was open and therefore does not serve as a barrier or defensible space
(Newman 1972) to possibly deter criminals. The neighborhood is not completely
surrounded with a fence either, which would also act as a possible barrier and deterrent
of criminals.
Although there was a State Trooper living in the neighborhood, he/she might not
have been present during the years of the study, 2005-2009, and therefore did not help
to reduce criminal activity within the neighborhood. Lastly, similar to a previously
discussed neighborhood, Crest at Waterford Lakes Condos, Audubon Villas also had
visible residents who were younger, which was concluded by university parking permits
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located on vehicles. Both of these neighborhoods had higher foreclosures and higher
counts of residential burglary. All in all, the physical and social characteristics were
strong indicators that this neighborhood had a lower level of collective efficacy.
Bella Terra Condos
Foreclosure Rate: 12.7
Residential Burglary Rate: 4.2
Bella Terra Condos lie within Census tract 152.01, which is considered a middleincome tract. The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as follows: 57.2% white;
24.6% Black/African American; 10.7% Hispanic; and 5.5% Asian. The surrounding area
of the neighborhood appeared to be older, but Bella Terra Condos are newer condos.
In fact, this neighborhood was the furthest north neighborhood visited for this research,
in the city of Maitland, Florida. The neighborhood is located off a fairly busy road and
also near a busy highway. The condos themselves are pushed back a little off the road,
and there is a La Petite daycare nearby. There are two entrances/exits located at the
front of the property, both of which are gated. In total, there are 14 individual buildings
with around 360 condos in entire complex that were built in 2000. There is a Home
Owners’ Association that maintains the yard and general upkeep on the structures.
Thus, individual residents are not responsible for the maintenance of any grass. There
is a fence surrounding the entire premises of the property.
Outside of the neighborhood, much of the condominium complex is surrounded
by woods and to the south there is a residential neighborhood. Within the neighborhood
there is a community pool, a tennis court, and a park/playground. Just as important,
according to Table 1, the foreclosures increased from 0, 0, 4, 11, to 31 in the years of
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2005-2009. What’s more, the residential burglary count for the same years actually
decreased as the foreclosures increased: 6, 6, 0, 2, and 1. As a result, this specific
neighborhood did not follow social disorganization theory’s argument that as a
neighborhood becomes more disorganized then crime, measured by residential
burglary, will increase. Interestingly, the neighborhood falls around the middle in ranking
of foreclosure and residential burglary rates, ranking eighteenth and twenty-third
respectively, so a further understanding of what makes this neighborhood different from
those with high foreclosures/high residential burglaries and high foreclosures/low
residential burglaries is warranted.
Canvass 1 – May 13, 2011, 12:20 pm
Upon arrival at Bella Terra Condos, one of the entrance/exit gates was left open
while the other gate was closed. Also, located at the gates was a sign posted indicating
that there is camera surveillance for the neighborhood and a neighborhood watch. The
neighborhood was fairly quiet and the parking lot was rather empty; yet, this is to be
expected since this day was a weekday and many residents could either be at work or
school. The condos were in nice condition and the grass/shrubs were nicely
maintained. During the duration of the canvass, the vehicle traffic count was eight,
there was zero foot traffic, and there were two people recorded as being outside, one of
which was a man working on his car. There was also a grounds/maintenance man out
walking the property. There were two people at the pool, but no one at the tennis court
or park/playground within the neighborhood. Also consistent with other condominium
complexes, there were zero visible ‘For Sale’ and ‘For Rent’ signs, nor were there any
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visual signs of vacancies or foreclosures. Just as important, the neighborhood
mentioned previously that Bella Terra is adjacent to appeared to be an older
neighborhood and many of the houses seem to show signs of more physical disorder.
Despite that, the entire surrounding neighborhood of Bella Terra had fewer foreclosures
and residential burglaries, so any spillover from another neighborhood would not
probably affect Bella Terra’s residential burglaries.
Canvass 2 – June 18, 2011, 12:15 pm
Upon second arrival at Bella Terra Condos on a Saturday, both of the entrance
and exit gates were closed. I was able to gain access however by following another
driver in. There was slightly more activity on this day, but the neighborhood was still
somewhat quiet. The vehicle traffic count on this day was nine, there was once again
zero foot traffic within the neighborhood, and there were four people counted outside of
their residences. There was also a mother and several children walking up the flights of
stairs to their condos. There were four people at the pool, but no one at the tennis court
of park/playground. The parking lot appeared to be about half full as well. In all, during
both canvasses the neighborhood did not exhibit any visual signs of physical disorder.
As both of the neighborhood canvasses illustrate, Bella Terra Condos did not
exhibit any obvious signs of physical disorder, which is a clear indicator of higher
collective efficacy. There was also a moderate level of foot traffic and number of people
outside that show a lack of social disorder (Woldoff 2002) and serve as indicators for
higher collective efficacy. The neighborhood was also gated, with one entrance’s gate
remaining closed and one remaining open. The neighborhood was fully fenced and at
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least half of it was surrounded by a wooded area. There were no strong indicators
found within this neighborhood that would support a low level of collective efficacy.
The structures themselves were also in good condition and the grounds were
nicely maintained. The neighborhood displayed signs indicating there were video
surveillance and a neighborhood watch present in the neighborhood, both of which
could increase a sense of safety within the neighborhood and possibly deter a criminal.
All of these indicators can help to explain why Bella Terra Condos were ranked 23rd
(residential burglary rate: 4.2 per 100 condos). While there were some indicators that
would suggest this neighborhood having less collective efficacy, there were additional
stronger indicators supporting a higher level of collective efficacy. Undoubtedly, these
indicators of collective efficacy could reduce criminal behavior (Sampson et al. 1997).
Sandhill Preserve
Foreclosure Rate: 28.0
Residential Burglary Rate: 10.0
Sandhill Preserve lies in Census tract 168.05, which is considered a middleincome tract. The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as follows: 23.3% white; 10%
Black/African American; 61% Hispanic; and 4.6% Asian. Sandhill Preserve is a smaller
neighborhood located within Arbor Meadows, a larger subdivision with multiple
neighborhoods. It is located at the end of the larger neighborhood. Also, this area is
located off of a busy state road. Near the very front of the larger neighborhood, newer
commercial shopping is present with a Publix Shopping Center as the main shopping for
Sandhill Preserve. There is one entrance and/or exit into the neighborhood and it is
gated. The neighborhood consists of approximately 150 newer (built in the mid 2000s,
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mostly, if not all, in 2005), one to two-story residential homes and is a smaller
neighborhood.
There is a Home Owners’ Association (HOA) present and it enforces guidelines
on privacy fences, and in this case, there are no privacy fences allowed. Residents are
responsible for their own yard maintenance, however. There is a fence surrounding
part of the perimeter of the neighborhood, with ponds and wooded areas surrounding
the remaining parts. There is no neighborhood pool, tennis or basketball court, or a
park/playground, but there are privately owned pools in the neighborhood.
Furthermore, as Table 1 indicates, Sandhill Preserve’s foreclosure count was 0, 0, 1,
15, and 26 for the years of 2005-2009, while the residential burglary count was 3, 2, 3,
5, and 2 for the years of 2005-2009. Therefore, as foreclosures increased in the five
years, the residential burglary count in the neighborhood actually remained fairly stable.
This does not support the hypothesis that high foreclosures will cause a neighborhood
to be socially disorganized and thus will result in an increase in residential burglaries.
Canvass 1 – May 17, 2011, 3:00 pm
Upon arrival at Sandhill Preserve, the entrance and exit gate was closed, but I
was able to gain access by following another vehicle in. At the entrance there was a
‘Neighborhood Watch’ and a ‘Deed Restricted’ sign posted. The neighborhood was
fairly quiet on this day, with a vehicle traffic count of seven, a foot traffic count of zero,
and the number of people outside of zero. As mentioned previously, there is no
community pool, sporting courts, or park/playground, so no measurement could be
made. Interestingly though, there were no visible ‘For Sale’ or ‘For Rent’ signs present
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in the neighborhood. There were approximately two visible homes that were either
vacant or in foreclosure though, based on the appearance of the yard and/or lock
changes and lock boxes present on the front door of the homes. Most of the homes
and yards appeared to be well taken care of, but there are some yards that were not
taken care of very well, both occupied and vacant. Even more, there was some yard
debris visible at some residences, which is a sign of physical disorder.
Canvass 2 – June 4, 2011, 11:00 am
Upon second arrival of Sandhill Preserve, the gate was once again locked, but I
was able to gain access by following another vehicle in. This canvass took place on a
Saturday, and as would be expected, the activity within the neighborhood did increase
moderately. The vehicle traffic count was five, slightly lower than the first canvass, but
the foot traffic count was three and the number of people located outside was two.
There was a yard maintenance company present working on a resident’s yard. Also,
there were several vehicles parked on the road on this day. Yet, the sidewalk directly
outside of the neighborhood was unoccupied. Similar to the first canvass, there were
yards that were not well maintained and some trash in backyards.
As the results from the two canvasses demonstrated above, there were some
obvious signs of physical disorder. For instance, the observable vacancies or
foreclosures, the unmaintained yards, and yard debris were all signs of physical
disorder (Skogan 1992). The neighborhood did not exhibit much activity, which is an
indicator of less collective efficacy within the neighborhood (Woldoff 2002). Also, none
of the yards were privately fenced which could act as a barrier or cause others to view it
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as a defensible space (Newman 1972) and assist in deterring crime. All of these
characteristics would support claim that the neighborhood has a higher residential
burglary rate. Interestingly however, there were some neighborhood characteristics
which would decrease crime, or residential burglaries, in a neighborhood. For example,
the fact that the neighborhood is more secluded and lies at the end of a larger
neighborhood, the neighborhood is comparatively small, it is gated and the gate
remained closed, and the signs posted at the entrance warning that there is a
neighborhood watch and it is a deed restricted neighborhood are indicators of a higher
collective efficacy. Therefore, it does appear that this neighborhood is taking steps in
the right direction to reduce residential burglary; however, the other indicators seem to
be stronger and override the other neighborhood characteristics.
Capri at Hunters Creek Condos
Foreclosure Rate: 15.6
Residential Burglary Rate: 5.6
Capri at Hunters Creek Condos lie in Census tract 170.07, which is considered
an upper-income tract. The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as follows: 49.1%
white; 9.5% Black/African American; 29.8% Hispanic; and 9.4% Asian. The
neighborhood of Capri lies within a larger neighborhood, Hunters Creek, same as two
previously discussed neighborhoods. Also, similar to the other neighborhoods in
Hunters Creek, the neighborhood is off of a very busy road, and a Target Supermarket
is nearby and a golf course is next door. Plus, there is a La Petite daycare in close
proximity. In fact, Capri Condos did seem much nicer and more expensive based solely
on appearance than both Villanova and Audubon Condos, although they were built in
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1998. There are two gated entrance/exits into the neighborhood, each positioned on a
different road. Moreover, there are 12 buildings with condos located in each (n=250),
as well as 11 smaller buildings containing private parking garages for the residents.
Since this is a condominium complex, there is a Home Owners’ Association, which
maintains the premises and especially the grass; therefore, residents are not
responsible for any yard care.
There are speed bumps throughout the neighborhood and the neighborhood’s
perimeter is mostly fenced, except for the side of the neighborhood that is near a very
busy road, in which a pond acts as a barrier. There is a community pool inside the
neighborhood, but there is not a tennis or basketball court or park/playground. Plus, all
of the condos have balconies, and the balconies on the bottom floor are fully enclosed
with screens. According to Table 1, Capri at Hunters Creek Condos’ foreclosure count
for 2005-2009 was 0, 0, 1, 2, and 36. Just as important, the residential burglary count
for the neighborhood for 2005-2009 was 1, 2, 3, 4, and 4, showing a slight increase in
residential burglaries as foreclosures also increased. Granted, the increase in
residential burglaries was not a large increase like the foreclosure increase was, but
unquestionably the residential burglaries did increase in the same years the
foreclosures increased. So, the argument was supported with this neighborhood: as
foreclosures increased, which is an indicator of being socially disorganized, so did
residential burglary.
Canvass 1 – May 17, 2011, 2:45 pm
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Upon arrival at Capri at Hunters Creek Condos, the two gates entering and
exiting the neighborhood were closed and I could not gain access. However, I was able
to conduct some of the canvass from outside of the neighborhood. From my position
outside of the neighborhood, it did appear that the neighborhood was kept in very nice
condition with no debris or trash around the premises. Also, I counted two vehicles
coming/going from the neighborhood, which was counted as vehicle traffic. I was
unable to see any foot traffic and therefore the count was zero, but I was able to see
two people outside of their condos. I was also unable to see if anyone was located at
the pool on this day. Yet, just from making a scan throughout the neighborhood, it
seemed that the parking lot was approximately half, or less full, and appeared
somewhat quiet on this weekday. Lastly, since I was unable to gain access, I could not
observe a ‘For Sale’ or ‘For Rent’ condos, nor could I observe any visible signs of
vacancies or foreclosures.
Canvass 2 – June 4, 2011, 11:50 am
Upon second arrival at Capri at Hunters Creek Condos, both gates were open,
so I was able to enter the neighborhood and conduct a more detailed canvass. This
canvass took place on a Saturday, and the activity on this day increased slightly
compared to the first canvass on a weekday. For instance, the vehicle traffic count was
six, the foot traffic count was one, and there were five people located outside. However,
there was no one located at the community pool on this day. I could not see any ‘For
Sale’ signs, but there were two ‘For Rent’ condos visible. I also could not visibly see
any vacancies or foreclosures, but once again, that is normal for condos, especially
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since they maintain the structures and the grounds, so they hamper the ability to
observe these from a neighborhood canvass. The activity on the outside of the
neighborhood was fairly busy, both vehicle traffic and foot traffic. The golf course next
door was very active as well, both of which were an increase from the first
neighborhood canvass.
All in all, there are certain characteristics of the neighborhood that support the
argument that it has a higher amount of collective efficacy, which could result in a lower
residential burglary rate (Sampson et al. 1997). For instance, it does seem that the
gates stay closed the majority of the week, especially on weekdays when residents are
less likely to be home and more vulnerable to being victimized during a burglary. This
undeniably could reduce criminal activity by creating a sense of a defensible space
(Newman 1972). Also, the neighborhood was very well maintained and appeared more
costly which could increase which are positive indicators of collective efficacy (Skogan
1992). Just as important, the neighborhood’s perimeter was mostly fenced, and the
bottom floor balconies were enclosed, which can act as a barrier to would-be criminals.
Thus, compared to other neighborhoods with high foreclosures and higher residential
burglaries, Capri at Hunters Creek Condos seemed has many strong indicators of
higher collective efficacy.
Eagle Creek PH 1A
Foreclosure Rate: 7.3
Residential Burglary Rate: 4.6
Eagle Creek PH 1A lies in Census tract 167.04, which is considered an upperincome tract. The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as follows: 60% white; 10%
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Black/African American; 26% Hispanic; and 6.4% Asian. The neighborhood is located
in a rather rural, but developing area, in the southern part of the county. There is a lot
of new construction on the main road, and the road itself at the time of this research
was under construction. Compared to other neighborhoods, there is less traffic near
this neighborhood and a lot more undeveloped land. There is a Publix shopping plaza,
which is about nine minutes from the neighborhood but appears to be the closest
grocery store. Eagle Creek PH 1A is a golf course community, with one entrance and
exit that is gated with a fulltime guard. There is a Home Owners’ Association for Eagle
Creek which enforces guidelines for the neighborhood but residents still maintain their
personal yards. The neighborhood is not fenced and can be accessed from the road,
but it does lie further off of the main road. The community golf course separates the
neighborhood from the main road. It is very obvious that the neighborhood has not
finished construction, with many empty lots and more room to expand and build houses.
In total, there are approximately 480 homes with additional addresses of empty lots. In
fact, many of the homes were built in 2006 and after, but some homes were built as
recent at 2010.
Just as important, Eagle Creek does have four other phases; however, PH 1A is
of importance for this study because it contained higher foreclosures and residential
burglaries. Three of the other phases that are directly linked to this phase had less than
five foreclosures and residential burglaries (several had zero) for the five years of
interest. Thus, there is a large difference between this section of Eagle Creek, Ph 1A,
and the other three sections. There is a community center that also acts at the main
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headquarters for the golf club, as well as a restaurant. Further down the road, within
another phase, there is a community pool, but no tennis or basketball court and no
park/playground located within the neighborhood. Moreover, as Table 1 indicates, for
the years of 2005-2009, Eagle Creek PH 1A had a foreclosure count of 0, 0, 2, 6, and
27. The residential burglary count for 2005-2009 was 3, 3, 7, 5, and 4. Interestingly
then, as the foreclosures in Eagle Creek PH 1A increased, the residential burglary count
remained somewhat stable. In fact, in 2007 when foreclosures reached 2, residential
burglaries in the neighborhood reached its highest at 7, and then as foreclosures
increased in 2008 and 2009, reported residential burglaries actually decreased.
Therefore, the hypothesis was not supported for this neighborhood. Just as interesting,
when taking into account the number of residences present in this neighborhood, the
foreclosure rate is tied for rank at #24 and the residential burglary rate is tied for rank at
#21, placing this neighborhood fairly low on both foreclosures and residential burglaries
for the five years.
Canvass 1 – May 17, 2011, 4:00 pm
Upon arrival at Eagle Creek PH 1A, the gate was closed and the guard was
present. I was unable to gain access because the guard would not allow me to enter
without having a purpose, besides wanting to observe the neighborhood. Therefore, I
was unfortunately unable to collect much data about the neighborhood. From my
vantage point though, I did count six vehicles both coming and going at the gate. In
addition, I observed several people on the golf course. The golf course and the grounds
at the front of the neighborhood were nicely manicured and maintained. From the road
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it was also visible that many of the houses in the neighborhood were fenced. I also
used Google Earth to get a better visual representation of the neighborhood and found
that none of the houses were privately fenced. So, not only was the neighborhood itself
not fenced, personal residences were not fenced, probably due to HOA guidelines of
the neighborhood.
Canvass 2 – June 4, 2011, 9:40 am
Upon second arrival at Eagle Creek PH 1A, there was once again a guard at the
main entrance into the neighborhood. However, this time the guard let me past the
main entrance and to enter the neighborhood. Unfortunately, this only brought me to
the community center/golf club. There was another gate to enter the actual residential
neighborhood of PH 1A, and this gate was closed. I did make a vehicle count of five
during this partial canvass though. I was unable to get a count for foot traffic and
people outside in the neighborhood itself, but there were people at the community
center/golf club and people playing golf. The community pool was located behind
another closed gate that went into a different phase, so I was unable to gain a count of
people who were possibly at the pool. Interestingly though, some of the other phases in
Eagle Creek were not gated and these had townhomes built in them. The gated phases
were one to two story homes, much larger, and appeared much nicer and more
expensive. So it appears that the neighborhood was divided somewhat economically –
the gated areas were more expensive homes, and the non-gated were less expensive,
but still very nice and new, townhomes. However, these phases, as mentioned above,
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still had fewer foreclosures and residential burglaries, compared to the more expensive,
gated phase.
Although I was unable to gain all of the information I wanted on the neighborhood
to further understand the level of collective efficacy, there was still some very interesting
findings. Even though the neighborhood’s residential burglary count did not increase
when the foreclosures increased, the neighborhood also only had a residential burglary
rate of 4.6, tying it for the rank of 21st for 2005-2009. Interestingly though, there were
obvious characteristics that this neighborhood would have lower collective efficacy, and
therefore may not be able to enforce informal social controls and reduce criminal
activity. First, the neighborhood is not fenced around the perimeter, which could allow
easy access into the neighborhood to commit criminal acts. Even more, none of the
residences have privacy fences that could act as a barrier, or resemble a defensible
space (Newman 1972; Brower et al. 1983), yet again, possibly allowing criminals an
easy access into homes.
Another important factor supporting the claim that Eagle Creek PH 1A should
have lower collective efficacy is the abundance of empty lots within the neighborhood
which are strong indicators of low collective efficacy (Skogan 1992). Empty residential
lots are a sign of disorder, similar to vacant, foreclosed, or abandoned structures. Not
only can it reduce the amount of residents to act as informal social control agents, but it
also illustrates that the neighborhood is struggling financially and is an obvious sign of
disorder. However, there is a gate with a guard, as well as other gates entering
different phases of Eagle Creek, which help to prevent would-be criminals from entering
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the neighborhood and committing a crime such as residential burglary. Therefore,
despite the numerous characteristics that are indicators of a decrease in collective
efficacy, the ruralness (defined as an isolated area by Taylor, Twiff, and Mohan 2010) of
the neighborhood and the fact that it was located further off the road are strong
indicators that the collective efficacy was higher. This finding is supported by other
research that has also found that rural communities have a higher level of collective
efficacy (Putnam 2007; Taylor et al. 2010). The fact that it is also gated and has a
guard present to act as an agent of social control is additional indicators of an increase
in collective efficacy. These positive indicators seem may overshadow all of the other
structural characteristics that could result in higher residential burglaries. Another
possible explanation is that a section of this neighborhood is located next to Orlando
Police Department’s jurisdiction. This could cause a lower residential burglary rate
reported by the Sheriff’s office because some of the burglaries could have been handled
by the municipal police department.
Waterford Trails PH 2 East Village
Foreclosure Rate: 10.1
Residential Burglary Rate: 5.8
Waterford Trails PH 2 East Village lies within Census tract 167.19, which is
considered an upper-income level tract. The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as
follows: 53.8% white; 8.3% Black/African American; 28% Hispanic; and 6.4% Asian.
The neighborhood rests in a more secluded area, surrounded by other residences, both
single-family units and mobile homes. The elementary school for the neighborhood also
backs right up to it. There are other phases of the neighborhood, so some of the
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findings may incorporate parts of these phases. However, I attempted to only focus on
the roads included in PH 2 East Village of Waterford Trails. One of the phases, PH 1,
did actually have a rather high foreclosure and residential burglary count – 16
foreclosures and 19 residential burglaries – but did not have a high enough count to
make the list. There are three entrances/exits into this neighborhood, and two of the
entrances/exits are in other phases, none of which are gated. Yet, the main
entrance/exit into the neighborhood (also the largest) is in the phase of interest.
There is a Home Owners’ Association (HOA) present for the neighborhood which
regulates residents’ control over certain aspects of their home, such as the type of
fencing. The perimeter of the neighborhood is partially fenced with wooded areas on
other parts. The neighborhood is in fair condition, with somewhat newer homes, but not
as new of homes as other neighborhoods in the adjacent areas. The roughly 325
homes vary from one to two-story and most were built around 2005 or a little later,
during the time of the housing boom. Within the neighborhood there is a community
pool, a tennis and basketball court, and a park/playground. According to Table 1, the
foreclosure count for 2005-2009 was 0, 0, 0, 10, and 23. In contrast, the residential
burglary count for the same years was 0, 4, 5, 3, and 7, respectively. With that said,
there was a slight increase in residential burglaries when foreclosures were at their
highest in 2009. The argument, therefore, was supported – as foreclosures increased
in this neighborhood and the neighborhood became more socially disorganized,
residential burglaries also increased because of a lack of residents to enforce informal
social controls.
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Canvass 1 – May 12, 2011, 11:00 am
Upon arrival at Waterford Trails PH 2 East Village, and as mentioned above, I
noticed that the neighborhood is not gated, but has a brick wall running along the front
of the neighborhood. The neighborhood had a fair amount of activity on this day, with
many cars parked in driveways and on the road. In fact, during the canvass, the vehicle
traffic count was nine, the foot traffic was three, and the number of people located
outside of their home was three. These people ranged from doing yard work to washing
vehicles. There were two people at the neighborhood pool, and one gentleman on the
tennis court, but the basketball and park/playground were vacant. Also, although there
is a neighborhood HOA, it was very apparent that residents were responsible for the
maintenance of their own yards. In fact, many of the yards, approximately half, were
unkempt, overgrown, lots of weeds, and some contained trash or debris. It was very
obvious that the lack of yard care was a sign of physical disorder.
Additionally, most of the residential homes were not privately fenced. During the
canvass, I observed around 12 homes with ‘For Sale’ signs, and approximately 2 with
‘For Rent’ signs. Just as important, I could visibly identify at least five vacancies or
foreclosures, if not more, based on the appearance of an overgrown yard and a house
being empty and/or lock boxes present or changed locks (there are standard locks that
mortgage contractors use to secure homes and they are also required to post signs in
the window after inspection and changing of locks/securing). Many of the yards though
that were unkempt were not yards of vacant or foreclosed homes, but yards of homes
with residents living in them. The neighborhood was quite large with multiple phases to
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the neighborhood. In truth, in some areas of the neighborhood there was new
construction going on and model homes present for prospective buyers to tour.
Canvass 2 – June 18, 2011, 2:00 pm
Upon second arrival at Waterford Trails PH 2 East Village on a Saturday, the
activity within the neighborhood was similar to the first canvass. For example, the
vehicle traffic count was also nine, the foot traffic count was also three (one of which
was a dog walker), but the number of people outside did increase to six (one of which
was a resident mowing his/her lawn). There were three people at the community pool
and no one at the tennis or basketball court, or the park/playground. Interestingly then,
there was not a significant increase in outside activity on a weekend compared to a
weekday, but both canvasses appeared to have a decent amount of activity no matter
the day/time. Same as the first canvass, at least half or more of the yards were not well
taken care of, and many of these yards belonged to occupied residences. There was
also visible trash or debris, some in back yards of homes and some at the end of
driveways as if waiting for trash day.
The results of both canvasses found strong indicators that support the argument
that this neighborhood has less collective efficacy. Some indicators were the
appearance of physical disorder and the lack of barriers to prevent criminals from
gaining access into the neighborhood and residences. Although there was a bit of
activity witnessed during both canvasses, which could shows that residents feel
somewhat safe, the physical decay of yards, both occupied and vacant, was a common
theme throughout the neighborhood. Just as important, the fact that the neighborhood
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was not gated, most of the neighborhood perimeter was not fenced, and most of the
private residences did not have personal fences, are strong indicators of lowering
collective efficacy. In fact, it suggests that there is a lack of a barrier that can act as a
defensible space (Newman 1972) to prevent or deter criminals from gaining access into
a structure. Interestingly then, some of the findings from the canvass would show that
the neighborhood does have collective efficacy, while other stronger indicators show
that because of the physical disorder and decay, the collective efficacy among residents
is reduced, which could result in more crime such as residential burglary.
Plantation Park Private Residences Condos
Foreclosure Rate: 9.9
Residential Burglary Rate: 4.6
Plantation Park Private Residences Condos lie in Census tract 170.05, which is
considered a middle-income tract. The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as
follows: 64.8% white; 6% Black/African American; 18.2% Hispanic; and 6.6% Asian.
The neighborhood is located off of a very busy road where tourism is prominent. There
are other condos located nearby, and Plantation Park Condos advertises that they are a
luxury condos. There are two entrance and/or exits into the complex, both located at
the very front of the neighborhood and it is gated. Moreover, there are 12 buildings with
over 300 privately owned condos, ranging from two to three-stories. There is a Home
Owners’ Association present for the neighborhood, which handles the maintenance of
the buildings and the surrounding premises. Yet again then, the residents are not
responsible for the yard care themselves. The perimeter of the condominium complex
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is partly fenced; it is fenced along the most of the front near the road but a landscaping
birm as well, but then around the sides there are bushes and a wooded area.
Some of the residences have personal detached garages, while others do not.
The neighborhood has a community pool, tennis court, and park/playground. The
condos were built in 1996, and although they are well maintained, it was obvious that
they were somewhat older compared to the other neighborhoods and condos in this
study. Furthermore, as Table 1 shows, the foreclosures for Plantation Park from 20052009 ranged from 0, 0, 0, 1, to 31, while the residential burglary count for 2005-2009
ranged from 3, 8, 0, 2, to 2. Therefore, as foreclosures increased, and drastically
increased in 2009, the residential burglary count remained stable, or even decreased,
considering it peaked at eight residential burglaries in 2006. The evidence does not
lend strong support for this neighborhood being socially disorganized.
Canvass 1 – May 17, 2011, 1:25 pm
Upon arrival at Plantation Park Private Residences Condos, both gates located
at the front of the neighborhood were closed. I was able to gain access though using a
‘dummy’ code. The area surrounding the neighborhood, as mentioned above, is a fairly
busy tourist and commercial area, and on this day, it was definitely active. Also as
mentioned in the above discussion, the condos advertise as being luxury condos.
Although they were well maintained, they did not appear to be luxury condos, at least
compared to other condos nearby. On this weekday, the activity in the neighborhood
was quiet and the parking lot appeared about half full. As for the activity in the
neighborhood, there was a vehicle traffic count of four, foot traffic count of one, and only
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one person recorded as being outside. There were two people located at the
community pool, but no one at the tennis court or park/playground. Just as important,
there were no visible signs of any ‘For Sale’ or ‘For Rent’ condos, nor were there any
visible signs of vacancies or foreclosures. Then again, this is expected for
condominium complexes and strict HOA guidelines. Obviously, the grounds, grass,
trees, shrubs, etc., were well maintained because they are professionally done through
the HOA. During the canvass, there did appear to be some physical disorder though;
some of the blinds in the private residences were in disarray, mostly ripped and/or
severely damaged.
Canvass 2 – June 4, 2011, 1:50 pm
Upon second arrival at Plantation Park Private Residences Condos, both gates
were once again closed. Luckily, I was able to gain access using a ‘dummy’ code
again. The activity in the surrounding area was even busier on this day. For the most
part, there was more activity in the neighborhood on this Saturday, and around half or
more of the parking lot was full with vehicles. During the canvass, I counted five for
vehicle traffic, zero for foot traffic, and five people outside of their residences. Even
more, there were five or more people at the community pool, but no one at the tennis
court or park/playground. There was also more signs of physical disorder on this
canvass; there was a large amount of trash outside of one of the dumpster within the
neighborhood.
The results of both neighborhood canvasses do somewhat support the
contention that there is collective efficacy among neighbors. The main neighborhood
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indicator is the fact the Plantation Park is gated and the gates remained closed. This
undoubtedly forms a barrier or defensible space (Newman 1972) and can also prevent
criminals from gaining access into the neighborhood. Also, the fact that there was
activity in the neighborhood, vehicle traffic, people outside, and people at the pool,
shows a reduction is social disorder (Woldoff 2002); it also shows that residents may
feel safe since they are outside which can increase collective efficacy. Yet, there were
also characteristics that support having a lower level of collective efficacy. There were
definite signs of physical disorder, such as the blinds in some condos being in disarray
and the excess of trash at the dumpsters. Also, there was not much foot traffic within
the neighborhood. These are all good indicators of why this neighborhood falls around
the middle of ranks in residential burglary. While there are strong indicators of more
collective efficacy, there are also other indicators which can reduce it.
Los Terranos
Foreclosure Rate: 26.9
Residential Burglary Rate: 4.6
Los Terranos lies in three different Census tracts: 135.06, 135.07, and 167.11,
which are considered moderate, middle, and middle-income tracts. The racial/ethnic
composition of the three tracts are as follows: 41.6% white; 7.1% Black/African
American; 49.9% Hispanic; and .7% Asian (135.06); 37.2% white; 10% Black/African
American; 48.2% Hispanic; and 3.3% Asian (135.07); and 43.1% white; 4.9%
Black/African American; 39.4% Hispanic; and 6.4% Asian (167.11). There is a busy,
six-lane road located nearby with a lot of commercial buildings, new shopping, and a
Super Wal-Mart. The City of Orlando’s Police Department is also located close by and
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although this neighborhood lies within Orange County Sheriff’s office jurisdiction, it is
situated next to Orlando Police Department’s jurisdiction. Yet, the neighborhood itself is
more rural and more of an industrial area, with homes (slightly more than 100) mixed in
with industrial businesses. Interestingly, locating Los Terranos proved to be difficult.
There is not a designated neighborhood called Los Terranos, with a sign or an obvious
perimeter. The neighborhood is more spread out, and many of the homes and
businesses are situated on larger lots, similar to many other neighborhoods in the area.
Of the businesses located in Los Terranos, there are construction companies, several
churches, an auto body business, and a phone company, to name a few. There is no
Home Owners’ Association present for the neighborhood, and therefore, all residents
are responsible for the maintenance of their own property.
What’s more, since this is not a typical neighborhood, there is no community
pool, sporting courts, or park/playground within the neighborhood. Also, there is no
fence surrounding the neighborhood, because once again, locating the boundary of the
neighborhood was quite difficult. The homes in the neighborhood varied a lot as well,
from single and double-wide mobile homes, to one to two story newer constructed
homes. The year the homes were built ranged significantly as well, from being built in
the 1930s all the way into the 2000s. Plus, as mentioned above, Los Terranos lies in
three different Census tracts, both moderate and middle-income level tracts, and this
was evident based on the appearance of many of the homes. Some are more rundown
and dilapidated, while others are better maintained and more presentable. In addition,
as Table 1 indicates, the foreclosure count for 2005-2009 was 0, 0, 0, 2, and 27. The
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residential burglary count, in contrast, was 0, 2, 0, 2, and 1 for the same years. With
that said, as foreclosures jumped in 2009, residential burglaries in Los Terranos
remained stable and very minimal. Thus, it does not appear that the neighborhood
became socially disorganized, based on the residential burglary count, when
foreclosures increased.
Canvass 1 – May 12, 2011, 1:00 pm
Upon arrival at Los Terranos, it was apparent that this neighborhood was more
laid back and slow paced, with less traffic, both vehicle and foot, and minimal people
outside. In fact, during the canvass, there were only three vehicles counted as vehicle
traffic, and no one on foot or outside of his/her home. Also, some of the yards appeared
to be more unkempt and in worse condition. The same goes for some of the homes.
Some homes were in nice condition and well maintained, while other homes were more
dilapidated and cluttered. There was yard debris at some homes as well. Some of the
houses had privacy fences, but that lots were larger and so there was a lot of land and
wooded area between private residences. I did not see any ‘For Sale’ or ‘For Rent’
signs; I did have a difficult time identifying possible vacancies and foreclosures. Even
more, there was an industrial park near the homes and warehouses used for storage or
business fronts. There are other neighborhoods nearby that appear to be more
rundown and older as well. Despite all of the other neighborhoods nearby
(approximately 20 surrounding Los Terranos), only one has more foreclosures than Los
Terranos, and of the areas covered by the Orange County Sheriff’s Office, a handful
have more residential burglaries. So, it does appear that the areas surrounding this
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neighborhood also have high foreclosures and residential burglaries, but not enough to
make the sample for the current research. Accordingly, this neighborhood was very
different than all of the other neighborhoods in the study.
Canvass 2 – June 18, 2011, 9:30 am
Upon second arrival at Los Terranos, the activity around the neighborhood did
improve. On this Saturday, the vehicle count was four, the foot traffic was four, one of
which was a dog walker, and the number of people outside was five. Also, there was a
garage sale underway in the neighborhood. Some of the yards were still overgrown and
unkempt, and there were still some signs of physical decay, such as debris and trash in
some of the yards. Without a doubt though, this neighborhood is an anomaly and far
different than any of the other neighborhoods. Why there were only five reported
residential burglaries in 2005-2009 is really unknown.
There are some conclusions that can be made from the canvassing however.
First, the fact that there are many commercial and industrial businesses located in the
neighborhood could decrease the number of residential burglaries because there are
less residences in this neighborhood; however, the rates obviously take this into
consideration and the results are still surprising. Also, there are many other
neighborhoods surrounding Los Terranos and perhaps residential burglaries are more
dispersed throughout the various neighborhoods and not so concentrated in Los
Terranos only. Lastly, the ruralness of the neighborhood is a strong indicator of higher
collective efficacy, as Putnam (2007) and Taylor et al. (2010) also found.
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Despite these characteristics, there are also many characteristics that would
support having lower collective efficacy and therefore one would expect there to be a
higher residential burglary rate in the neighborhood. For instance, this neighborhood is
comprised of both moderate and middle-income levels, and many of the houses are
more decayed than most of the houses in other neighborhoods (Skogan 1992). Also,
there was not a large amount of activity within the neighborhood, which is an indicator of
having less collective efficacy. Perhaps there is less collective efficacy but some other
variable explains why the residential burglary rate is so low for this neighborhood
despite the high foreclosure rate. One possible explanation is the fact that this
neighborhood is located directly next to Orlando Police Department’s jurisdiction, as
discussed previously. This could cause a lower residential burglary rate reported by the
Sheriff’s office because some of the burglaries could have been handled by the
municipal police department. However, that is not the scope of the current research to
investigate.
Sandpoint at Meadow Woods
Foreclosure Rate: 20.6
Residential Burglary Rate: 17.6
Sandpoint at Meadow Woods lies in Census tract 168.05, which is a middleincome tract. The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as follows: 23.3% white; 10%
Black/African American; 61% Hispanic; and 4.6% Asian. The neighborhood is located
in a quiet area with other residential neighborhoods. There are approximately 136
residences in the neighborhood, all of which are two stories built in 1998 and connected
to each other by a small structure, most likely a utility room. The neighborhood is not
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gated, with only one entrance/exit. There is a mobile guard office located at the
entrance, but it is unoccupied. Moreover, there is a sign at the entrance indicating that
there is video surveillance for the neighborhood. There is a Home Owners’ Association
for the neighborhood which maintains the residents’ grass in the front yard only
(residents are still responsible for maintaining the backyards). Most of the perimeter is
fenced, except for a section near the back of the neighborhood in which is backs up to a
pond. In fact, all of the personal yards are also fully fenced (HOA guidelines). There is
a community pool in the neighborhood, but no sporting courts or park/playground. Also,
there are speed bumps throughout the neighborhood and signs displayed that you are
not allowed to park on the street between 12:00 am and 6:00 am (HOA guidelines). As
Table 1 illustrates, foreclosures in the neighborhood for 2005-2009 were 0, 0, 4, 9, and
15, while the residential burglary count for the same years was 2, 4, 3, 8, and 7. Thus,
residential burglaries in the neighborhood did actually increase in the latter years when
foreclosures increased. So, there is support for the hypothesis that foreclosures caused
this neighborhood to become socially disorganized and in effect, residential burglaries
increased.
Canvass 1 – May 18, 2011, 2:40 pm
Upon arrival at Sandpoint at Meadow Woods, the yards appeared to be very well
maintained and the streets were very clean. Perhaps the HOA placed very strict
guidelines and rules for residents and it helped to maintain a very clean and presentable
neighborhood. It is was quiet on this day, with only one recorded vehicle traffic, zero
recorded foot traffic, and two people located outside. There was no one at the
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community pool, but almost every household has a private pool as well. During the
canvass, I located at least two ‘For Sale’ signs and one ‘For Rent’ sign, and there were
approximately three visible vacancies or foreclosures. All in all, the neighborhood’s
activity was minimal and there were not many residents according to the field
observation.
Canvass 2 – June 4, 2011, 11:20 am
Upon second arrival at Sandpoint at Meadow Woods, many of the same findings
were observed. This time, however, the vehicle count was three, the foot traffic count
was one, and the number of people located outside was two. Also, the community pool
was closed for construction on this day. Yet, I once again observed the same ‘For Sale’
and ‘For Rent’ signs and the visible vacancies or foreclosures. Moreover, the
neighborhood was quiet and still in very nice condition, and the guard office was still
unoccupied. In fact, it appeared that the guard office was just the structure and no one
had occupied it for some time.
All in all, this neighborhood ranked 6th in foreclosure rates and 2nd in residential
burglary rates for the five years, resulting in a high foreclosure/high crime relationship.
So, does this neighborhood have lower collective efficacy which helps to explain this
phenomenon? Some of the findings do support that. For instance, there is no gate or
guard occupying the office, so those two cannot act as deterrents. Also, there was
minimal activity on both days of the canvassing, making it appear that residents may not
feel as safe outside of their home. However, there are many other indicators that could
increase the level of collective efficacy within the neighborhood. For example, there is a
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sign posted at the entrance indicating there is video surveillance which could deter
criminals. Also, every home is fenced (Brower et al. 1983), which displays to possible
criminals that this is a defensible space (Newman 1972) and may keep criminals out.
Lastly, the neighborhood was very well taken care of, with the houses in exceptional
condition and the yards very well maintained which shows a lack of physical disorder
(Skogan 1992).
So, what other explanations are there for the neighborhood’s higher residential
burglary rate? One last explanation, spillover from surrounding neighborhoods, holds
some credence. For instance, the various neighborhoods surrounding Sandpoint have
foreclosures ranging from five up to nineteen, and a residential burglary count ranging
from four to twenty-three. Thus, it does appear that this neighborhood has a moderate
level of collective efficacy based on various physical and social indicators even though it
has high foreclosures, and that the spillover from surrounding neighborhoods may help
to explain the higher rate of residential burglaries.
La Cascada PH 1
Foreclosure Rate: 13.9
Residential Burglary Rate: 11.4
La Cascada PH 1 lies in Census tract 168.05, which is a middle-income tract.
The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as follows: 23.3% white; 10% Black/African
American; 61% Hispanic; and 4.6% Asian. This neighborhood is surrounded by cow
pastures, off the side of a busy state road. In other words, La Cascada PH 1 is in the
middle of nowhere. Basically, the neighborhood is surrounded by open fields and
woods. There are three entrances/exits into the neighborhood, none of which are
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gated. Also, as the neighborhood’s name implies, there are several phases to La
Cascada; of interest to this research is PH 1, but there is also PH 1B and PH 1C. Some
of the entrances/exits into the neighborhood are in the different phases, and PH 1
actually lies more in the middle of the other two phases. Therefore, I did try to limit my
canvass to PH 1 only (PH 1B had eight foreclosures and eleven residential burglaries;
PH 1C had eleven foreclosures and fourteen residential burglaries).
Furthermore, there is a Home Owners’ Association (HOA) which enforces rules
and guidelines, such as the type of fencing residents can use. However, each resident
is responsible for the maintenance of their own yard. There is no fence surrounding the
perimeter of the neighborhood, but instead open land and some wooded areas, as
mentioned above. The roughly 200 homes in the neighborhood are in fairly good
condition, ranging from townhomes to one and two-story homes. The homes were built
in the mid 2000s, about 2005, during the construction boom. There is a community pool
and park/playground in the neighborhood, but no sporting courts. Interestingly, as
Table 1 explains, the foreclosures in the neighborhood for 2005-2009 increased from 0,
0, 1, 7, and 20, while the residential burglary count in the neighborhood for the same
years fluctuated from 1, 5, 4, 9, and 4. Thus, as the foreclosures in La Cascada PH 1
increased, residential burglaries actually increased in 2008 and then decreased in 2009
when foreclosures were at their highest. As a result, it does not appear that this
neighborhood fits social disorganization theory’s basic argument – as an area becomes
more socially disorganized (e.g., increase in residential instability/mobility, or
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foreclosures in the case of this research), crime (e.g., residential burglaries) will
increase.
Canvass 1 – May 19, 2011, 1:45 pm
Upon arrival at La Cascada PH 1, there were flags along the road leading up to
the neighborhood advertising the home builder’s name, as well as signs indicating they
are now leasing homes. Even more, there was a sign for Beacon Park, which appeared
to be part of the larger neighborhood of La Cascada. Also, there was a ‘Private
Property’ sign displayed at the entrance of the neighborhood. The neighborhood was
rather quiet with not much outside activity, with approximately half or fewer vehicles
parked in driveways and some parked on the street. In fact, there were four vehicles in
the neighborhood and were recorded as vehicle traffic. There was also one person
recorded as foot traffic, and four people outside, some of which were doing yard work.
The community pool was occupied by five people, some of which were children, and no
one was at the park/playground. Some of the private yards in the neighborhood were
fenced, but most were not. Furthermore, some of the yards were not well maintained
and some contained debris or trash. Some of these yards belonged to occupied homes
while some did not. During the canvass, I located around eight visible ‘For Sale’ signs
and three visible ‘For Rent’ signs, and there were around four visible homes either
vacant or in foreclosure. Lastly, there were two patrol vehicles in the neighborhood that
appeared to belong to residents, both were police for the local city police department.
Canvass 2 – June 4, 2011, 10:00 am

149

Upon second arrival at La Cascada PH 1, there were mowers present
maintaining the neighborhood’s boundary. On this Saturday, the activity was once
again quiet, with only one recorded vehicle as vehicle traffic, two people recorded as
foot traffic, and three people located outside. Also, there was only one person at the
community pool on this day and no one at the park/playground once again. Perhaps
the activity was lower during this canvass because the canvass took place in the early
morning and people were not out and mobile yet. Once again, numerous yards were
unkempt and not well maintained, and there was visible trash and yard debris. Finally,
the two police patrol vehicles were present during this canvass as well.
Although residential burglary in each individual year did not increase as
foreclosures increased, the total residential burglary rate for 2005-2009 places this
neighborhood in fourth out of the thirty neighborhoods in this study. So, the canvasses
were relevant in locating certain indicators that would clarify if collective efficacy
explains this phenomenon. Despite the fact that the neighborhood is located in a more
rural area (Putnam 2007), surrounded by open pastures and woods, and is more
difficult to access, as well as the two police patrols living in the neighborhood, other
indicators of this neighborhood would suggest lower collective efficacy which explains
the higher total residential burglary count. For instance, of the three entrances/exits,
none of them are gated to help reduce residential burglaries.
What’s more, the perimeter of the neighborhood is not fenced (Newman 1972),
which could act as a barrier and deterrent for criminals. There were not many personal
yards that were fenced either (Brower et al. 1983), which also can act as a barrier and
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deterrent. There were also signs of physical disorder or decay. There were obvious
vacancies and foreclosures, and many of the yards were not well maintained, even the
ones that were currently occupied (Skogan 1992). In addition, the trash and/or yard
debris is a sign of disorder and can reduce collective efficacy among residents. Also,
there was less activity in this neighborhood on both days of the canvass compared to
other neighborhoods with less residential burglaries, which are all strong indicators of
lower collective efficacy.
Cedar Bend at Meadow Woods PH 1
Foreclosure Rate: 15.8
Residential Burglary Rate: 11.1
Cedar Bend at Meadow Woods PH 1 lies in Census tract 168.05, which is
considered a middle-income tract. The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as
follows: 23.3% white; 10% Black/African American; 61% Hispanic; and 4.6% Asian.
The neighborhood is located in a larger neighborhood, Meadow Woods, close to a
previously discussed neighborhood, Sandpoint. This neighborhood is situated in a quiet
area surrounded by many other neighborhoods, and there is a shopping plaza with a
Publix Shopping store located close by. There is a second phase to the neighborhood,
PH 2, which is intertwined within Cedar Bend (PH 2 had a total foreclosure count of 12,
and a residential burglary count of 9). I attempted to minimize as much of my
observations to PH 1 only. There is one entrance and/or exit into the neighborhood,
and it is gated. There are approximately 170, one to two-story residences located in PH
1, and most of the homes were built in 2005, during the housing boom.
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There is a Home Owners’ Association present, but the residents are still
responsible for the preservation of their own yards. The HOA does enforce strict
guidelines on the type of fencing residents can use though. With that said, most of the
yards are not fenced, and the perimeter of the neighborhood is partially fenced. There
is fencing along the front and sides, separating it from the road and other
neighborhoods, but no fence in the rear where there are ponds and a wooded area.
There is a community pool and a park/playground located within the neighborhood, but
no tennis or basketball courts. More importantly, according to Table 1, as foreclosures
increased in 2005-2009 from 0, 0, 0, 9, and 18, the residential burglary count actually
remained stable, at 5, 2, 5, 3, and 4. Thus, the hypothesis that as foreclosures increase
the neighborhood becomes more socially disorganized and then crime (e.g., residential
burglary) will increase, was not supported.
Canvass 1 – May 19, 2011, 11:35 am
Upon arrival at Cedar Bend at Meadow Woods PH 1, the entrance and exit gates
were both closed. I was able to gain access though by following another vehicle in.
Posted at the entrance was a ‘Deed Restricted’ sign, as well as a brick wall running
along the front of the neighborhood. As would be expected on a weekday morning, the
neighborhood was mostly quiet, with about half of the driveways with parked cars. Just
as important, a member of the Orange County Sheriff’s Office had his/her vehicle
parked in a driveway. There were also some cars parked on the street, although there
were signs posted against doing so. There was in fact some activity in the
neighborhood, albeit not as much as other neighborhoods. The vehicle traffic count
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was six, the foot traffic count was seven, and the number of people outside was zero.
Moreover, there was no one located at the community pool or park/playground. During
the canvass, I did not locate any ‘For Sale’ or ‘For Rent’ signs, but I did locate
approximately five homes that were vacant or in foreclosure, based on unkempt yards
and visible empty homes. Many yards were very well maintained, but some yards were
not; some of these yards belonged to vacant or foreclosed homes, but some unkempt
yards were in fact currently occupied. There was some trash and/or debris located in
yards and along streets. There were also many garbage cans located at the end of
driveways, but it was apparent that it was trash pickup day.
Canvass 2 – June 4, 2011, 10:20 am
Upon second arrival at Cedar Bend at Meadow Woods PH 1, the entrance and
exit gates were once again closed, and I was able to gain access once again. For a
weekend, the traffic activity for the neighborhood was fairly minimal. For example, the
vehicle and foot traffic count were both two, but the number of people outside increased
to six. These were either people doing yard work or working on their vehicles. No one
was at the pool or park/playground on this day either. Interestingly though, at the time
of this canvass, there was a sign posted at the pool that the pool was closed. Once
again, there were a few cars parked on the street, even though there are obvious signs
posted against doing so. On this day of canvassing, I also located another police patrol
vehicle parked at a residence; this time is was a city police department vehicle.
Therefore, there are at least two police officers living in the neighborhood. Yet again,
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there were yards that were unkempt, overgrown, and contained debris, as well as
visible vacancies and/or foreclosures.
All in all, as both of the neighborhood canvasses demonstrate, Cedar Bend at
Meadow Woods PH 1 exhibited some signs of physical disorder which are indicators of
low collective efficacy (Skogan 1992). Overgrown, unkempt yards, trash and debris in
the neighborhood, and obvious vacancies and/or foreclosures were all signs of physical
disorder. The neighborhood also showed signs of social disorder, such as parking on
the street even though there are obvious signs against doing so. Other observations
that support the neighborhood having lower collective efficacy are the fact that the
perimeter of the neighborhood is not fully fenced and most of the yards are not privately
fenced (Newman 1972; Brower et al. 1983). Also, compared to other neighborhoods in
the study, the activity within the neighborhood on both days of observations was
minimal. All of these are strong indicators of low collective efficacy.
However, there were other indicators within the neighborhood of more collective
efficacy. For instance, the fact that the neighborhood is gated, and it is closed most, if
not all of the time, makes it more difficult for would-be criminals to gain access. Also,
the presence of two police officers living in the neighborhood could act as a deterrent.
Yet, these police officers might not have been present in the years of 2005-2009, so
they would not have acted as a deterrent for the years of this research. When taking all
of these factors into consideration, it is obvious why this neighborhood has a higher rate
of residential burglary. While the neighborhood is taking steps to increase collective
efficacy, there are also other considerable characteristics of the neighborhood that are
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stronger and suppress these which results in a low to moderate level of collective
efficacy.
Island Cove Villas PH 3
Foreclosure Rate: 15.4
Residential Burglary Rate: 8.6
Island Cove Villas PH 3 lies in Census tract 168.05, which is a middle-income
tract. The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as follows: 23.3% white; 10%
Black/African American; 61% Hispanic; and 4.6% Asian. The neighborhood is situated
off of a busy road with other residential neighborhoods and shopping plazas. There is a
Publix Shopping plaza, a Walgreens, and a new CVS located nearby. There is one
entrance/exit into the neighborhood and it is not gated. The neighborhood is comprised
of approximately 37 separate buildings, with about 175 different residences in one to
two-story townhomes. The townhomes were built in the mid 1990s, between 1994 and
1995. There is a Home Owners’ Association present that is responsible for all of the
maintenance and enforces the rules and regulations of the residents. With that said, the
HOA is responsible for the maintenance of the lawns, and therefore residents are not
responsible for maintaining the grass.
What’s more, the perimeter of the neighborhood is partially fenced, but there are
also ponds and other wooded areas surrounding the neighborhood. There are speed
bumps throughout the neighborhood. There is a community pool, but no a tennis or
basketball court or park/playground. None of the yards are privately fenced either. As
the neighborhood’s name suggests, there are other phases to Island Cove Villas.
However, the other phases are not directly connected together, but actually have
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separate entrances and roads off the major road. Therefore, none of the findings and
observations incorporate the other phases of the neighborhoods. Furthermore, as
Table 1 indicates, Island Cove Villas PH 3’s foreclosure count for 2005-2009 was 0, 0,
1, 8, and 18. The residential burglary count was 4, 5, 4, 1, and 1. Thus, as foreclosures
increased in the neighborhood, residential burglary actually decreased.
Canvass 1 – May 18, 2011, 2:50 pm
Upon arrival at Island Cove Villas PH 3, there was a ‘Neighborhood Watch’ and
‘No Solicitor’ sign posted at the entrance. The neighborhood is fairly small and well
taken care of. As mentioned above, the HOA maintains the yards and they were nicely
kept. There were three vehicles recorded as vehicle traffic, one person recorded as foot
traffic (a dog walker), and one person located outside (working on his/her vehicle).
Also, there were three people located at the community pool. During the canvass, I did
not locate any ‘For Sale’ or ‘For Rent’ homes. On this day, I did not locate any
vacancies or foreclosures, but as mentioned in previous discussions, this can be difficult
in condos and townhome neighborhoods when an HOA maintains the lawn.
Canvass 2 – June 4, 2011, 3:00 pm
Upon second arrival at Island Cove Villas PH 3, some of the activity increased.
For instance, the vehicle traffic count was three, the foot traffic count was one, but the
number of people located outside increased to nine, some of which were children
playing. This is somewhat to be expected since this canvass took place on a weekend.
There was also a garage sale in progress during this canvass which can undoubtedly
increase the overall activity within the neighborhood. There was no one at the
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community pool on this day though. Even more, during this canvass, I was able to
indentify approximately four vacancies or foreclosures based on the presence of
changed locks and lock boxes at the front doors of some townhomes.
As the results of both canvassing reveal, this neighborhood did have less
physical disorder than previous neighborhoods which is a strong indicator of collective
efficacy (Skogan 1992). The fact that the HOA maintained the lawns really helps on the
appearance of a neighborhood, and can increase resident’s collective efficacy.
Moreover, it was a smaller neighborhood and residents could more easily be acquainted
with one another which can reduce social disorder (Woldoff 2002). The ‘Neighborhood
Watch’ and ‘No Solicitor’ sign could also act as a deterrent for possible criminals.
However, there were other characteristics of the neighborhood that could decrease the
collective efficacy and increase crime, such as residential burglary. For example, the
neighborhood is not gated, the homes are not privately fenced, and the neighborhood’s
perimeter is not entirely fenced (Newman 1972; Brower et al. 1983). There were also
visible vacancies and foreclosures in the neighborhood that could decrease collective
efficacy because there is less neighbors to bond with and act as informal agents of
control. Perhaps this is why this neighborhood is ranked 11th in residential burglary
rate.
Wyndham Lakes ESTS UT 1
Foreclosure Rate: 6.5
Residential Burglary Rate: 9.0
Wyndham Lakes ESTS UT 1 lies in Census tract 168.05, which is a middleincome tract. The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as follows: 23.3% white; 10%
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Black/African American; 61% Hispanic; and 4.6% Asian. Wyndham Lakes Estates UT 1
is located further down on a residential road off of a main road (Rhode Island Woods
Circle), with many neighborhoods along the way. The neighborhood is definitely more
secluded, or ‘off the beaten path,’ compared to the many neighborhoods that are
located closer to the main entrance road. Even more, Wyndham Lakes Estates has
smaller neighborhoods located within, with some being attached directly and others
located off the main road (Wyndham Lakes Blvd). Wyndham Lakes Blvd and the
neighborhoods located off of it were nicely maintained, with sidewalks and a brick wall
separating the main road from the neighborhoods. Most of the area surrounding this
neighborhood, as well as others nearby, backs up to a heavily wooded area. Wyndham
Lakes ESTS itself has three entrances and exits for the neighborhood; one
entrance/exit on the north side of the neighborhood and two entrance/exits on the south
side. None of the three entrance or exits are gated. Lastly, the 400 homes in the
neighborhood were built in the mid to late 2000s, mostly from 2006-2008.
There is a Home Owners’ Association for the neighborhood. It appeared that the
HOA enforced guidelines in regard to the type of fencing the residences could install
around their homes. Some of the residential homes were in fact privately fenced, but
the majority were not and either backed up to a wooded area or a pond. However, all
residences are responsible for the maintenance of their own yards. The perimeter of
the neighborhood was partly fenced, only with the brick wall located in the front of the
neighborhood. Within the neighborhood, some residents have personal pools, but there
is not a community pool, tennis court and basketball court, or park/playground located
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inside the neighborhood. However, there is a community center near the neighborhood
with a large pool, four tennis courts, and a basketball court.
According to the property appraiser’s office, there are three sections to Wyndham
Lakes Estates (UT 1, UT 2, and UT 4). In fact, these ‘units’ are all attached, but are
comprised of certain streets/addresses within Wyndham Lake Estates. Yet, the
information on foreclosures and residential burglaries is only for UT 1, and so when
conducting the neighborhood canvasses, I limited my observations and notes to only
the streets and addresses that were given for this unit. Interestingly, one of the streets
located in Wyndham Lakes Estates UT 1 is a dead-end street with houses with a much
larger value than the other houses located on other streets within the same unit. This
one street however, is still located within the same Census tract, which is considered
middle-income. Just as important, the foreclosure count for Wyndham Lakes ESTS UT
1 for 2005-2009 was 0, 0, 0, 7, and 19, while the residential burglary count for the same
years was 0, 2, 5, 14, and 15. Therefore, there was an increase in residential burglaries
in this neighborhood as foreclosures increased, indicating that this neighborhood did
become more disorganized as foreclosures, one ecological characteristic, increased.
Canvass 1 – May 19, 2011, 12:25 pm
Upon arriving at Wyndham Lakes ESTS UT 1, the first location canvassed was
the dead-end road with newer and more expensive homes. The street is not long, and
has only one entrance and exit, with no gate. There were approximately 10-15 homes
located off this one street, with many empty lots. It was very obvious that this area had
slowed, or even stopped, construction due to the economy. This street, as well as the
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others located in UT 1, were surrounded by many ponds and wooded areas. Just as
important, the different entrance/exits to the various streets within the neighborhood
also had posted signs indicating the neighborhood was deed restricted and had an
active neighborhood watch. The other streets within this unit, which were located a
short distance down the main road, were also newer constructed homes, just smaller
than the homes discussed above.
While conducting the first neighborhood canvass, five vehicles were recorded as
car traffic, two people were recorded as foot traffic, and there were two people who
were located outside. Furthermore, as mentioned previously, the residents in the
neighborhood are responsible for the maintenance of their own yards, and some of the
yards of homes that were in fact occupied were poorly maintained. Also, there were
some obvious signs of vacancies or foreclosures, strictly measured by the visibility of
abandoned of homes (grass in yards very overgrown), and visible signs of changed
locks and lock boxes on the front doors of some homes. However, there were no visible
‘For Sale’ or ‘For Rent’ signs located at the homes within this neighborhood. Just as
important, there was an Orange County Sheriff’s Office vehicle parked at one of the
homes during the canvass. As mentioned above, there was a community center
located near the neighborhood that offered various recreational activities. On this day
though, the community center, the pool, and the various courts appeared empty (some
vehicles but no visible activity). In all, the neighborhood was fairly quiet, with not much
activity or cars parked outside; although, the canvass did take place on a weekday,
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around lunch time, where many residences could be working or out for the day which
can explain this observation.
Canvass 2 – June 4, 2011, 10:15 am
The second canvass of the neighborhood took place on a Saturday, and one
would assume that the activity within and around the neighborhood should increase.
However, there was not a substantial increase in activity from the first canvass that took
place on a Thursday and the second canvass, which took place on Saturday. The car
traffic count was only one, while the foot traffic was recorded as four, and there were
two people outside during the canvass. Thus, there was a fluctuation in activity among
all three, with car traffic decreasing from five to one, foot traffic slightly increasing from
three to four, and the number of people recorded outside stayed the same on both days,
at two. Nonetheless, there was an increase in activity around the surrounding area,
with more foot activity, such as dog walkers, using the sidewalks located on the outside
of the neighborhood. There was also more people at the community center.
Additionally, there were people at the basketball court and people at the pool.
Even though this neighborhood had one of the lowest foreclosure rates for the
five years (6.5 per 100 houses), the total residential burglary rate was still 9.0.
Therefore, the residential burglary rate for this neighborhood ranked as #9 for all thirty
neighborhoods. Moreover, even though the outside of the neighborhood was nicely
maintained, with sidewalks, a community center, and a brick wall, there were other
indicators indicating a lower level of collective efficacy within the neighborhood. This is
supported by the level of activity recorded on the two days of canvassing. Also, none of
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the neighborhood’s entrances/exits were gated, and therefore there was no barrier to
prevent or reduce residential burglaries. Most of the houses were not privately fenced
either (Brower et al. 1983), which can also reduce or prevent crime, especially
residential burglary. Although the neighborhood had posted signs indicating a
‘Neighborhood Watch,’ it is not clear when the neighborhood administered a
neighborhood watch, and whether that was implemented after 2009 when residential
burglaries increased substantially. Also, as mentioned previously, a Sheriff’s officer was
a resident in the neighborhood, but it is not apparent on when he/she became a resident
of the neighborhood either. Once again, this could have been after 2009. If both of the
‘Neighborhood Watch’ and Sheriff’s officer were present in the neighborhood during the
years of 2005-2009, it is apparent that neither were good indicators of an increased
amount of collective efficacy and thus could not reduce residential burglary.
Heather Glen at Meadow Woods
Foreclosure Rate: 13.3
Residential Burglary Rate: 16.1
Heather Glen at Meadow Woods lies in Census tract 168.05, which is considered
a middle-income tract. The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as follows: 23.3%
white; 10% Black/African American; 61% Hispanic; and 4.6% Asian. The neighborhood
is the third and final neighborhood in this research that lies in the larger neighborhood of
Meadow Woods. This neighborhood is located further down the road though, closer to
other neighborhoods that are older and more dilapidated. There is a large park located
next door to the neighborhood, Meadow Woods Park, which is part of Orange County
Parks and Recreation. Also located around the park is the Orange County Recreation

162

Center, which is sponsored by the Orlando Magic basketball team. There is a water
plant around the corner as well. There is only one entrance/exit into the neighborhood
and it is not gated. The neighborhood is made up of approximately 180, one to twostory single family homes that were built in the early 2000s.
There is a Home Owners’ Association for the neighborhood, but it does not
handle the maintenance of the yards; each resident is responsible for his/her own yard.
The perimeter of the neighborhood is partially fenced, but mostly only on the east side
of the neighborhood separating it from another residential neighborhood. The rest of
the boundary is either not fenced or has a heavily wooded area serving as a boundary.
Also, the majority of the personal yards are not fenced. Within the neighborhood, there
is a community pool and a park/playground. According to Table 1, Heather Glen at
Meadow Woods’ foreclosure count for 2005-2009 was 0, 0, 0, 9, and 15, while the
residential burglary count was 2, 4, 4, 12, and 7. Therefore, there was indeed an
increase in residential burglary in the latter years when foreclosures increased.
However, the largest increase in residential burglaries was in 2008, and then it
decreased in 2009 when foreclosures peaked. Yet, the residential burglary count was
still higher in 2009 than the first three years which gives support to the hypothesis that
foreclosures caused this area to be more socially disorganized.
Canvass 1 – May 19, 2011, 1:20 pm
Upon arriving at Heather Glen at Meadow Woods there was a person jogging on
the outside sidewalk of the neighborhood and there was a bit of vehicle traffic. The
neighborhood was not very large and was basically a big square, and had power lines
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running through it. The front of the property, which is maintained by the HOA, was in
nice condition. The activity within the neighborhood was minimal, with a vehicle traffic
count of two, a foot traffic count of one, and four people located outside. What’s more,
no one was located at the community pool or park/playground. From what I observed,
there was only one ‘For Sale’ sign and ‘For Rent’ sign posted. There were also several
obvious homes either vacant or in foreclosures.
Some of the yards were not well maintained, and this was found to be common
with both occupied and vacant homes. It apparently was also trash pickup day, and
there was loose trash along some of the road. As mentioned previously, the
neighborhood is surrounded by other older and more rundown neighborhoods. In fact,
there was physical disorder on the outside of the neighborhood, such as graffiti on
fences and other structures. Lastly, the park next door, Meadow Woods Park,
consisted of a playground, basketball courts, a pavilion, and restrooms, and appeared
to be very clean and well maintained. On this day there were approximately six people
at the park, ranging from bike riders, children playing at the park, and people walking.
Canvass 2 – June 4, 2011, 10:40 am
Upon second arrival at Heather Glen at Meadow Woods, the activity directly on
the outside of the neighborhood was much quieter on this Saturday, with no foot or
vehicle traffic. The activity within the neighborhood was low, same as the first day of
canvassing. The vehicle traffic count was four, the foot traffic count was three, and the
number of people located outside was two, one of which was a man painting his house
and another one was a resident mowing his/her lawn. Once again, there was no one at
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the community pool or park/playground. The ‘For Sale’ and ‘For Rent’ houses
discussed above were still evident, and so were the several vacancies and/or
foreclosures. Meadow Woods Park next door was very active though. There was a
cricket team playing in the field, children at the playground, a person walking, and dogs
with their owners at a designated dog section of the park.
As both canvasses suggest, Heather Glen appears to have less collective
efficacy, based on many strong indicators such as the physical disorder observed, the
lack of deterrent barriers present, and the level of activity. For instance, there were
many yards that were overgrown and unmaintained, some yard debris and trash
present, and graffiti around the neighborhood, which are indicators of a reduction in
collective efficacy (Skogan 1992). There was also power lines running through the
neighborhood, and the neighborhood was close to other, more rundown neighborhoods.
In fact, of the surrounding neighborhoods, one neighborhood had a total foreclosure
count of 18 and a residential burglary count of 43, substantially higher than Heather
Glen and could cause a spillover effect for this neighborhood. Two other
neighborhoods nearby had less residential burglaries, but still had 11 and 12 reported
residential burglaries for 2005-2009. Therefore, this neighborhood seems to be nestled
in an area with higher residential burglaries in general.
There are also a lack of barriers that can act as defensible spaces (Newman
1972), since there is no gate at the entrance/exit. Also, most of the perimeter of the
neighborhood is not fenced, and the majority of the personal yards are not fenced
(Brower et al 1983). Moreover, the activity within the neighborhood on both days of the
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canvass was minimal compared to other neighborhoods, which is a sign of social
disorder (Woldoff 2002). This could result in residents feeling a lower sense of safety
which can also decrease the collective efficacy within the neighborhood. Although the
park next door was reasonably active, many of these people could have come from
other neighborhoods. All in all, Heather Glen has many indicators of low collective
efficacy.
Tudor Grove at Timber Springs
Foreclosure Rate: 17.4
Residential Burglary Rate: 5.3
Tudor Grove at Timber Springs lies in Census tract 167.19, which is an upperincome tract. The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as follows: 53.8% white; 8.3%
Black/African American; 28% Hispanic; and 7.3% Asian. There is new shopping located
near the neighborhood, with a Wal-Mart Super Center. The neighborhood is
surrounded by many other neighborhoods, in a heavily residential area in Avalon Park.
Timber Springs is the main road the neighborhood is located off of, and there are about
six other neighborhoods situated in the Timber Springs area. There are two gates, one
for entering and one for exiting, positioned at the front of the property and this is the
only way of entering or exiting the neighborhood. The neighborhood consists of
approximately 132, one and two-story single family homes that were built in the mid
2000s, mostly 2005 and 2006, around the construction boom. There is a Home
Owners’ Association present, which is responsible for enforcing rules and guidelines,
such as the type of privacy fence; however, they are not responsible for the
maintenance of residents’ yards.
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The perimeter of the neighborhood is not fenced but instead surrounded by
wooded areas, ponds, and other neighborhoods. The only place where the
neighborhood is fenced is up front near the gate, where there is a small fence. Also,
most of the homes are not privately fenced. The neighborhood does not have a
community pool, tennis or basketball court, or park/playground. There is a community
park down the road that residents who live in Timber Springs use though. Just as
important, as Table 1 indicates, Tudor Grove at Timber Springs had 0, 0, 1, 9, and 13
foreclosures for 2005-2009, and had only 1, 2, 1, 1, and 2 reported residential burglaries
for the same years. Thus, as foreclosures increased, residential burglary in this
neighborhood remained stable, and very minimal, especially compared to previously
discussed neighborhoods. This is contradictory to social disorganization’s argument.
Canvass 1 – May 18, 2011, 10:40 am
Upon arrival at Tudor Grove at Timber Springs, the entrance and exit gates were
both closed. I was able to gain access into the neighborhood using a ‘dummy’ code.
There was a landscaping company at the front of the neighborhood maintaining the
entrance. The vehicle traffic activity and the number of people outside were low on this
day, one and one respectively. The foot traffic activity, however, was moderately high,
with a recorded five people. What’s more, there were around three visible ‘For Sale’
signs and two visible ‘For Rent’ signs throughout the neighborhood. There were also
roughly four visible vacancies or foreclosures. Many of the yards were well kept, but
many were not as well. Some of the unkempt yards belonged to households that were
definitely occupied, while others belonged to the obvious vacancies and/or foreclosures.
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Canvass 2 – June 18, 2011, 1:30 pm
Upon second arrival at Tudor Grove at Timber Springs, the gates were once
again closed, and I was able to gain access using the same method as the first
canvass. For a Saturday afternoon, the neighborhood’s activity was low. For example,
the vehicle traffic count was six, foot traffic count was one, and the number of people
outside was three. There were some vehicles parked on the street on this day, and
there were also several trashcans at the end of driveways still left out from trash day.
On this day of canvassing, I observed around half of the yards to be in poor condition,
and there was also some visible yards debris.
Interestingly, this neighborhood definitely exhibited signs of physical disorder,
putting into question its level of collective efficacy, such as the obvious vacancies or
foreclosures, ill-maintained yards, yard debris, lack of fenced perimeter, minimal
privately fenced yards, and low level of activity (Skogan 1992; Brower et al 1983). Yet,
this neighborhood had only seven reported residential burglaries in the five years, with a
residential burglary rate of 5.3. So what factors can explain this phenomenon? First,
the fact that this neighborhood is smaller compared to other neighborhoods in this
research, then residents could engage in more interaction and increase the level of
collective efficacy more easily than if they were in a larger neighborhood. Also, the
neighborhood is nestled in the back of Timber Springs and is not easily accessible.
There is not much traffic that passes by besides residents who live in the Timber
Springs area. Lastly, the neighborhood is gated and these gates stay closed. This not
only creates a barrier (Newman 1972) and/or a deterrent for criminals, it is also a strong
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indicator of higher collective efficacy. In the end, this neighborhood has been able to
maintain a low level of residential burglary despite the higher number of foreclosures in
the five years.
Spring Isle UT 1
Foreclosure Rate: 7.3
Residential Burglary Rate: 2.7
Spring Isle UT 1 lies in Census tract 167.19, which is an upper-income level tract.
The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as follows: 53.8% white; 8.3% Black/African
American; 28% Hispanic; and 7.3% Asian. The neighborhood is located down the road
from Tudor Grove, the neighborhood discussed above. There is new shopping located
nearby: restaurants, a Wal-Mart Super Center, etc. Moreover, as the neighborhood
implies, there are other UT’s, or units, to Spring Isle. For example, there is Spring Isle
UT 2 and UT 3 as well. Spring Isle UT 1, the section of the neighborhood of interest for
this research, is located at the front of the neighborhood. Interestingly though, the other
two UT’s for the neighborhood, which were built in the same years, do not have nearly
as many foreclosures (3 and 6), or as much reported residential burglaries (2 and 5).
One explanation of this could be because these two UT’s are located behind UT 1,
further back in the neighborhood. Criminals often prefer an easy access in and out, and
would rather stay closer to the main entrance to make it easier to get away.
The totality of the neighborhood is quite large compared to other neighborhoods
observed. The road leading into the neighborhood is the only entrance/exit, and there is
a gate for entering and a gate for exiting. Just as important, there is an occupied guard
office located at the gates. There is a Home Owners’ Association that is responsible for

169

the regulation of rules and enforcement of guidelines, but not personal lawn
maintenance. There are around 200 residences located in the neighborhood. The
neighborhood has both townhomes and one and two-story homes, which were built in
the mid 2000’s, during the housing boom (mostly 2005 and 2006). The perimeter of the
neighborhood is partially fenced, while other parts are backed up to wooded areas. The
areas when there is a fence are where the neighborhood backs up to other
neighborhoods, as well as there is a brick wall running along the front of the
neighborhood.
Also, the majority of the single family homes are not privately fenced. The
neighborhood has a community pool located in the very back of the neighborhood (in
either UT 2 or UT 3), and a park/playground located closer to the front of the
neighborhood. There are no sporting courts located within the neighborhood.
Furthermore, as Table 1 illustrates, the neighborhood’s foreclosure count for 2005-2009
increased from 0, 0, 0, 3 and 19, while the residential burglary count remained stable at
0, 1, 3, 2, and 2. Therefore, this neighborhood does not support the theory’s premise
that as foreclosures increase, so does residential burglary because the neighborhood
becomes socially disorganized.
Canvass 1 – May 18, 2011, 10:30 am
Upon arrival at Spring Isle UT 1, the gates were closed and the guard was
present. I was unable to gain access into the neighborhood unfortunately. Therefore, I
was unable to get an activity count of vehicle and foot traffic, the number of people
located outside, and the number of people at the community pool and park/playground.
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I was also unable to observe the number of ‘For Sale’ and ‘For Rent’ units and unable to
visibly observe any vacancies or foreclosures. Lastly, I was not able to observe any
signs of physical disorder in the neighborhoods. From my vantage point of observation,
I was able to see that the outside of the neighborhood was very well maintained, and
there was several cars entering and exiting the neighborhood.
Canvass 2 – June 18, 2011, 1:50 pm
Upon second arrival at Spring Isle UT 1, the gates were once again closed, the
guard was present, and I was unable to gain access into the neighborhood. Therefore,
none of the observations were able to be conducted. There was however heavy activity
of vehicles entering and exiting on this day. Due to these limitations, it is very difficult to
draw any significant conclusions on the collective efficacy of this neighborhood.
However, there are some factors that could explain the lower level of residential
burglary. For example, the neighborhood is gated and guarded. That undoubtedly
could act as a deterrent for would-be criminals, and could increase the sense of safety
among residents, also increasing residents’ collective efficacy. Despite these
characteristics, I cannot draw any decisive conclusions of what causes this
neighborhood to have less residential burglaries.

Lakes of Windermere PH 2A
Foreclosure Rate: 10.7
Residential Burglary Rate: 1.5
Lakes of Windermere PH 2A lies in Census tract 171.03, which is considered an
upper-income level tract. The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as follows: 59.6%
white; 3.4% Black/African American; 23% Hispanic; and 10% Asian. The neighborhood
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is surrounded by many other neighborhoods, water, and orange groves, and is what I
consider to be in a rural setting. The area surrounding is not heavily commercialized,
but instead more residential. There are 12 different entrances into Lakes of
Windermere and none of them are gated. The neighborhood also has 3 other phases
(PH 1, PH 3, and PH 4) and it is a very large and dispersed neighborhood.
Interestingly, one of the phases, PH 1, actually had more residential burglaries than PH
2A, 11 residential burglaries for 2005-2009, but only had 19 total foreclosures, so it did
not meet the sample requirements for this research. Despite the multiple phases of the
neighborhood, I did attempt to stay in PH 2A only for the neighborhood canvasses.
The roughly 200 houses within the neighborhood vary from one to two-story
homes, which were built in the mid 2000s, during the construction boom. There is a
Home Owners’ Association for the neighborhood, which is responsible for enforcing
certain guidelines, such as the type of privacy fencing residents can use. Residents are
all responsible for the maintenance of their own yards though. The perimeter of the
neighborhood is not fenced, and a small number of homes have privacy fences. The
neighborhood still looks newly constructed and is well taken care of. There is a
community pool and a park/playground within the neighborhood, but no tennis or
basketball courts. Moreover, as Table 1 reveals, the foreclosure count for Lakes of
Windermere PH 2A for 2005-2009 was 0, 0, 0, 5, and 17, while the residential burglary
count for the same years was 0, 0, 0, 3, and 0. Thus, as foreclosures increased in the
neighborhood, the residential burglary count did not increase. There was an increase in
2008, resulting in three reported residential burglaries, but when foreclosures research
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their highest in 2009, residential burglaries actually decreased to zero. As a result, the
theory could not explain this neighborhood, which has a very low residential burglary
count in general.
Canvass 1 – May 18, 2011, 12:35 pm
Upon arrival at Lakes of Windermere PH 2A, there were commercial grounds
maintenance workers mowing. The neighborhood was reasonably quiet, but that is
expected on a weekday since people are typically either working or at school. The
vehicle traffic count was three, the foot traffic count was one, and the number of people
located outside was three. There were also two people riding bikes on the bike path on
the outside of the neighborhood. No one was at the community pool or
park/playground. Just as important, there were no visible ‘For Sale’ or ‘For Rent’ signs,
but there were obvious signs of several vacancies or foreclosures. In fact, some of the
yards throughout the neighborhood were not maintained well, and this was found in
occupied and vacant/foreclosed homes. Lastly, there were also some vehicles parked
on the street and trash cans left at the road (perhaps it was trash day that morning).
Canvass 2 – June 18, 2011, 10:20 am
Upon second arrival at Lakes of Windermere PH 2A, the activity in the
neighborhood increased, as would be expected on a weekend. For example, on this
day of canvassing, the vehicle traffic count was ten, the foot traffic count was six
(several dog walkers), and the number of people outside was five. There was also a
person riding a bike. Once again though, the community pool and park/playground
were vacant. Moreover, there was no visible trash or debris in the neighborhood.
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There were once again vehicles parked on the street. During this canvass, however,
there was a sheriff’s patrol vehicle parked in the neighborhood at a residence. There
were still yards that were not well taken care of, although the majority of them were.
Some of the yards that were ill-maintained were vacant or foreclosed homes, but others
were definitely occupied. Overall, the community grounds were nicely maintained.
All in all, the activity in this neighborhood was more than other neighborhoods
showing there was minimal social disorder (Woldoff 2002) and the majority of the
homes were well maintained showing there was minimal physical disorder (Skogan
1992). It could be concluded that the there was a sense of safety throughout the
neighborhood. Interestingly though, the fact that the neighborhood has 12
entrances/exits and none of them are gated, raises some interesting questions about
importance of these characteristics as being good indicators of collective efficacy.
Perhaps other indicators of more collective efficacy, such as the ruralness of the
neighborhood (see Putnam 2007 and Taylor et al. 2010 on the relationship between
rural areas and higher collective efficacy), it is in a higher-class area, and the higher
level of activity all balance out the fact that the neighborhood is very open, which can
decreases the criminal activity (Sampson et al. 1997), and in this case, residential
burglaries.
Island Walk
Foreclosure Rate: 11.1
Residential Burglary Rate: 8.9
Island Walk lies in Census tract 168.05, which is considered a middle-income
level tract. The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as follows: 23.3% white; 10%
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Black/African American; 61% Hispanic; and 4.6% Asian. The neighborhood is located
down from Wyndham Lakes next to a busy state road. There is one entrance/exit for
the neighborhood and it is gated with a brick fence running along the front of the
neighborhood. Even more, the neighborhood consists of 37 units, with approximately
190 different townhomes. The neighborhood is small compared to many other
neighborhoods. The townhomes were built in the early to mid 2000s, between 2002
and 2005. There is a Home Owners’ Association present which is responsible for
maintenance of the neighborhood, especially the lawn. Therefore, residents are not
responsible for the maintenance of their own lawns.
The perimeter of the neighborhood is partially fenced. When there is no fence
there is a wooded area and a pond separating Island Walk from surrounding
neighborhoods. There are no personal privacy fences however. There is a community
pool and a park/playground located inside the neighborhood, but not any sporting
courts. Just as important, according to Table 1, the foreclosures for 2005-2009
increased from 0, 0, 0, 8, to 13. However, the residential burglary for the same years
remained stable, at 2, 3, 5, 4, and 3. When residential burglary was at its highest in
2007, foreclosures were at zero, and then as foreclosures increased in 2008 and 2009,
residential burglary actually decreased. Therefore, the expectation, that residential
burglaries will increase because foreclosures increased, an indicator of social
disorganization, is not supported.
Canvass 1 – May 19, 2011, 1:00 pm
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Upon arrival at Island Walk, the entrance and exit gates were closed. I was able
to gain access though by following another vehicle through the gate. Located at the
front gate of the neighborhood are a ‘Deed Restricted’ and a ‘Neighborhood Watch’
sign. Also, there is a ‘No Parking’ and a ‘Tow Away’ sign located at the front entrance,
perhaps in case people park and walk in the neighborhood since they are unable to gain
access in a vehicle. The overall activity inside the neighborhood was relatively low, but
this is to be expected on a weekday when people are at work or school. The vehicle
traffic count was three, the foot traffic count was zero, and there were three people
located outside. There was no one at the community pool or park/playground either.
Moreover, there were no visible ‘For Sale’ signs but there was one ‘For Rent’
sign located in one of the townhome’s windows. There were no visible vacancies or
foreclosures, but since the neighborhood is maintained by the HOA, then being able to
identify vacancies or foreclosures through observation only is difficult. Although the
activity was low, nearly half of the garages were open, and less than half of the
townhomes had cars parked outside on the driveways. Interestingly, there were also
signs posted in the neighborhood indicating that there were not to be any playing in the
alley way or courtyard, indicating that the HOA places strict rules on its residents. The
overall condition of the neighborhood and the housing were nice and clean.
Canvass 2 – June 4, 2011, 10:35 am
Upon second arrival at Island Walk, there were several runners located on the
sidewalk in front of the neighborhood. Once again, the entrance and exit gates were
closed, but I was able to gain access by following another vehicle in. The activity within
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the neighborhood on this weekend was also relatively low. For example, the vehicle
traffic count was three, the foot traffic count was one, and the number of people outside
was two. In addition, there was no one located at the pool or park/playground. There
was construction workers present working on a resident’s townhome. Similar as the
first canvass, approximately half of the residents’ garages were open, indicating that
residents were most likely home but not outside.
In summary, there were strong indicators of higher collective efficacy within this
neighborhood. For instance, the neighborhood is gated and the gates remain closed
which can act as a defensible space (Newman 1972) and prohibit unwanted people
from entering the neighborhood. There are the various signs posted about the
neighborhood having a neighborhood watch and being deed restricted, which are could
act as an agent of social control themselves. Just as important, the HOA does seem to
enforce strict rules and regulations, such as the sign indicating no playing in certain
parts of the neighborhood. The HOA may assist in maintaining order and safety in the
neighborhood. Also, part of the neighborhood is enclosed which is a strong indicator of
higher collective efficacy.
However, there are other indicators of low collective efficacy found within this
neighborhood. For example, although some of the neighborhood’s perimeter is fenced,
other parts are not; especially along the south side of the neighborhood where is backs
up to another residential neighborhood – there is no fence separating the two.
Interestingly, the neighborhood/s that lie/s to the south also has/have higher residential
burglary counts, such as 14 and 15 residential burglaries for the five years. Therefore,
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there could be a spillover of other neighborhoods, which helps to explain the larger
amount of residential burglaries Island Walk despite the various indicators supporting
having a lower level of collective efficacy. Lastly, there was minimal outside activity on
both days which can suggest more social disorder (Woldoff 2002). So, perhaps
residents in Island Walk do not have a sense of security, and thus are not outside,
which could increase interaction and neighborhood bonds, ultimately increasing
collective efficacy.
Discovery Palms Condos
Foreclosure Rate: 6.3
Residential Burglary Rate: 2.1
Discovery Palms Condos lie in Census tract 170.05, which is considered a
middle-income tract. The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as follows: 64.8%
white; 6% Black/African American; 18.2% Hispanic; and 6.6% Asian. The neighborhood
is situated in a very busy, heavily populated area near the attractions in Orlando.
Discovery Palms Condos is off of 1-4 and is surrounded by many different timeshares,
vacation clubs, and hotels. There is also a lot of shopping nearby, such as the Orlando
Premium Outlets and a Walgreens. So, these condos are in a relatively nonresidential
area, and more of a tourist area. There are two entrance/exits located at the front of the
property and another located at the back. All entrance/exits are gated. The complex is
made up of 28 different buildings with approximately 335 condos that were built in 2003.
As with most condos, there is a Home Owners’ Association present that maintains the
entire grounds, including the lawn. Therefore, residents are not responsible for the
upkeep of the lawn.
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The perimeter of the neighborhood is mostly fenced, with only a small portion not
fenced along one side, where there is a heavily wooded area. Within the neighborhood
there is a community pool, a tennis court, a sand volleyball court, an indoor basketball
court, and a playground. Furthermore, according to Table 1, Discovery Palms Condos
had a foreclosure count for 2005-2009 of 0, 2, 2, 6, and 11 and a residential burglary
count of 0, 3, 1, 2, and 1. Thus, as foreclosures steadily increased, the residential
burglaries in the neighborhood remained stable. In fact, the highest count of reported
residential burglary was in 2006, when foreclosures were near their lowest, and when
foreclosures were at their highest in 2009, residential burglary actually decreased. As a
result, this neighborhood did not appear to be socially disorganized based on using the
measurement of foreclosures.
Canvass 1 – May 18, 2011, 1:45 pm
Upon arrival at Discovery Palms Condos, all of the entrance and exit gates were
closed. Also, these gates were equipped with swing down arms, which helps to prevent
vehicles from following other vehicles in. Therefore, unfortunately I was unable to gain
access by following any vehicles in, and the dummy codes for the gates would not work
either. Regrettably, I was unable to gain access into this neighborhood. Yet, located at
the front of the neighborhood near that entrance/exit gates is a parking area, where the
community center is located. I parked there and conducted observations of the activity I
could observe. Just as important, there was a ‘Private Property’ sign posted at the
entrance of the neighborhood. The vehicle traffic count was two, and there was no
observable foot traffic or people (residents) outside on this day. There were grounds
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keepers present though, maintaining the landscaping. I was unable to observe any of
the amenities for the condominium complex, so I do not have a count for the pool,
tennis court, basketball court, volleyball court, or playground. Also from where I was
parked, it appeared that approximately half of the parking lot was full (at least the
parking lot located at the front of the neighborhood). All in all, the condos were very
well taken care of and in very nice condition.
Canvass 2 – June 4, 2011, 2:05 pm
Upon second arrival at Discovery Palms Condos, all of the entrance and exit
gates were once again closed and I was unable to gain access. I therefore conducted
observations from the front of the property, parked near the main entrance/exit. During
the period of observation, I counted one vehicle as vehicle traffic, and once again, could
not observe any foot traffic or people located inside. Similar as the first canvass, I was
unable to observe any activity at the condo’s amenities. Since many of the field
observations were not able to be conducted, an interpretation of the level of collective
efficacy for this neighborhood is difficult. Yet, there are definitely some indicators of the
neighborhood that support the claim that Discovery Palms has a higher level of
collective efficacy. These include indicators such as it being a gated, and closed
community, mostly fenced, and in very nice condition, which increases the sense of
security of residents and could increase the bonds between residents, all increasing the
level of collective efficacy. However, without getting a detailed canvass of the
neighborhood, conclusions are hard to make. It would be assumed that the level of
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collective efficacy would in fact be higher in this neighborhood based on the indicators
from an ‘outside’ appearance.
Signature Lakes-Parcel 1C
Foreclosure Rate: 6.5
Residential Burglary Rate: 2.2
Signature Lakes-Parcel 1C lies in Census tract 171.05, which is an upper-income
level tract. The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as follows: 75.3% white; 5.8%
Black/African American; 10.8% Hispanic; and 6.8% Asian. The neighborhood is located
in a more rural, secluded area, with lots of water and woods surrounding it. Also, the
neighborhood is located in what is considered a more ‘high class’ town, the town of
Windermere. There is a new Publix shopping center nearby as well. There is a
bike/jogging path located outside of the neighborhood. Overall, Signature Lakes is a
very large neighborhood with multiple parcels in it. For instance, Signature Lakes is
divided up into six different parcels – 1A, 1B, 1C, 1D PH 1, 1D PH 2, and PH 2.
However, of interest for this research is only Parcel 1C. The other parcels in Signature
Lakes did not meet the requirements for sampling for this research and therefore were
not included in the overall sample. In fact, Parcel 1A had 13 foreclosures and 6
residential burglaries, Parcel 1B had 12 foreclosures and 2 reported residential
burglaries, Parcel 1D PH 1 had 0 foreclosures and 1 reported residential burglary,
Parcel 1D PH 2 had 1 foreclosure and 0 reported residential burglaries, and Parcel PH
2 has 0 foreclosures and 0 reported residential burglaries. So, Parcel 1C had more
foreclosures and residential burglaries than any of the other parcels located within the
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same neighborhood. I did attempt to limit my observations and analysis to Parcel 1C
only.
There are two entrance/exits into Signature Lakes, one of which is located in
Parcel 1C, in which the canvassing took place. Neither of the roads into the
neighborhood are gated. The houses (n=325) in this neighborhood parcel vary
significantly in size and value, as well as the year they were built. For example, the
houses were built between 2006-2010, some of them being townhomes, while others
are one and two-store homes. In fact, one road of the street also has waterfront homes
that are valued at nearly $1 million. What’s more, there are empty lots within this
parcel, indicating that either the builders have halted construction or that construction
companies are still building. This is also obvious by the fact that some of the homes in
the neighborhood were built as late as 2010. However, there are many streets that
consist of only empty lots with no homes situated at the back of the neighborhood. This
area though is located in a different parcel. As a result though, it is obvious that parts of
this neighborhood have halted any construction, which much of the construction did
take place during the housing boom in the mid 2000s.
There is a Home Owners’ Association present that covers all of the various
parcels in Signature Lakes. The HOA is responsible for the enforcement of rules and
guidelines, such as the type of privacy fencing residents can install, but residents are all
still responsible for the maintenance of their own yards. The majority of the perimeter of
the neighborhood is not fenced (only a white PVC fencing running across the front of
the neighborhood), with woods and ponds acting as barriers when there is no fencing.
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There are some privacy fences throughout the neighborhood, but the majority does not.
In fact, many of the homes do not have a large yard to even fence. There are sidewalks
located throughout the neighborhood as well. Moreover, there are two community
pools, tennis and basketball courts, and a park/playground located in the neighborhood
(but in different parcels). More importantly, as Table 1 illustrates, the foreclosures
count for 2005-2009 in Signature Lakes-Parcel 1C was 0, 0, 1, 2, and 18, while the
residential burglary count for the same years was 0, 3, 2, 3, and 3. Thus, as
foreclosures increased throughout the five years, the residential burglary count actually
remained stable. Accordingly, the theory was not supported for this neighborhood.
Canvass 1 – May 18, 2011, 12:15 pm
Upon arrival at Signature Lakes-Parcel 1C, the activity throughout the
neighborhood was moderately busy. For example, the vehicle traffic count was three,
the foot traffic count was three, and the number of people outside was four. Even more,
there were a lot of service vehicles present throughout the neighborhood for various
services, such as cable, lawn maintenance, security, etc. There were around four
people I could visibly see at one of the pools located at the community center, and there
were also numerous bikes parked out front. There was no one located at the tennis or
basketball courts though. There were about three children with parents present at the
park/playground as well. During the canvass I recorded approximately eight visible ‘For
Sale’ signs but no ‘For Rent’ signs. Furthermore, there were several visible vacancies
or foreclosures in the neighborhood.
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Most of the residential yards were well kept, while some were not. Those of
which were not belonged both to occupied homes and vacant/foreclosed homes. As
mentioned above, most of the yards in Parcel 1C are not privately fenced either.
Interestingly, of the nicer, waterfront homes in the neighborhood, these houses did have
fences and coded-gates at the driveway. The grounds belonging to the neighborhood
were nicely maintained, and there were no real signs of physical disorder (i.e., trash,
debris). The main sign of physical disorder, as mentioned previously, were the
numerous empty lots in the neighborhood.
Canvass 2 – June 18, 2011, 10:50 am
Upon second arrival at Signature Lakes-Parcel 1C, the activity within the
neighborhood increased significantly, as is expected on a weekend. For instance, the
vehicle traffic count on this day was 13, the foot traffic count was 1 (a person jogging),
and the number of people outside was 10 (mostly residents maintaining their lawns).
Once again, there were yards that were not well kept, but there was not any visible
trash or debris throughout the neighborhood. There were vehicles parked on the street
on this day as well. There were three people located at the pool at the community
center, but no one at the tennis and basketball courts of park/playground. Interestingly,
despite the increase in overall activity on the day of this canvass, there were not many
children out playing. In fact, during the canvass, I recorded no children outside, only
adults. Lastly, there was a jogger located on the path outside of the neighborhood.
According to both canvasses, there were obvious indicators of higher collective
efficacy which can explain its lower residential burglary rate (Sampson et al. 1997).
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Although the neighborhood is not gated, the perimeter is mostly not fenced, and many
of the yards are not privately fenced, Signature Lakes-Parcel 1C is located in an area
that is considered a safe area, and therefore the residents could have a sense of safety.
The residential burglaries around the area in general are low, and if residents feel safe,
they may be more likely to engage in interaction with others which could increase
collective efficacy. This is also supported by the higher activity count throughout the
neighborhood. The neighborhood is also located in a more rural, secluded area where
there is not much outside traffic, and therefore there is a decrease in possible criminals.
The fact that the neighborhood is more rural is an indicator of higher collective efficacy
(Putnam 2007; Taylor et al 2010). Besides the empty lots in the neighborhood, there
were no other signs of physical disorder. This neighborhood is much larger than many
of the other neighborhoods as well, and with more people, there are more residents to
look out for one another. All in all, the other neighborhood in Windermere, Lakes of
Windermere, also had a very low residential burglary count. It appears that there are
strong indicators of higher collective efficacy which can help explain this neighborhood’s
lower residential burglary rate.

Timber Isle
Foreclosure Rate: 10.5
Residential Burglary Rate: 6.8
Timber Isle lies in Census tract 167.19, which is considered an upper-income
neighborhood. The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as follows: 53.8% white;
8.3% Black/African American; 28% Hispanic; and 7.3% Asian. The neighborhood is
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located within the Timber Springs area, which is where a previously discussed
neighborhood, Tudor Grove, is also located. In fact, these two neighborhoods are next
to each other (with woods separating them directly). So, this neighborhood is also
positioned in a heavily residential area, with the same shopping centers close by. Just
as important, there is another phase to Timber Isle, PH 2, which is situated within the
general Timber Isle neighborhood. The canvass attempted to not incorporate this part
of the neighborhood. This phase of the neighborhood is smaller than Timber Isle, and it
has a foreclosure count of five and a residential count of four, much less than the
designated Timber Isle phase. The entire Timber Isle neighborhood is larger than
Tudor Grove as well, with approximately 300 homes in both Timber Isle (n=190) and
Timber Isle PH 2.
The neighborhood consists of one and two-story homes which were built in 2005
and 2006, during the housing boom. There is a Home Owners’ Association present
which enforces guildelines (type of fencing) and helps maintain the neighborhood’s
grounds. Yet, all residents are responsible for the maintenance of their own yards. The
neighborhood has one entrance/exit with a gate. Also, the perimeter of the
neighborhood is only partially fenced, with other parts backing up to heavily wooded
areas. There is no community pool, sporting courts, or park/playground located inside
the neighborhood. There is a community park located outside of the neighborhood
however, which other neighborhoods in Timber Springs also have access too. The park
has a playground, three basketball courts, and two tennis courts. Moreover, as Table 1
shows, Timber Isle’s foreclosure count for 2005-2009 was 0, 0, 1, 6 and 13. The
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residential burglary count for the same years was 2, 2, 3, 3, and 3. Therefore, as
foreclosures increased, the residential burglary in the neighborhood did in fact increase,
but not substantially, and it could be argued that the residential burglary actually
remained stable. As a result, the hypothesis, that as foreclosures increase a
neighborhood becomes more socially disorganized and thus crime (e.g., residential
burglary) increases, was not supported.
Canvass 1 – May 18, 2011, 11:00 am
Upon arrival at Timber Isle, the gate at the entrance/exit was closed, but I was
able to gain access by using a ‘dummy’ code. New landscaping was being installed at
the entrance of the neighborhood as well. The neighborhood was relatively active on
this day. For instance, the vehicle traffic count was four, the foot traffic count was three
(a few people jogging), and the number of people located outside was five. There was
no one at the tennis or basketball courts that are located at the park outside of the
neighborhood but five people/children were located at the park/playground. It should
also be pointed out that there is a sidewalk and entrance into the neighborhood from the
park, which is behind the gates into the neighborhood. This at least allows for easy foot
traffic into the neighborhood, but not vehicle traffic. There were about six visible signs
indicating a home was ‘For Sale’ and about five signs indicating a home was ‘For Rent.’
There were also several visible vacancies or foreclosures throughout the neighborhood.
As discussed above, the majority of the yards are not privately fenced either. The roads
appeared to be recently paved and speed bumps were currently being installed in the
neighborhood. Approximately half of the yards appeared to be unkempt (dead,
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overgrown grass), some of which were yards of occupied homes, while others were
vacant or foreclosed homes. There were a few trash cans left out at the road, but
perhaps trash day was the same day as this canvass. For the most part, the
neighborhood did not have any noteworthy signs of physical disorder, such as trash and
debris.
Canvass 2 – June 18, 2011, 1:15 pm
Upon second arrival at Timber Isle, the gates were once again closed, but I
gained access by following another vehicle in. The overall activity did increase on this
day, which is to be expected since the canvass took place on a Saturday. The vehicle
traffic count was 15, the foot traffic count was 0, and the number of people outside was
6. There were several vehicles parked on the road on this day also. Despite the
increase in vehicle traffic, the neighborhood seemed fairly quiet for a weekend. In fact,
there were no children outside playing. Located at the park outside the neighborhood, I
counted one youth playing basketball and a mother and child at the playground. No one
was at the tennis courts. Once again, there were trash cans left out at the road, and
there was yard debris at the road, probably for pickup.
All in all, there were apparent indicators of higher collective efficacy found during
the canvasses of Timber Isle, which can help to explain its low/moderate residential
burglary rate. First and foremost, the neighborhood is gated and the gates remain
closed which creates a barrier or defensible space (Newman 1972). This could also
prevent easy access of any criminals. Also, the neighborhood is located in a heavily
residential area, where there is not much thru-traffic passing by but typically only
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residents. Even more, comparing other neighborhoods, the total activity of both
canvasses is a sign of less social disorder (Woldoff 2002) which is a good indicator of a
higher level of collective efficacy. Although a fence surrounding a neighborhoods’ and
residents’ yards being fenced typically is a strong indicator of higher collective efficacy
(Brower et al. 1983), it does not seem to be a compelling indicator of collective efficacy
in this neighborhood. Although there were a few signs of physical disorder, such as
trash cans and yard debris, and unkempt yards (Skogan 1992), the neighborhood
overall appeared to be well taken care of and residents appeared to take action in their
neighborhood when they feel it is needed (i.e., installation of speed bumps). All of these
indicators of higher collective efficacy help to explain this neighborhood’s lower level of
residential burglary.
Huntcliff Park
Foreclosure Rate: 9.9
Residential Burglary Rate: 6.9
Huntcliff Park lies in Census tract 168.05, which is a middle-income tract. The
racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as follows: 23.3% white; 10% Black/African
American; 61% Hispanic; and 4.6% Asian. The neighborhood is located near Wyndham
Lakes Estates, a neighborhood previously discussed. It is a smaller neighborhood
inside of Wyndham Lakes (Island Walk, a previously discussed neighborhood, is also
located nearby). There is a Publix shopping center located near the entrance of
Wyndham Lakes. In fact, Huntcliff Park is located directly next to Wyndham Lakes
Elementary. There is one entrance/exit of the neighborhood with a gate entering and a
gate exiting. There are approximately 200, one and two-story homes that were built in
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2003 and 2004. There is a Home Owners’ Association present that enforces certain
guidelines, such as the type of privacy fencing, but residents are responsible for the
care of their own yards.
The perimeter of the neighborhood is partially fenced, with fencing between the
elementary school next door and along the front of the neighborhood. However, there is
no fencing around the remaining perimeter, which is a heavily wooded area instead.
There is a community pool and a park/playground located within the neighborhood, but
no sporting courts. Only about a quarter of the residences have a fenced-in backyard.
What’s more, according to Table 1, foreclosures in Huntcliff Park increased from 0, 0, 0,
7 and 13 in 2005-2009, while the residential burglary count went from 3, 1, 2, 3, and 5.
Accordingly, there was a slight increase in residential burglary in 2009 when
foreclosures peaked. Although the increase in residential burglaries was not
substantial, there was in fact an increase, which supports, albeit modestly, the argument
that as foreclosures increase a neighborhood becomes socially disorganized.
Canvass 1 – May 19, 2011, 11:10 am
Upon arrival at Huntcliff Park, the gates were closed but I was able to gain
access using a ‘dummy’ code. There was also a ‘Deed Restricted’ sign posted at the
entrance/exit, and the entrance/exit was nicely maintained. There was not a significant
amount of activity within the neighborhood on this day. For example, the vehicle traffic
count was six, the foot traffic count was zero, and the number of people outside was
five. Moreover, there was no one located at the community pool or park/playground.
There were roughly two ‘For Sale’ signs and zero ‘For Rent’ signs that I visibly identified
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during the canvass. Just as important, there were several houses that could be
identified as vacant or in foreclosure. The majority of the yards were well maintained,
but some were not; these yards belonged to both occupied and vacant/foreclosed
homes. There were signs posted in the neighborhood prohibiting vehicles parking on
the street, although there were indeed vehicles parked on the street. There was some
visible trash in the neighborhood, but not a lot. Also, it appeared that it was trash day
because there were many garbage cans at the end of driveways. Yet, there were also
recycling bins at the street, but it was not recycling day.
Canvass 2 – June 4, 2011, 10:30 am
Upon second arrival at Huntcliff Park, the entrance gate into the neighborhood
was closed, but I was once again able to gain access by using a ‘dummy’ code.
However, the exit gate of the neighborhood was open, and remained open for the
duration of my canvass. The activity in the neighborhood on this day was also low,
which is somewhat surprising since this canvass took place on a Saturday. For
example, the vehicle traffic count was two, the foot traffic count was zero, and the
number of people outside was five. No one was located at the community pool or
park/playground once again. There were some vehicles parked on the street, once
again, despite the sign stating that is it prohibited. All in all, the neighborhood was fairly
quiet during this canvass and many residents were not out and active.
Overall, there are characteristics of Huntcliff Park that explains its rank of 13th of
total residential burglary rates, a rather moderate ranking. For instance, there are
indicators within the neighborhood of high collective efficacy; such as, gated community,
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located in a heavily residential area with minimal outside traffic, and the neighborhood is
partially fenced (Newman 1972). However, the neighborhood did exhibit some
indicators of physical disorder, such as the overgrown, unkempt yards, trash and/or
debris in some parts of the neighborhood, and recycling bins left out, even though it was
not recycling day (Skogan 1992) which support having a lower level of collective
efficacy. Just as interesting, the fact that not all of the residents abide by the rules (e.g.,
parking on the street even though there are posted signs against doing so), shows signs
of social disorder. Also, it was apparent that the level of collective efficacy was lower
because of the limited activity in the neighborhood, which is an indicator of collective
efficacy, on both days of the canvass. Even more, the majority of the residences were
not fenced (Brower et al. 1983), which creates a barrier and acts as a deterrent to
would-be criminals. Taking all of the characteristics into consideration, it appears that
the neighborhood ‘balances’ itself out, which helps explain why it falls close to the
middle of the ranking in total residential burglaries. There are both strong indicators of
high and low levels of collective efficacy.
Windrose at Southmeadow UT 2
Foreclosure Rate: 18.3
Residential Burglary Rate: 10.1
Windrose at Southmeadow UT 2 lies in Census tract 168.05, which is considered
a middle-income tract. The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as follows: 23.3%
white; 10% Black/African American; 61% Hispanic; and 4.6% Asian. The neighborhood
is located among many other residential neighborhoods, such as Sandhill Preserve and
Sandpoint at Meadow Woods, both of which are included in this research. Nearby there
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are a Super Target, a CVS, and many other shopping centers. What’s more, Windrose
at Southmeadow UT 2 is situated in a more secluded area, surrounded by woods and
water. As the name suggest, there is also a UT, or unit 1. The UT 1 for Windrose is
located at the entrance of the neighborhood. Further back in the neighborhood is UT 2,
the unit of interest for this research. Windrose at Southmeadow UT 1 contains fewer
residences than UT 2 as well. In truth, UT 1 had a total foreclosure count of one and a
total residential burglary count of eight for the five years, substantially less than UT 2.
Although the difference in the residential burglary count is not considerable, this in itself
is puzzling, since the only entrance/exit into the neighborhood is located at UT 1; yet
more residential burglaries took place at the back of the neighborhood, UT 2, where
there is no easy exit. Although part of the neighborhood was a different unit, I did
attempt to limit that as much as possible.
As mentioned above, there is only one entrance/exit for the neighborhood and it
is not gated. There are approximately 110 homes, which range from one to two-story,
and were built in the mid 2000s, mostly 2006. There is a Home Owners’ Association
present that enforces rules and guidelines for resident. Yet, the residents are
responsible for the maintenance of their own yards. The perimeter of the neighborhood
is not fenced, with only a small fence along one side, but mostly surrounded by water
and heavily wooded areas. Also, the majority of the yards are not privately fenced.
There is no community pool in the neighborhood, but there is a basketball court and two
parks/playgrounds. Just as interesting, as Table 1 indicates, the foreclosure count from
2005-2009 significantly increased from 0, 0, 1, 2, and 17, while the residential burglary
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count fluctuated and slightly increased from 0, 2, 3, 1, and 5. With that said, there was
a slight increase in residential burglaries when foreclosures were at their highest in
2009. This supports the claim that as foreclosures increase, a neighborhood becomes
socially disorganized and then crime, residential burglaries, also increases.
Canvass 1 – May 18, 2011, 2:35 pm
During the first canvass at Windrose at Southmeadow UT 2, the vehicle traffic
count was recorded as four, the foot traffic count was one, and the number of people
located outside was three. Furthermore, no one was located at the basketball court or
either of the parks/playgrounds. Also, there were a large amount of vehicles parked at
residences, although these people were not outside of their homes. There were roughly
three visible ‘For Sale’ signs and no ‘For Rent’ signs. Just as important, there were
about four visible homes that were vacant or in foreclosure. Some of the yards within
the neighborhood were unkempt, and these belonged to both occupied and vacant or
foreclosed residences. Also mentioned above, the majority of the yards were not
privately fenced. On this day, recycling bins were located at the end of driveways
waiting for pickup. Moreover, there was graffiti on the small fence located within the
neighborhood. Other signs of physical disorder, such as trash and debris, were not
apparent in the neighborhood.
Canvass 2 – June 4, 2011, 11:30 am
During the second canvass at Windrose at Southmeadow UT 2, the level of
neighborhood activity increased significantly. In fact, there was a HOA garage sale
being conducted with multiple residences taking part. Naturally then, the activity did
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increase because there were more people in the neighborhood specifically for the yard
sale. With that said, the vehicle traffic count was 11 (some of which could be for the
garage sale), the foot traffic count was 3, and the number of people located outside was
15. I conducted a second count of additional people that were located at the garage
sale only, and that was 12. However, of the 15 that were located outside, some of them
could have been for the garage sale as well. Despite this increase in activity, there was
still no one at the basketball court or the two parks/playgrounds. There were no
additional signs of physical disorder from the previous canvass, aside from the unkempt
yards and graffiti on the fence (the recycling bins were not located at the street).
According to both of the neighborhood canvasses of Windrose at Southmeadow
UT 2, there are some indicators of high collective efficacy found within the
neighborhood. The fact that the neighborhood was isolated and situated in a vast area
of residential neighborhoods, and the moderate level of activity (taking into
consideration that the activity could be skewed because of the HOA yard sale)
(decreasing social disorder; see Woldoff 2002), are indicators of more collective
efficacy. Yet, the neighborhood is not gated, most of it is not fenced, there is a minimal
amount of privately fenced yards (Brower et al. 1984), and there are obvious signs of
physical disorder (e.g., unkempt yards, foreclosures and graffiti) (Skogan 1992), all of
which are indicators of low collective efficacy. These latter indicators appear to be
stronger and overshadow the other indicators, resulting in less collective efficacy within
the neighborhood. Perhaps this explains the ranking for this neighborhood at 7th in total
residential burglary rates. Undoubtedly, this neighborhood has obvious characteristics
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that can reduce the level of collective efficacy, and therefore the residents may be less
likely to act as informal agents of social control. In the end, residential burglary
increases.
This chapter has presented the findings of the two analyses. First, I tested the
overall argument of social disorganization theory – as an area becomes more socially
disorganized (e.g., increase in foreclosures), crime, measured by residential burglary,
will increase. For the years 2005-2009, the results showed three different patterns of
residential burglary among the neighborhoods as foreclosures increased – increased,
remained stable, or decreased. As Table 1 indicated, around half of the neighborhoods
remained stable, while roughly twenty-five percent increased in residential burglary and
the remaining twenty-five percent decreased. Even though the comparison of years of
foreclosures and residential burglary did not lend significant support for social
disorganization theory in these more affluent neighborhoods, an analysis of the level of
collective efficacy in the neighborhoods was still important. It helps determine if
collective efficacy can explain the difference between neighborhoods with high
foreclosures and high residential burglaries and those with high foreclosures but low
residential burglaries.
I measured collective efficacy through the observations I completed by
canvassing the top thirty neighborhoods in foreclosures. Table 3 presents a summary
of the observations ranked from highest to lowest in residential burglary rate for the
thirty neighborhoods (to get a more detailed table, see Appendix C). After using ArcGIS
to locate the neighborhoods, I conducted observations in each of the neighborhoods on
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two separate days (one on a weekday and one on a weekend) to measure the collective
efficacy within the neighborhood and among the residents. I defined and measured
collective efficacy by identifying certain indicators of physical disorder: gated or guarded
community; fenced perimeter; HOA or deed restricted; privacy fences; overall condition
of neighborhood and houses within; level of foot and vehicle activity; and the presence
of visible foreclosures. After I completed the neighborhood canvasses and analyzed the
results, there were thirteen noteworthy neighborhoods that fell at the extreme ends of
the foreclosure/residential burglary spectrum. These thirteen neighborhoods were
further analyzed to determine if collective efficacy explains differences in their
residential burglary rates even though they all had significant foreclosure rates. This
analysis and my overall findings are presented in the next chapter.

197

Table 3: Observations of Neighborhood Characteristics by Residential Burglary and Foreclosure Rates
Neighborhood Name
Hawthorne Village Condos
Sandpoint at Meadow Woods
Heather Glen at Meadow Woods
La Cascada PH 1
Crest at Waterford Lakes Condos
Cedar Bend at Meadow Woods PH 1
Windrose at Southmeadow UT 2
Sandhill Preserve
Wyndham Lakes ESTS UT 1
Island Walk
Island Cove Villas PH 3
Sand Lake Private Residences Condos
Huntcliff Park
Timber Isle
Sanctuary at Bay Hill Condos
Palms Villa Residences Condos
Waterford Trails PH 2 East Village
Audubon Villas at Hunters Creek Condos
Capri at Hunters Creek Condos
Tudor Grove at Timber Springs
Eagle Creek PH 1A
Los Terranos
Plantation Park Private Residences Condos
Villanova at Hunters Creek Condos
Bella Terra Condos
Spring Isle UT 1
Signature Lakes – Parcel 1C
Summerport PH 5
Discovery Palms Condos
Lakes of Windermere PH 2A
*: Rates are per 100 homes
: Guard shack present, empty
2
: Closed, but gained access
3
: Guarded, no access
1

Res Bur
Rate*
18.9
17.6
16.1
11.4
11.2
11.1
10.1
10.0
9.0
8.9
8.6
7.4
6.9
6.8
6.6
6.2
5.8
5.7
5.6
5.3
4.6
4.6
4.6
4.5
4.2
2.7
2.2
2.2
2.1
1.5
4

st

Fore
Rate*
23.8
20.6
13.3
13.9
17.3
15.8
18.3
28.0
6.5
11.1
15.4
14.8
9.9
10.5
19.7
24.4
10.1
13.0
15.6
17.4
7.3
26.9
9.9
23.1
12.7
7.3
6.5
16.4
6.3
10.7

Gated
O/C
Y(1)-O
1
N(1)
N(1)
N(3)
N(1)
2
Y(1)-C
N(1)
2
Y(1)-C
N(3)
2
Y(1)-C
N(1)
Y(1)-O
2
Y(1)-C
2
Y(1)-C
Y(1)-O
Y(2)-C,C
N(3)
Y(1)-O
Y(2)-C,O
2
Y(1)-C
3
Y(1)-C
N(Multi)
2
Y(1)-C
Y(2)-C,O
4
Y(2)
3
Y(1)-C
N(2)
N(3)
Y(2)-C,C
N(12)

HOA/
5
Deed






























nd

Vehicle
Traffic
5
4
6
5
10
8
15
12
6
6
6
17
8
19
19
9
18
6
8
7
11
7
9
11
17
13
16
35
3
13

Foot
Traffic
7
1
4
3
2
13
4
3
7
1
2
11
1
1
5
0
6
0
1
6
NA
4
1
4
0
NA
4
5
NA
7

: 1 day of canvass, O,C; 2 day C,C, gained access
: HOA/Deed varies depending on if they maintain entire
premise (yard), restrict type of fencing or no restriction
6
: Yards that were not unkempt were managed by the HOA
5
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Ppl
Outside
4
4
6
7
7
2
18
2
4
5
10
9
10
11
6
4
9
4
7
4
NA
5
6
2
6
NA
14
12
NA
8

Sale/
Rent






Vac/
Fore





Unkempt
6
Yards







































NA








NA







NA: No Access gained to get a count

Fenced
Partly
Mostly
Partly
None
Mostly
None
None
Partly
Partly
Partly
Partly
Partly
Partly
Partly
Partly
Fully
Partly
Partly
Fully
Partly
None
None
Partly
Fully
Fully
Partly
Partly
Partly
Partly
None

CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS

As noted earlier, my research of selected neighborhoods is important for
understanding if, and when, social disorganization theory can be applied to middle- and
upper-income neighborhoods with high rates of foreclosures. The in-depth canvasses
that I conducted provide detailed information for each neighborhood. The purpose of
the canvasses was to measure a neighborhood’s level of collective efficacy to
determine if it explains why neighborhoods with high foreclosures vary considerably on
the level of criminal activity (residential burglary). My research located neighborhoods
that fell on both ends of the spectrum – neighborhoods with a significant amount of
foreclosures and residential burglaries, and neighborhoods with foreclosures but less
residential burglaries. However, thirteen neighborhoods evidenced patterns that were
in-line with the focus of my research. Additional discussion of these neighborhoods is
warranted.
After calculating the foreclosure and residential burglary rates for the
neighborhoods, it really brought into perspective which neighborhoods were
characterized by high foreclosure/high residential burglary and high foreclosure/low
residential burglary (a table ranking the neighborhoods by residential burglary and
foreclosures can be found in Appendix D). The thirteen neighborhoods and the
presence of collective efficacy within them are presented in Figure 4. Seven
neighborhoods were characterized by a significantly higher foreclosure and residential
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burglary rates: Hawthorne Village Condos, Sandhill Preserve, Sandpoint at Meadow
Woods, La Cascada PH1, Cedar Bend at Meadow Woods PH1, Heather Glen at
Meadow Woods, and Windrose at Southmeadow UT2. Six neighborhoods were
characterized by a high foreclosure rate but much lower residential burglary rate:
Villanova at Hunters Creek Condos, Summerport PH5, Palms Villa Residences Condos,
Bella Terra Condos, Los Terranos, and Tudor Grove at Timber Springs.

Heather Glen at Meadow Woods
C.E. Low

Hawthorne Village Condos
C.E. Low

Cedar Bend at Meadow Woods PH1
C.E. Moderate

HIGH
FORECLOSURE
HIGH
CRIME

Windrose at Southmeadow UT2
C.E. Low

Sandhill Preserve
C.E. Low

Sandpoint at Meadow Woods
C.E. Moderate

La Cascada PH1
C.E. Low

Villanova at Hunters Creek Condos
C.E. High

Tudor Grove at Timber Springs
C.E. High

Los Terranos
C.E. Unclear*
HIGH
FORECLOSURE

Palms Villa Residences
Condos
C.E. High

LOW
CRIME

C.E.: Collective Efficacy
*: The collective efficacy in Los Terranos
offered mixed results and drawing any
conclusion on the collective efficacy within this
neighborhood could not be done.

Summerport PH5
C.E. High

Figure 13: Collective Efficacy among the Thirteen Neighborhoods
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Bella Terra Condos
C.E. High

Once again, these neighborhoods represent two ends of the spectrum and are perhaps
the most important neighborhoods in understanding and explaining social
disorganization in middle- and upper-income neighborhoods.
As discussed, Hawthorne Village Condos did exhibit signs of physical disorder,
such as boarded windows. This is a strong indicator of low collective efficacy (Taylor et
al. 1984; Skogan 1992). This neighborhood also was older than other neighborhoods in
my study and had visible vacancies and/or foreclosures. The level of outside activity
was not considerable. When neighbors are not out interacting with others then Woldoff
(2002) argues that this is a lack of routine and social neighboring which is a sign of
social disorder. Although this neighborhood was gated, the gates remained opened for
anyone to come and go as they please, including possible criminals. In other words, the
gates did not serve as a deterrent. Moreover, this neighborhood lies in a middle-income
tract, not a high-income tract, in an older, more rundown surrounding area. All of these
findings may explain why this neighborhood had the highest rate in residential burglary
(18.9 per 100 houses) and the fourth highest rate in foreclosures (23.8 per 100 houses).
In the end, this neighborhood’s indicators of collective efficacy were quite low which
may account for the higher residential burglary in the neighborhood (Sampson et al.
1997; Morenoff et al. 2001).
Sandhill Preserve is another middle-income neighborhood with high foreclosures
and high residential burglary. The findings from the neighborhood canvasses, such as
vacancies or foreclosures, unmaintained yards, and yard debris, are indicators of
physical disorder which can reduce collective efficacy (Taylor et al. 1984). Just as

201

important, none of the yards in Sandhill Preserve were fenced, and therefore, may not
have prevented residential burglaries. Researchers have found that the presence of a
fence around a home is a sign that the homeowners would react toward intruders
(Brower et al. 1983). Thus, a lack of a yard fence may not serve as a deterrent. Also,
during the canvasses, there was minimal activity in the neighborhood, which is a
characteristic of social disorder (Woldoff 2002). These are all strong indicators of a
neighborhood having low collective efficacy. However, the neighborhood is gated and
the gates were closed on both days of the canvasses which can prevent criminal
behavior (Newman 1972). Moreover, the neighborhood is located within a larger
neighborhood, and is a deed restricted neighborhood. These are all indicators which
could increase collective efficacy and thus reduce crime, such as residential burglary.
That, however, does not appear to be the case since this neighborhood ranks as
number one in foreclosures (28.0 per 100 houses) and number eight in residential
burglaries (10.0 per 100 houses). In sum, it appears that there are characteristics in
this neighborhood that are stronger in reducing collective efficacy, which may explain
the higher residential burglary rate, compared to others in my study.
Next, Sandpoint at Meadow Woods is a neighborhood with high foreclosures and
high residential burglary rates. Sandpoint is also a middle-income neighborhood.
Interestingly though, there were some characteristics that would seem to increase
collective efficacy in this neighborhood. For example, there were no signs of physical
disorder. Also, the neighborhood was well maintained, and there was a sign at the
entrance of the neighborhood indicating that there was video surveillance present.
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Undoubtedly, this sign could deter would-be criminals from committing residential
burglaries in this neighborhood because of the increased chance of being identified and
caught. Nevertheless, like the previously discussed neighborhood, there were other
characteristics of this neighborhood that could lower the level of collective efficacy. For
instance, the neighborhood was not gated and although there was a guard shack at the
entrance, there was no guard occupying it. Also, during both canvasses there was little
activity in the neighborhood which suggests social disorder (Woldoff 2002). After further
investigation however, the neighborhoods surrounding Sandpoint also had a reasonable
amount of residential burglaries. Therefore, it could be that Sandpoint was experiencing
spillover from these other neighborhoods. All of the evidence taken together suggests
that there is a moderate level of collective efficacy within the neighborhood. In other
words, the neighborhood characteristics that would increase collective efficacy balance
out the characteristics that would decrease collective efficacy, resulting in a moderate
level. In all, the neighborhood ranks sixth in foreclosure rate (20.6 per 100 houses) and
second in residential burglary rate (17.6 per 100 houses).
Turning to La Cascada PH1, we find a middle-income neighborhood which also
has high foreclosures and high residential burglary. Interestingly, there are many
physical and social characteristics in this neighborhood which support the claim that it
has low collective efficacy. For example, it has multiple entrances/exits which makes it
easier to flee after committing a crime, no gates to prohibit easy access into the
neighborhood, visible signs of vacancies or foreclosures which are a sign of disorder
(Skogan 1992), minimal amount of personally fenced yards which can act as a deterrent
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(Brower et al. 1983), and a lack of a sizable amount activity among residents indicating
social disorder (Woldoff 2002). All of these help explain why this neighborhood has the
fourth highest rate (11.4 per 100 houses) in residential burglary. It is interesting that the
neighborhood’s rural location, which has been found to increase collective efficacy
(Putnam 2007; Taylor et al. 2010), coupled with the presence of police living in the
neighborhood, did not appear to be strong enough indicators to offset the factors which
decreased its collective efficacy.
Cedar Bend at Meadow woods PH1, another middle-income neighborhood,
displayed a moderate level of collective efficacy. As discussed, a neighborhood
exhibiting a moderate level of collective efficacy has strong indicators for both high and
low collective efficacy, which offset each other and make it neither strictly low or high on
my measure of collective efficacy. For example, the neighborhood is gated (and it
remains closed most, if not all of the time) and there was a reasonable amount of
activity within the neighborhood which can facilitate routine and social neighboring,
resulting in a lack of social disorder (Woldoff 2002). Yet, the perimeter of the
neighborhood is not fenced, which portrays a lack of a defensible space (Newman
1972) that could invite possible criminals. Brower and colleagues (1983) argue that
having a privacy fence is a sign that the homeowners would react toward any intruders;
however, the majority of the yards in this neighborhood are not privately fenced.
Together, these factors may explain why Cedar Bend’s residential burglary rate is the
sixth highest (11.1 per 100 houses). During my canvasses, I located police officers who
live in the neighborhood which would act as a deterrent.
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However, with the previous

neighborhood, the officers may not have been present during 2005-2009. Therefore,
despite the presence of strong indicators that would increase collective efficacy in this
neighborhood, there were other indicators that appear to be more influential, which
explains this neighborhood’s higher level of residential burglary.
Heather Glen at Meadow Woods is another middle-income neighborhood that
exhibited high foreclosures and high residential burglaries. Interestingly, Heather Glen
is the third neighborhood in my sample from Meadow Woods (the others are Cedar
Bend and Sandpoint, discussed above). The other two neighborhoods, however,
demonstrated characteristics that pointed toward a moderate level of collective efficacy.
In contrast, Heather Glen displayed low levels of collective efficacy based on the
neighborhood canvasses. For instance, there was no gate at the entrance of the
neighborhood and the majority of the perimeter surrounding the neighborhood was not
fenced (Newman 1972). Also, there were obvious signs of physical disorder, such as
unkempt yards, yard debris, trash, and obvious signs of vacancies and foreclosures in
the neighborhood (Skogan 1992). There was graffiti on the outside of the
neighborhood, which indicated a lack of social control (Wilson and Kelling 1982). In
addition, there was apparent social disorder attributed to low social activity within the
neighborhood (Woldoff 2002). All of these are strong indicators which suggest that the
neighborhood has a low level of collective efficacy. This helps explain why this
neighborhood is ranked third in residential burglary rate (16.1 per 100 houses) out of all
the neighborhoods in this study.
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The last neighborhood characterized by high foreclosures and high residential
burglaries was Windrose at Southmeadow UT2. Windrose is also a middle-income
neighborhood. Interestingly, there are few characteristics in this neighborhood that
would reduce its level of collective efficacy, such as being a more isolated
neighborhood, distant from heavy traffic, and high to moderate levels of activity (Woldoff
2002). Yet, there are stronger indicators that overshadow these and explain why this
neighborhood ranks seventh in total residential burglary rate (10.1 per 100 houses).
The neighborhood was not gated and most of the perimeter or private yards were not
fenced (Newman 1972; Brower at al. 1983). There were also signs of physical
disorder, such as unkempt yards, visible vacancies or foreclosures (Skogan 1992), and
graffiti (Wilson and Kelling 1982). These latter indicators help explain this
neighborhood’s lower collective efficacy. According to research (Sampson et al. 1997),
lower levels of collective efficacy explain why disorganized neighborhoods have higher
crime.
In contrast to the above discussion, there are six neighborhoods that were
located at the other end of the spectrum – high foreclosures but low residential burglary.
These neighborhoods were discussed earlier but need to be readdressed to understand
the impact of collective efficacy on low residential burglary within these neighborhoods
which demonstrated high levels of social disorganization as measured by high
foreclosures. The neighborhoods that are characterized by high foreclosures and low
residential burglary are Villanova at Hunters Creek Condos, Summerport PH5, Palms
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Villa Residences Condos, Bella Terra Condos, Los Terranos, and Tudor Grove at
Timber Springs.
The first neighborhood, Villanova at Hunters Creek Condos, lies within an upperincome Census tract. Social disorder, measured by a lack of routine and social
neighboring (Woldoff 2002), was not evident in this neighborhood. The vehicle, foot,
and outside activity were recorded as moderate. There were other indicators that this
neighborhood has a higher level of collective efficacy as well. For example, the
neighborhood is fully fenced with gates located at all entrances and exits. Though the
gates were open on one day of canvassing, they were closed on the other. The fencing
and gates can act as a deterrent for criminals as well as serve as indicators of higher
collective efficacy (Newman 1972; Brower at al. 1983). This, in turn, may also increase
the residents’ sense of safety. Even more, there was an obvious presence of a security
guard. These are all positive indicators of promoting collective efficacy within the
neighborhood. While canvassing the neighborhood, there was definitely a sense of
safety I even felt within the neighborhood. Taken together, these factors may explain
why this neighborhood ranked 22nd out of the 30 neighborhoods in residential burglary
(i.e., 4.5 per 100 houses) yet evidenced a significantly high foreclosure rate.
Next, Summerport PH5 was another upper-income neighborhood with a low rate
of residential burglary (2.2 per 100 houses) despite a higher rate of foreclosures. The
results of my canvasses showed that this neighborhood has relatively high indicators
collective efficacy, which may explain its lower residential burglary rate (25th out of the
30 neighborhoods). Interestingly, even though the neighborhood was not gated, there
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was some fencing around the perimeter of the neighborhood (Brower et al. 1983). Also,
there is a golf course and open, expansive areas around other parts of the
neighborhood that might discourage criminals because it resembled a rural area
(Putnam 2007; Taylor et al. 2010). Perhaps more importantly, the activity within the
neighborhood was much higher compared to the other neighborhoods in this study
which implies less social disorder (Woldoff 2002) and is a good indicator of collective
efficacy. In fact, it had the highest recorded activity of all the neighborhoods I
canvassed. The neighborhood appeared to be more recently developed and located in
an overall quiet area. All of these are strong indicators of high collective efficacy within
the neighborhood, which could explain the lower residential burglary rate (Sampson et
al. 1997).
Another neighborhood with a low residential burglary rate was Palms Villa
Residences Condos, which is a middle-income neighborhood. Palms Villa Residences
Condos is a neighborhood that also exhibits a higher level of collective efficacy.
Despite the high rate of foreclosures (24.4 per 100 condos, ranking 3 rd highest), this
neighborhood has a residential burglary rate of 6.2 per 100 condos, ranking it around
the middle of all neighborhoods. Considering it has such a high foreclosure rate, it was
expected to have more residential burglaries (Taylor 1984; Skogan 1992). However,
this neighborhood appears to have created a defensible space (Newman 1972). For
instance, the neighborhood is fully fenced and gated, and the gates remained closed.
These characteristics found within Palms Villa Residences are significant indicators and
support the argument that levels of collective efficacy within this neighborhood are high.
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Another middle-income level neighborhood, Bella Terra Condos, also had
indicators of relatively high collective efficacy. These indicators may help to explain the
neighborhood’s lower residential burglary rate despite its higher rate of foreclosures
(Sampson et al. 1997; Morenoff et al. 2001). For example, the neighborhood was
gated, though most remained closed one was open and it had a fully fenced perimeter
(Newman 1972; Brower et al. 1983). Also, video surveillance and signs indicating a
neighborhood watch program were visible along with no obvious signs of physical
disorder (Skogan 1992). The higher amount of activity found within Bella Terra Condos
is also another positive indicator of collective efficacy (Woldoff 2002). Although one of
the gates remained open during the canvasses, the other characteristics are strong
indicators of higher levels of the neighborhood’s collective efficacy. Despite this, the
other indicators, especially the gated and fenced perimeters, are significant indicators of
collective efficacy. These characteristics may help to explain Bella Terra’s rank of
twenty-third in the overall residential burglary rate (4.2 per 100 condos).
The middle-income neighborhood, Los Terranos, had a very high rate of
foreclosures (26.9 per 100 houses) which ranked 2nd highest in foreclosures, but a
significantly low residential burglary rate (4.6 per 100 houses) which was 21st among the
neighborhoods in my study. As discussed in the previous chapter, this neighborhood is
an anomaly compared to the other neighborhoods I examined. For example, since this
neighborhood was in an older, more rundown area, was identified as a slightly
moderate- to mostly middle-income neighborhood, had a high rate of foreclosures, and
had more signs of physical disorder and decay, extant research would likely point to the
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conclusion that Los Terranos should have higher levels of residential burglaries (Shaw
and McKay 1942; Taylor 1984; Skogan 1992). Yet, my findings do not support this
conclusion. There is a significantly lower rate of residential burglaries in Los Terranos.
The indicator that might account for the lower residential burglary rate is the
neighborhood’s ruralness, which past research has found to increase collective efficacy
(Putnam 2007; Taylor et al. 2010). In fact, more rural areas have been found to
increase the bonds among residents which could increase the level of collective
efficacy. Over all, this neighborhood’s indicators produced somewhat conflicting
findings with regards to extant research.
The last neighborhood that exhibited a low residential burglary rate, Tudor Grove
at Timber Springs, is also an upper-income neighborhood. Similar to the
neighborhoods discussed above, there were some characteristics of Tudor Grove that
are associated with increased levels of criminal activity. For example, there were
obvious signs of physical disorder (Skogan 1992) such as obvious vacancies and
foreclosures with ill-maintained yards and visible yard debris. Also, there was a lack of a
fenced perimeter, and minimal privately fenced yards (Newman 1972; Brower et al
1983). However, there were other characteristics of the neighborhood that could
explain why Tudor Grove has such as a low residential burglary rate (5.3 per 100
houses, ranking it 20th) despite its high foreclosure rate (17.4 per 100 houses, ranking it
7th). For instance, the neighborhood is smaller compared to other neighborhoods in my
study, which may help to increase the likelihood that residents interact more frequently
because of the close proximity. The activity within the neighborhood was average
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(Woldoff 2002), which could also indicate that residents feel a sense of safety. Also,
Tudor Grove is located in the back of a larger neighborhood which makes it less
accessible. Lastly, the neighborhood is gated and the gates remained closed, creating
a barrier and/or deterrent for criminals (Newman 1972; Brower et al. 1983). These are
all strong indicators of the neighborhood’s higher level of collective efficacy. Also, the
characteristics could increase the residents’ sense of security, which may encourage
more residents to be out and form mutual bonds with one another.
In the end, there were seven neighborhoods at one end of the spectrum – high
foreclosures and high residential burglaries, and there were six neighborhoods at the
other end of the spectrum – high foreclosures and low residential burglaries. These two
groups represent the main focus of my research – to explore the level of collective
efficacy in an attempt to understand and explain its impact on residential burglary in
middle- and upper-income neighborhoods with high foreclosures in Orange County,
Florida. There were some physical and social indicators of collective efficacy which
neighborhoods exhibited that could undoubtedly encourage residents to act as informal
agents of social control and thereby reduce criminal behavior. These will be discussed
next. The next section will discuss these main characteristics and my key findings
along with the limitations of my research as well as suggestions for future research.

Disorganization in the Suburbs
My research examined levels of social disorganization in middle- and upperincome neighborhoods using social disorganization theory. I used foreclosures as the
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main ecological characteristic to measure residential instability/mobility in
neighborhoods in Orange County, Florida. Social disorganization theory, which was
proposed by Shaw and McKay (1942), argues that various structural or ecological
characteristics, such as concentrated poverty, racial/ethnic heterogeneity, residential
mobility or instability, and family disruption are identifying factors on whether a
neighborhood is socially disorganized. The disorganization in neighborhoods that are
characterized by these ecological factors results in higher levels of criminal behavior.
Research by Sampson and his colleagues (Sampson et al. 1997; Morenoff et al.
2001) extended social disorganization theory by arguing that collective efficacy, the link
between mutual trust and the willingness of residents to intervene for the good of the
community, is the explanatory variable in whether criminal behavior occurs, even in
neighborhoods with the structural characteristics noted above. In all then, collective
efficacy is the ability of residents to act as informal agents of social control to reduce
crime in their neighborhood. This is only possible if residents are able to form bonds
and mutual trust with each other. With the increase in foreclosures (a form of residential
instability/mobility), it creates a situation where fewer residents are available to build
these relationships. Also, with the continuous flow of residents moving in and out of
neighborhoods, it will become more difficult for residents to act as informal agents of
social control, and thus, diminish their ability to control crime in their neighborhood.
I collected my data from various sources such as the Orange County Sheriff’s
Office (residential burglary data), the Orlando Realtors Association (foreclosure data),
and the Orange County Property Appraisers Office (neighborhood data). Just as
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important, I used ArcGIS mapping as a sampling tool to locate the neighborhoods’
levels of foreclosures and residential burglary. I located neighborhoods with high
foreclosure from the years of 2005 to 2009. I then found the residential burglary rate for
these neighborhoods to obtain my sample. I used qualitative methods of analysis,
specifically neighborhood canvassing and observation, to identify and measure the
neighborhoods’ level of collective efficacy. In the end, I draw my conclusions from
these various sources and methodologies.
My analysis of Orange County middle- and upper-income neighborhoods first
looked at whether the neighborhoods increased in residential burglaries as foreclosures
increased between the years of 2005-2009, which was before and during the radical
increase in foreclosures. This part of the analysis tested the basic premise of social
disorganization theory -- as foreclosures increase (an ecological characteristic
measuring residential instability/mobility), the neighborhood becomes socially
disorganized and thus, crime (e.g., residential burglary) increases. As previously
discussed and presented in Table 1, the majority of the eighty-four neighborhoods
analyzed did not increase in residential burglaries as foreclosures increased. In fact, as
foreclosures increased, it appeared that the majority of the neighborhoods remained
stable in residential burglaries (n=41). However, to measure the collective efficacy of
these neighborhoods, I combined the data from 2005-2009 for both foreclosures and
residential burglaries to locate the top thirty neighborhoods.
The second part of my research examined the collective efficacy within
neighborhoods that evidenced high foreclosures and high residential burglary rates and

213

neighborhoods with high foreclosures and low residential burglary rates. This aspect of
my project was undertaken to determine if neighborhoods with high foreclosures and
high residential burglaries had fewer indicators of collective efficacy than neighborhoods
with high foreclosures and low residential burglaries. As stated previously, past
research (Sampson 1997) has shown that neighborhoods which evidence structural
characteristics of disorganization, such as high poverty, high residential
mobility/instability, high racial and ethnic heterogeneity, and high family disruption, may
experience reduced rates of criminal behavior if residents’ level of collective efficacy is
high. This occurs because high levels of collective efficacy among residents enables
them to act as informal agents of social control and thereby monitor, and reduce,
criminal behavior. In my study, all the neighborhoods exhibited consistently high levels
of foreclosures, but differed in their residential burglary rates. According to social
disorganization theory, the level of collective efficacy explains this difference (Sampson
et al. 1997; Morenoff et al. 2001).
To conduct this part of my analysis, I located thirty neighborhoods with the
highest foreclosures. I then measured residential burglary in these neighborhoods to
identify neighborhoods that were at the opposite ends of the spectrum. The canvasses
of these thirty neighborhoods identified various characteristics that measured levels of
collective efficacy. These indicators included the following: was the neighborhood
gated; was it guarded; was it fenced; were the houses privately fenced; how was the
condition of the neighborhood and the houses within; was there a lot of debris and/or
trash in the neighborhood; was there visible vacancies/foreclosures; was there ‘For
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Rent’ or “For Sale’ signs; and, the level of various forms of activity in the neighborhood.
My findings were presented in Chapter Four. After summarizing the thirty neighborhood
canvasses, thirteen noteworthy neighborhoods were then discussed in more detail.
These thirteen neighborhoods fell at the far ends of the spectrum – neighborhoods with
high foreclosures and high residential burglaries and neighborhoods with high
foreclosures and low residential burglaries. These thirteen neighborhoods were then
compared in greater detail to determine if collective efficacy helped explain variations in
the neighborhoods’ residential burglary rates. Essentially, to gauge the level of
collective efficacy, I adopted various physical and social disorder indicators that other
researchers have used in order to identify whether there was high or low collective
efficacy within the thirteen neighborhoods (Skogan 1992; Woldoff 2002).
As discussed throughout this paper, there were some characteristics that differed
between the neighborhoods with high residential burglaries and low residential
burglaries. For instance, if the neighborhood was gated and remained closed, there
appeared to be less residential burglaries because it could act as a barrier or defensible
space (Newman 1972). It also may increase the level of collective efficacy because
residents may feel safer and more likely to monitor residential traffic as well as engage
in relationships with other residents. If the neighborhood was fully fenced it seemed to
be a good indicator of higher collective efficacy as well, which could also act as a
defensible space barrier. Privacy fences also were a good indicator (Brower et al.
1983). Another interesting finding is that if the neighborhood was located in a more
rural area or nestled back in other neighborhoods, residential burglaries were lower.
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Past research has shown that rural neighborhoods exhibit more social capital or
collective efficacy (Putnam 2007; Taylor et al. 2010). In addition, the majority of the
neighborhoods with high foreclosures and high residential burglaries also had visible
vacancies and/or foreclosures (Skogan 1992). Lastly, the level of activity within the
neighborhood was also a good indicator, which Woldoff (2002) also found by measuring
routine behavior and social neighboring among residents. She found that with more
interaction, which results from coming into contact with neighbors, there is less social
disorder. All of these indicators can increase collective efficacy because if residents
feel safer due to the physical characteristics of the neighborhood, they may be more
likely to spend time outside interacting with one another, which enhances their ability to
operate as informal agents of social control.
Interestingly, when comparing middle- to upper-income neighborhoods, there
was no substantive difference in residential burglaries between the two income groups.
In fact, the majority of the upper-income neighborhoods fell in the middle of the
spectrum, not at either end. Moreover, the presence of a police officer living in the
neighborhood was not a strong indicator of collective efficacy. However, as already
discussed, the data comes from 2005-2009 and the canvasses took place in 2011. As
such, I cannot determine if the police officers lived in the neighborhood during the years
of interest. Just as important, the presence of signs, such as deed restricted signs or
signs indicating there was video surveillance did not appear to be strong indicators of
collective efficacy. Lastly, among neighborhoods with stronger indicators of collective
efficacy, there was typically more activity within the neighborhood. However, some
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neighborhoods that had higher rates of residential burglaries also had a moderate level
of activity, which should reduce social disorder and thus increase collective efficacy
(Woldoff 2002). More research is needed to understand how levels of activity may
operate as an indicator of disorder and collective efficacy.
With that said, there are several concerns that need to be discussed. First,
during the years of analysis (2005-2009), there was still residential construction going
on and more homes could have been built during the years of this study. With an
increase in homes there could be an increase in the chance of victimization. Moreover,
within the five years of study, neighborhoods could have taken measures to increase
the safety and well-being of its residents, which undoubtedly increases collective
efficacy. For example, the neighborhood may have added a gate at some point within
the five years that could have caused a decrease in criminal behavior. Unfortunately, I
cannot control for these measures that a neighborhood might have undertaken within
the years of my study. The same concern may be attributed to actions taken by
residents within the neighborhoods. For instance, the privacy fences may not have
been there during the five years of data. However, they could have been constructed
later and would have been present during the canvassing that took place over a year
later. As the economy worsened, however, it would not seem likely that the majority of
neighborhoods, nor residents, took these costly actions, such as adding a gate at the
entrance or constructing privacy fences. Lastly, there is no way to determine how long
a home was in foreclosure and/or empty without any occupants present. For example, I
only have the foreclosure addresses for homes that went into REO status during the
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years of 2005-2009. It is unclear whether the home way empty for a couple months or
several years.
There are policy implications resulting from the findings of my research. First, if a
neighborhood is gated, but the gate remains open, it defeats the purpose of the gate
acting as a protective agent. Also, neighborhoods that only have fencing along the
front/entrance do not protect the rest of the perimeter which is where criminals may gain
easy access to the neighborhood. Even more important, from my experience working in
the field of property preservation and foreclosed homes, the mortgage companies need
to take quicker action to maintain foreclosed homes as they quickly become an eye
sore, and an easy target for vandalism and/or squatting making them a safe haven for
unwanted entities (animals and humans alike). Foreclosed properties can take over a
year before the banks and mortgage companies finalize foreclosures and they are often
left unattended during this process. The yards become overgrown and the houses often
turn into easy targets for vandalism. This increases physical disorder and decreases
collective efficacy – both of which may lead to increased levels of crime, such as
residential burglary.
Using foreclosures to solely measure social disorganization in middle- and upperincome neighborhoods in central Florida did not result in overly strong findings and may
benefit from additional measures. It is difficult to say whether it is the foreclosures, the
middle- and upper-income neighborhoods, or a combination of both that did not lend
strong support for social disorganization theory, but on the whole, the findings in my
study did not fully support the hypotheses. There was some support for certain
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indicators of collective efficacy as an important determinate in shaping a neighborhood’s
level of crime, such as residential burglary. However, more research is needed to fully
understand this relationship. Many of these neighborhoods definitely evidenced an
increase in physical and social disorder with the presence of foreclosures, but only
select indicators were identified in helping to explain the level of collective efficacy.
More effort is needed in our neighborhoods around the country to improve the housing
market, clean up our neighborhoods, and make our residents feel safer, which in the
end, would increase their collective efficacy and their ability to function as informal
agents of social control. Ultimately, this could decrease the levels of criminal behavior
in our neighborhoods.
Contextualizing Social Disorganization among the Affluent

My research has shed light on the impact that foreclosures have had on middleand upper-income neighborhoods and families. Not only has there been an apparent
increase in residential burglary in some neighborhoods, the overall disorder that has
increased in the majority of the neighborhoods examined in my study is also cause for
concern. As stated previously, the measurement used in the current study to test
disorganization in more affluent neighborhoods, such as foreclosures, could possibly
benefit from additional measures. Also, perhaps how I measured collective efficacy
could benefit from other measures of visible physical and social disorder, such as
residents’ subjective perceptions rather than a more objective approach. However, the

219

findings of my study still contribute to the large and growing body of research on crime,
social disorganization theory, and foreclosures.
The research on social disorganization theory is very vast. The theory is widely
researched to test its relationship on various indicators of crime and physical
characteristics. My research has added to the body of research with a new and
interesting approach – using foreclosures to measure disorganization and applying the
theory to middle- and upper-income neighborhoods. I applied disorganization theory,
which has usually been used to look at high poverty, urban areas, to examine more
suburban, single-family, affluent neighborhoods. Also, most research using social
disorganization theory uses a quantitative approach. My research has taken a
qualitative approach to bring an in-depth, visual representation of foreclosures in
middle- and upper-income neighborhoods and a presentation of indicators of collective
efficacy. It is important to test a theory’s scope and extend its research into other
phenomena and that is what I have attempted to do. Therefore, with the change in
neighborhood dynamics it seemed important to attempt to apply social disorganization
theory to different areas, such as affluent, suburban neighborhoods, using qualitative
analysis.
Collective efficacy, a major focus of my research, draws from the systemic
approach of social disorganization and focuses on informal social control through social
ties. Sampson and colleagues (1997) argue that mutual trust and expectations of
residents in a neighborhood greatly affects the willingness of residents to intervene in
acts of crime and delinquency. Also, the shared norms and values, as well as mutual
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trust among neighbors, is used to assess social cohesion within communities. It is this
link between mutual trust and the willingness of residents to intervene for the good of
the community that they claim is collective efficacy. The higher this collective efficacy
among residents, the more likely they are to take on the role of informal social control
agents.
Research on collective efficacy among residents has been measured it various
ways. For instance, Woldoff (2002) looked at attitudinal and behavioral attachment
(communicating and/or spending time with neighbors). Others have looked at how the
physical residential environment can impact social ties (Taylor 1984). In fact, some
research found that the presence of a fence around a home implied to the observers
that the homeowners would react toward any intruders (Brower et al. 1983). Newman
(1972) developed his theory of defensible space based on this concept. The physical
environment of a neighborhood and its surroundings can either increase of decrease
perceptions of fear among residents. The more secure residents feel in their
neighborhood, the more likely they are to be outside and to come into contact with
others (Newman 1972). Moreover, Skogan (1992) found that abandoned structures
(e.g., foreclosed homes) can indirectly reduce collective concern among neighborhood
residents. Thus, the collective efficacy of a neighborhood can be impacted if residents
do not feel safe enough in their neighborhood to form social ties and establish mutual
trust with other residents. It is from prior research (Newman 1972; Brower et al. 1983;
Taylor 1984; Skogan 1992) that I developed the measurement of collective efficacy for
my current research.
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Therefore, the present study borrowed measurements of collective efficacy from
previous research but also implemented additional measurements. For instance, I
recorded the physical characteristics of the environment – debris around the
neighborhood and residential homes, the condition of the yards and homes (Skogan
1992), the activity by foot and vehicle to measures social disorder (Woldoff 2002), the
presence of privacy fences (Brower et al. 1983), the presence of a fence around the
perimeter of the neighborhood, the presence of a gate or guard at the entrance
(Newman 1972), and the overall condition of the surrounding environment of the
neighborhood. In all, every characteristic of the neighborhood and surrounding areas
were used as indicators to measure collective efficacy. All observations were taken into
consideration when explaining the collective efficacy among residents. The detailed
observations allowed more in-depth measurement and future research examining
collective efficacy should adopt this approach. Collective efficacy cannot be tested by
analyzing crime statistics or trends. It requires a further understanding of the dynamics
of neighborhoods, such as their physical and social characteristics.
One recommendation for researchers is to go even further into measuring
collective efficacy. For example, Woldoff (2002) extended the concept by investigating
collective efficacy from the perspective of the residents. I have measured collective
efficacy objectively. Yet, collective efficacy has a subjective component – residents
define it differently. Future research may need to look at collective efficacy subjectively
and acquire accounts from the residents themselves to understand how they define
collective efficacy. This would help develop a more solid measurement of collective
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efficacy and allow research to determine if collective efficacy is differentially defined in
more affluent neighborhoods. Overall though, an examination that encompasses all
characteristics, while not disregarding any visible characteristic in the neighborhood, is
the ideal way to measure collective efficacy across neighborhoods.
Another recommendation for future research is to investigate further the
association between various structural characteristics of social disorganization theory,
especially foreclosures, and academic performance or achievement. Past research has
found that neighborhood structural characteristics such as high levels of crime and
violence exposure (Schwartz and Gorman 2003; Shumow, Vandell, and Posner 1999),
high levels of economic impoverishment (Plunkett, Abarca-Mortensen, and Behnke
2007), and low levels of employment in professional jobs (Ensminger, Lamkin, and
Jacobson 1996) are associated with poorer academic achievement. Even more,
homeownership has been found to have positive effects on the educational
development and attainments of children (Aaronson 2000; Bramley and Karley 2007;
Green and White 1997; Harkness and Newman 2001). Because of the high rate of
foreclosures across the country, researchers should further understand the effects, if
any at all, that foreclosures have on students’ academic performance or achievement.
Lastly, future research needs to explore the relationship between condos and
high foreclosures. According to the present research, many of the neighborhoods with
high foreclosures were condominium complexes. Although many of the high
foreclosure neighborhoods were condos, most of these had a lower residential burglary
rate compared to single-family housing neighborhoods. Perhaps the close proximity of
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condo units and the overall layout of these types of neighborhoods help explain the
lower residential burglary rate. Future research should investigate this phenomenon to
gain a further understanding of the differences in neighborhood organization.
Not only does my research contribute to the plethora of research on social
disorganization theory, it also addresses concerns raised by other researchers on the
impact of foreclosures on crime. For instance, Immergluck and Smith (2006b) found
that residents in neighborhoods are concerned about foreclosures because they can
jeopardize the security and safety of the neighborhoods. Research on abandoned
structures, such as homes, has concluded that there are an abundance of negative
consequences that abandoned homes can have on the community. Some of these
consequences could be simply a harbor for trash or more worrisome, a harbor for
criminals. Vandalism is also frequent in empty homes (Skogan 1992). Others have
shown great concern for more affluent neighborhoods because of the increase in
foreclosures (Wilson and Paulsen 2008) and argued that violent and property crime has
increased as a result of the increase in foreclosures in these neighborhoods (Bess
2008). While others have suggested we need to further investigate the relationship
between foreclosures and crime, my research has provided a step in this direction.
There are many ways to measure social disorganization theory – poverty,
racial/ethnic heterogeneity, residential instability or mobility, and female-headed
households – which have been the primary method of explaining high crime in
neighborhoods. Using foreclosures as a measurement of residential instability and
mobility is ideal in the current time because of the significant number of foreclosures
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nationwide. However, foreclosures may not be a good measurement in affluent
neighborhoods, or any neighborhoods for that matter. Foreclosures are so widespread
that there is not any group of people who have not been affected in some way by the
housing crisis. This could explain why the current research did not establish stronger
conclusions on the relationship between residential burglaries and foreclosures. Yet,
collective efficacy is still very important among all socioeconomic neighborhoods as a
means to decrease crime. More indicators of collective efficacy need to be identified to
further understand the extent of residents’ ability to act as informal agents of social
control. Just as important, a subjective approach may better understand how collective
efficacy explains an increase or decrease in crime. Also, understanding it from the
perspective of residents could help in increasing collective efficacy among residents. In
the end, my study adds to the body of research on social disorganization by focusing on
foreclosures in middle- and upper-income neighborhoods.
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APPENDIX A: NEIGHBORHOOD CANVASSING CHECKLIST
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Neighborhood Canvassing Checklist
Tract and Block I.D.:
Neighborhood Name:

Entrance in Neighborhood
- The neighborhood is gated.
- The neighborhood has a home owners association or is deed restricted (circle
which one).
_____ - The neighborhood is fenced: partially or fully.

Canvassing the Streets of the Neighborhood
- The neighborhood and/or streets have trash present.
- There is activity in the neighborhood (e.g., people outside).
- There is evidence (e.g., whether the home has been secured, which will have a
changed lock and a sign in the window, or whether it is visible that the home is
vacant and unkempt) of multiple foreclosures in the neighborhood.
- Estimate the number of total, visible, foreclosures.
- Number of entrances/exits the neighborhood has.

Arrival at Foreclosed Home
- The home in foreclosure been secured?
- The home is listed by a realtor (realtor for sale sign present).
- The house has trash or other debris built up around it.
- The yard and shrubs are overgrown.
- The home has one or more broken windows.
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- Indicate the number of broken windows.
- The home has windows boarded up.
- Indicate the number of boarded windows.
- There are visual marks of graffiti on the outside of the house.

Additional Comments:
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APPENDIX B: STRUCTURAL SOCIAL CONTROLS BY
PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT SURROUNDING NEIGHBORHOOD
QUESTIONNAIRE
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Structural Social Controls/Physical Environment
Tract and Block I.D.:
Name of Neighborhood (if available):

List the stores (grocery) that are available to the neighborhood and describe the overall
condition of the store/plaza.

List and describe any commercial structures around the neighborhood (i.e., types,
condition, and in business/foreclosed).

Identify parks around the neighborhood and document the condition of the park/s and
how many people are in the park (MUST also be documented on a weekend).
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Describe the foot and bicycle traffic on sidewalks in the local of the neighborhood (also
give a count within a specific amount of time).

Describe the vehicle traffic on streets around the neighborhood, such as is it busy or
quiet (also give a count within a specific amount of time of the number of passing
vehicles).

Additional Comments:
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APPENDIX C: NEIGHBORHOOD CANVASSING RESULTS
TABLE
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Neighborhood Demographics

Neighborhood Characteristics

Name

Fore

Crime

Tract/Income

Date of Obs

Gated (O/C)

1

Hawthorne Village Condos

87

69

170.08/MI

5/13, 2:15; 6/4, 1:00

Y (1)-O

2

Villanova at Hunters Creek Condos

72

14

170.07/U

5/17, 2:00; 7/4, 12:30

Y (2) - C, O

3

Sand Lake Private Residences Condos

62

31

171.07/U

5/13, 3:15; 6/4, 2:00

Y (1)-O

4

Sanctuary at Bay Hill Condos

60

20

148.13/U

5/17, 11:30;6/4, 1:30

Y (1)-O

5

Summerport PH5

52

7

171.05/U

5/17, 12:15; 6/18, 11:15

N (3)

6

Crest at Waterford Lakes Condos

48

31

167.19/U

5/12, 11:45; 6/18, 12:55

N (1)

7

Palms Villa Residencecs Condos

47

12

170.08/MI

5/13, 2:00; 6/4, 12:45

Y (2)-C, C

8

Audubon Villas at Hunters Creek Condos

46

20

170.07/U

5/17, 2:20; 6/4, 11:45

Y (1)-O

9

Bella Terra Condos

46

15

152.01/MI

5/13, 12:20; 6/18, 12:15

Y (2)-O, C; C,C (GA)

10

Sandhill Preserve

42

15

168.05/MI

5/17, 3:00; 6/4, 11:00

Y (1)-C (GA)

11

Capri at Hunters Creek Condos

39

14

170.07/U

5/17, 2:45; 6/4, 11:50

Y (2)-C, O

12

Eagle Creek PH 1A

35

22

167.04/U

5/17, 4:00; 6/4, 9:40

Y (1)-C (G); 2nd C

13

Waterford Trails PH 2 East Village

33

19

167.19/U

5/12, 11:00; 6/18, 2:00

N (3)

14

Plantation Park Private Residences Con.

32

15

170.05/MI

5/17, 1:25;6/4, 1:50

Y (1)-C (GA)

15

Los Terranos

29

5

*

5/12, 1:00; 6/18, 9:30

N (Multiple)

16

Sandpoint at Meadow Woods

28

24

168.05/MI

5/18, 2:40; 6/4, 11:20

N (1); Gshack, Emp

17

La Cascada PH 1

28

23

168.05/MI

5/19, 1:45; 6/4, 10:00

N (3)

18

Cedar Bend at Meadow Woods PH 1

27

19

168.05/MI

5/19, 11:35; 6/4, 10:20

Y (1)-C (GA)

19

Island Cove Villas PH 3

27

15

168.05/MI

5/18, 2:50; 6/4, 3:00

N (1)

20

Wyndham Lakes ESTS UT 1

26

36

168.05/MI

5/19, 12:25; 6/4, 10:15

N (3)

21

Heather Glen at Meadow Woods

24

29

168.05/MI

5/19, 1:20; 6/4, 10:40

N (1)

22

Tudor Grove at Timber Springs

23

7

167.19/U

5/18, 10:40; 6/18, 1:30

Y (1)-C (GA)

23

Spring Isle UT 1

22

8

167.19/U

5/18, 10:30; 6/18, 1:50

Y (1)-C (G)

24

Lakes of Windermere PH 2A

22

3

171.03/U

5/18, 12:35; 6/18, 10:20

N (11) & (1)

25

Island Walk

21

17

168.05/MI

5/19, 1:00; 6/4, 10:35

Y (1)-C (GA)

26

Discovery Palms Condos

21

7

170.05/MI

5/18, 1:45; 6/4, 2:05

Y (2)-C, C

27

Signature Lakes-Parcel 1C

21

7

171.05/U

5/18, 12:15; 6/18, 10:50

N (2)

28

Timber Isle

20

13

167.19/U

5/18, 11:00; 6/18, 1:15

Y (1)-C (GA)

29

Huntcliff Park

20

14

168.05/MI

5/19, 11:10; 6/4, 10:30

Y (1)-C (GA)

30

Windrose at Southmeadow UT 2

20

11

168.05/MI

5/18, 2:35; 6/4, 11:30

N (1)
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Neighborhood Characteristics
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

HOA/Deed

Car Traffic

Foot Traffic

Ppl Outside

Pool (#)

Tennis/Hoop

Park/PLG (#)

For Sale

For Rent

Vac/Fore

Yes-All
Yes-All
Yes-All
Yes-All
Yes-Fence
Yes-All
Yes-All
Yes-All
Yes-All
Yes-NoFen
Yes-All
Yes-NoFen
Yes-All
Yes-All
No
Yes-All
Yes-Fence
Yes-Fence?
Yes-All
Yes-Fence?
Yes-Fence?
Yes-Fence?
Yes-All?
Yes-Fence?
Yes-All
Yes-All
Yes-Fence
Yes-Fence
Yes-Fence
Yes-Fence?

3; 2
4; 7
9; 8
11; 8
12;23
3; 7
4; 5
3; 3
8; 9
7; 5
2; 6
6; 5
9; 9
4; 5
3; 4
1; 3
4; 1
6; 2
3; 3
5; 1
2; 4
1; 6
5; 8
3; 10
3; 3
2; 1
3; 13
4; 15
6; 2
4; 11

2; 5
3; 1
6; 5
2; 3
3;2
0; 2
0; 0
0; 0
0; 0
0; 3
0; 1
?
3; 3
1; 0
0; 4
0; 1
1; 2
7; 2
1; 1
3; 4
1; 3
5; 1
?
1; 6
0; 1
?
3; 1
3; 0
0; 1
1; 3

1; 3
1; 1
3; 6
1; 5
2; 10
1; 6
0; 4
2; 2
2; 4
0; 2
2; 5
?
3; 6
1; 5
0; 5
2; 2
4; 3
0; 6
1; 9
2; 2
4; 2
1; 3
?
3; 5
3; 2
?
4; 10
5; 6
5; 5
3; 15 (GrgSl-12)

Y(2)-0; 0
Y-0; ≈ 3
Y- 0; 2
Y-0; 4
Y-0; 0
Y-0; 2
Y(1)-0; 3
Y-0; Prty
Y-2; 4
N
Y-0; 0
Y- ?
Y-2; 3
Y-2; 6
N
Y-Closed
Y-5; 1
Y-0; 0
Y-3; 0
N
Y-0; 0
N
Y-?
Y-0; 0
Y-0; 0
Y-?
Y(2)-4; 3
N
Y-0; 0
N

Y(2T)-0; 0
N
Y(1/1)-0; 2H
Y(1/1)-0; 0
Y(1/1)-0; 0
N
N
Y(1/1)-0; 0
Y(1T)-0; 0
N
N
N
Y(1/1)-1T; 0
Y(1T)-0; 0
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
Y(1T)-?
Y(1/1)-0; 0
Y(1T)-0; 1
N
Y(1H)-0; 0

Y(1)-0; 0
N
Y(1)-0; 0
Y(3)-0; 2
Y(3)-2; 0
N
N
N
Y(1)-0; 0
N
N
N
Y(1)-0; 0
Y(1)-0; 0
N
N
Y-0; 0
Y-0; 0
N
N
Y-0; 0
N
Y-?
Y-0; 0
Y-0; 0
N
Y-3;0
Y-5; 2
Y-0; 0
Y(2)-0; 0

0V
0V
0V
0V
Multi
0V
0V
0V
0V
0V
0V
≈ 12V
0V
0V
≈ 2V
≈ 8V
0V
0V
0V
≈ 1V
≈ 3V
0V
0V
≈ 8V
≈ 6V
≈ 2V
≈ 3V

0V
0V
0V
2V
Multi
0V
0V
0V
0V
0V
≈ 2V
≈ 2V
0V
0V
≈ 1V
≈ 3V
0V
0V
0V
≈ 3V
2V
0V
1V
0V
≈ 5V
0V
0V

≈ 3V
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Sev Vis

≈ 2V

Sev Vis

≈ 3V
≈ 4V
≈ 5V
≈ 4V
Sev Vis
Sev Vis
≈ 4V
Sev Vis

Sev Vis
Sev Vis
Sev Vis
≈ 4V

Neighborhood Characteristics

School Grades for 2005-2009

Yards

Fenced

Miscellaneous Notes

Elementary

Middle

High

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Little Tall (HOA)
Nice Kept (HOA)
Nice Kept (HOA)
Some Yrds unkept
Grnds Nice; yrds unkept
Nice Kept (HOA)
Nice Kept (HOA)
Nice Kept (HOA)
Nice Kept (HOA)
Some Bkyrd debris; unkept Yrds
Nice Kept (HOA)
≈ 1/2 yrds unkept; yrd debri
Nice Kept (HOA)

Partly
Fully
Partly
Partly
Partly
Most
Fully
Partly
Fully
Partly
Fully
None
Partly
Partly

Speed bumps

NG, A, A, A, A,
A, A, A, A, A
A, A, A, A, A
A, A, A, A, A
NG, NG, NG, A, A
A, A, A, A, A
NG, A, A, A, A,
A, A, A, A, A
B, A, C, B, C
B, A, B, B, C
A, A, A, A, A
NG for All
NG, NG, A, A, A
NG, A, A, A, A,

C, C, D, D, B
C,C, D, D, B
B, B, B, A, B
B, B, B, A, B
B, C, D, C, B
B, B, C, B, C
C, C, D, D, B
C, C, D, D, B
C, C, C, C, D
C, C, D, D, B
C, C, D, D, B
NG for All
NG for All
C, C, D, D, B

15

Some Yrds unkept

None

Speed bumbs
NoSol Sign; Some Per. Fence
VidSurv Sign; Sheriff Veh; College
NoTres Sign
StTroop Res
VidSurv Sign; NBHD Watch sign
DeedRes Sign
Speed bumps; scrnd prchs 1stflr
Vacant Lots; No fncd yrds
Mnml fncd yrds;
Some blinds
disarray
Industrial; country; Vrty of houses; Some fncd

C, B, A, A, A
A, A, A, A, A
A, A, A, A, A
A, A, A, A, A
NG for All
A, A, A, A, A
C, B, A, A, A
A, A, A, B, A
A, A, A, A, A
NG, NG, C, C, A
A, A, A, B, A
NG, NG, NG, A, A
NG, NG, A, A, A
C, A, B , A, A
NG, NG, A, A, A*

NG; B, C, C, A, C*

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Nice Kept (HOA)
Many Yrds unkept; yrd debri
Some Yrds unkept, some nice
Nice Kept (HOA)
Some yrds unkept
Some yrds unkept
Some yrds unkept; yrd debri
Some yrds unkept
Nice Kept (HOA)
Nice Kept (HOA)
Some yrds unkept
≈ 1/2 yrds unkept; yrd debri
Some yrds unkept
Some yrds unkept

Most
None
Partly
Partly
Partly
Partly
Partly
Partly
None
Partly
Partly
Partly
Partly
Partly
None

VidSurv Sign; Speed bumbs; Grd Ofc Not Ocp
2 OPDVeh; Some fncd; rural
Mnml fncd; OCSO&OPDVeh; Some debri
NBHD Watch, NoSol Sign; No fncd; Spd bumps
Mstly fncd; OSCOVeh; NBHD Watch&Deed Sign
Some fncd
Mnml fncd;
Some fncd
Rural, Orange Groves; Mnml fncd
NBHD Watch/TowAway Sign
I Drive; Vaca Clubs Nearby; PrivProp Sign
Windermere/Secl; Vacant Lots/FS; Mnml fncd
Some fncd; installing spd bumps
Mnml fncd
Mnml fncd; graffiti on fnc; HOA GarSal/busy

A, B, A, A, A
A, C, A, B, A
NG, NG, C, C, A
A, B, A, A, A
NG, NG, C, C, A
A, C, A, B, A
NG, NG, NG, NG, A
NG, NG, NG, NG, A
NG, NG, NG, A, A
NG, NG, C, C, A
C, A, B , A, A
NG for All
NG, NG, NG, NG, A
NG, NG, C, C, A
A, B, A, A, A

B, A, B, B, C
NG, NG, A, A, A
B, A, B, B, C
B, A, B, B, C
NG, NG, A, A, A
B, A, B, B, C
NG, NG, A, A, A
NG, NG, A, A, A
NG for All
B, A, B, B, C
NG, A, A, A, A,
NG, NG, NG, A, A
NG, NG, NG, A, A
B, A, B, B, C
B, A, B, B, C

C, C, C, C, C;
NG*
C, C, D, D, B
C, C, D, D, B
C, C, D, D, B
C, C, D, D, B
C, C, D, D, B
C, C, D, D, B
B, B, C, B, C
B, B, C, B, C
B, C, D, C, B
C, C, D, D, B
C, C, D, D, B
B, C, D, C, B
B, B, C, B, C
C, C, D, D, B
C, C, D, D, B
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APPENDIX D: TOP 30 NEIGHBORHOODS RANKING BY
RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY AND FORECLOSURES RATES
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Neighborhood
Name
Hawthorne Village Condos
Villanova at Hunters Creek Condos
Sand Lake Private Residences Condos
Sanctuary at Bay Hill Condos
Summerport PH5
Crest at Waterford Lakes Condos
Palms Villa Residencecs Condos
Audubon Villas at Hunters Creek Condos
Bella Terra Condos
Sandhill Preserve
Capri at Hunters Creek Condos
Eagle Creek PH 1A
Waterford Trails PH 2 East Village
Plantation Park Private Residences Con.
Los Terranos
Sandpoint at Meadow Woods
La Cascada PH 1
Cedar Bend at Meadow Woods PH 1
Island Cove Villas PH 3
Wyndham Lakes ESTS UT 1
Heather Glen at Meadow Woods
Tudor Grove at Timber Springs
Spring Isle UT 1
Lakes of Windermere PH 2A
Island Walk
Discovery Palms Condos
Signature Lakes-Parcel 1C
Timber Isle
Huntcliff Park
Windrose at Southmeadow UT 2

Residential Burg. Rate
Ranking
1
24
12
15
27
5
16
18
25
8
19
21
17
22
23
2
4
6
11
9
3
20
26
30
10
29
28
14
13
7

Foreclosure Rate
Ranking
4
5
15
7
11
10
3
18
19
1
13
26
23
24
2
6
16
12
14
28
17
9
27
21
20
30
29
22
25
8
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Residential Burg.
Rate
18.9
4.5
7.4
6.6
2.2
11.2
6.2
5.7
4.2
10.0
5.6
4.6
5.8
4.6
4.6
17.6
11.4
11.1
8.6
9.0
16.1
5.3
2.7
1.5
8.9
2.1
2.2
6.8
6.9
10.1

Foreclosure
Rate
23.8
23.1
14.8
19.7
16.4
17.3
24.4
13.0
12.7
28.0
15.6
7.3
10.1
9.9
26.9
20.6
13.9
15.8
15.4
6.5
13.3
17.4
7.3
10.7
11.1
6.3
6.5
10.5
9.9
18.3
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